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Summary
One of the vital applications for biometrics will be its ability to replace passwords or PINs
in a secure authentication system. Passwords have to be exactly the same at enrolment
and verification in order for a user to be accepted by the system. However, two biometric
samples from the same person will almost never be identical, even if taken within minutes
of each other, due to the nature of the biometric and the sampling technique. Conse-
quently, standard matching techniques that match the enrolled template with the query
template presented for verification require storage of the enrolment template. As a bio-
metric is irreplaceable, raw template storage is severely detrimental to biometric security.
The principle aim of this thesis was to implement a fingerprint minutiae-based au-
thentication system where the minutiae template is secure during storage and during
comparison. In order to achieve this, we employed ‘biocryptographic constructs’ i.e cryp-
tographic constructs that provide security of the template in spite of the error prone nature
of biometric data. It provides an implementation of a secure authentication system using
PinSketch where the templates are built from fingerprint minutiae and where the encryp-
tion process has a negligible effect on the system accuracy and clear bounds are provided
for template security. To our knowledge this is the only work that explores the design,
implementation and security issues with a set difference construct called PinSketch [24]
and presents a working solution with clear security bounds against a masquerade attack.
This thesis focuses on the fingerprint biometric. As it is one of the most popularly used
modalities in commercial systems, security issues arising in the community will affect it
first and the effects could have a negative impact on the uptake of biometrics as a whole.
We also focussed on minutiae-based templates as they are easily extracted by standard
fingerprint feature extractors and their comparison mimics the traditional method of fin-
gerprint comparison by eye.
To implement a secure minutiae-based authentication system, we first studied different
ways in which a minutiae-based template could be constructed. We chose 8 different tech-
niques to extract repeatable patterns from the spatial distribution of a set of extracted
XII
minutiae, giving rise to 8 distinct minutiae-based templates, each represented as a set of
elements from a finite universe. We tested the accuracy of a matching algorithm when
each of these template types was used.
In order to build any secure authentication system we identified four main steps to be
conducted:
1. Identification of a suitable match threshold based on a difference or commonality
based measure.
2. Quantisation of the data that comprise the templates.
3. Evaluation of the matching performance before and after use of the chosen biocryp-
tographic construct.
4. Analysis of the robustness of the secure authentication system to a masquerade
attack.
We defined a threshold for the matching algorithm that considered the cardinalities
of the sets being compared and for every template type, compared the matching perfor-
mance when our threshold was employed, to that when a fixed threshold, independent of
set sizes, was used. We also studied how the matching performance of each template type
was affected by a uniform quantisation process.
As the templates were treated as sets, the variation between templates was measured
using a set difference metric. Two biocryptographic constructs based on the set difference
metric - The Fuzzy Vault [38] and PinSketch were evaluated for their suitability to build
secure minutiae-based authentication systems. At the start of this research both these
constructs had been proposed in literature, but no information on their practicality of im-
plementation and suitability for different biometric modalities and template types existed.
The suitability of the Fuzzy Vault to protect three specific template types was first
explored. However, the Fuzzy Vault was found to be unsuitable to protect the three tem-
plate types tested, for a fundamental reason that would apply to all other template types
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considered in this thesis. We then explored the suitability of the PinSketch construct to
protect all the 8 template types. Three algorithms using the PinSketch construct were
proposed in this thesis. All three had caused some reduction in system’s matching ac-
curacy when compared to that before using the construct. When subject to a security
analysis however, two of the algorithms failed to provide security of the template due to
large natural intra sample variation between templates from the same finger. The third al-
gorithm used a two stage process and a combination of a set difference based measure and
a commonality based measure to compare two templates. This allowed some randomness
to be retained in the template types protected by this PinSketch based authentication
algorithm.
Our research demonstrated that when biometric templates possess a large intra sam-
ple variation between them, it becomes infeasible to protect them using a set difference
based construct. Our first solution, as demonstrated in the third algorithm is a two
stage process. The first stage is to identify elements of a template that themselves posses
variation, but within the limits that enable them to be protected by the construct. The
construct will then be used to securely compare these elements. The sets that comprise
these elements, which naturally have a much larger variation, will then be compared using
a commonality based measure. A possible alternative is to use an efficient commonality
based biocryptographic construct. We list the desirable characteristics of such constructs
but are not aware of the existence of any such construct to date.
The main conclusions of this thesis are:
1. Quantisation error significantly affects the matching performance of minutiae based
templates degrading the FNMR by 10− 20% across all structure types.
2. A relative matching threshold, like the the Set Difference Percentage Threshold
SDTh% and Match Percentage Threshold (MTh%), that takes set sizes into ac-
count, gives significantly better matching performance than an absolute match or
set difference threshold used across all fingerprint comparisons.
3. The ability to realise an authentication system with a Fuzzy Vault that uses Gen-
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eralised Reed Solomon decoding is limited by the amount of natural variation the
occurs between the templates being compared. A Fuzzy Vault can be realised when
samples of the same fingerprint have at least 33% of the minutiae structures in
common between them.
4. The security of a PinSketch based authentication system is also determined by the
commonality between samples of the same fingerprint. In general, the size of the
sets being compared must be greater than the maximum set difference errors that
need to be corrected for a secure system to be realised. In this thesis we successfully
develop a secure authentication system using the PinSketch construct that keeps the
template secure during storage as well as comparison at a threshold where the False
Match Rate is 0%. Such systems are primarily needed for high security applications.
5. Uniform quantisation of minutiae features in templates gives rise to templates whose
components have a non uniform distribution. This can reduce the complexity of an
attacker’s efforts to significantly less than brute force.
6. A structure representation using triangle patterns formed from a minutiae point
pattern showed potential to be used for secure pre-alignment of templates prior to
use in a cryptographic construct.
7. The basic requirements of a cryptographic construct that can securely compare non
rigid point sets with large natural variation between them are determined.
Results of the study of the feasibility of three structures for use in a Fuzzy Vault were
published in the proceedings of the Biometrics Symposium 2006 [37] and are described
in Chapter 6.1. The results on the study of the suitability of minutiae-based structures
for pre-alignment were published in the proceedings of the Biometrics Symposium 2007
[36] and are described in Chapter 6.2. The results on the design and performance of a
PinSketch based authentication system using minutiae-based templates were published in
the proceedings of the International Conference on Biometrics 2007 [8] and are described
in Chapter 7.1. The design and security analysis of an improved PinSketch based authen-
tication system has been published in the proceedings of the the Biometrics Symposium
2008 [7] and is described in Chapters 7.2 and 8.2.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of Research and Thesis Outline
The aim of this research is to investigate the feasibility of constructing a biometric au-
thentication system where the biometric template is protected at the time of storage and
at the time of matching. Most existing biometric authentication systems store their tem-
plate securely using an encryption function. However, in order to perform matching, the
enrolled template must be decrypted. It is at this point that the authentication system is
most vulnerable as the entire enrolled template is exposed. A biometric is irreplaceable if
compromised. It can also reveal sensitive information about an individual. If biometric
systems are taken up widely, the template could also be used as an individual’s digital
identifier. Compromise in that case, violates an individual’s right to privacy as their
transactions in all systems where they used that compromised biometric can be tracked.
This thesis aims to address this problem by studying cryptographic constructs that
allow the enrolled template to be stored and compared securely. We particularly focus on
the fingerprint biometric as it is one of the most popular biometric modalities currently
used in commercial systems. In particular we study the suitability of fingerprint tem-
plates built from the locations and orientations of fingerprint minutiae to be protected by
such cryptographic constructs. Comparison of minutiae location and orientation mimics
how fingerprints were traditionally matched by eye. In addition, minutiae information
is commonly available from standard commercial feature extractors thus eliminating the
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need for any specialist hardware to realise the authentication system and hence promoting
inter-system compatibility.
This thesis studies two cryptographic constructs developed from Error Tolerant Cryp-
tography for secure comparison of templates, the Fuzzy Vault and PinSketch (Fuzzy
Extractor) systems. Minutiae-based templates are represented so that they can be incor-
porated into these cryptographic constructs. The cryptographic constructs described for
use in the secure comparison process assume that the fingerprint templates are pre-aligned.
The research presented in this thesis is an attempt to establish a secure fingerprint based
authentication system by exploring two possible approaches to handle the translation and
rotation induced variation between templates:
1. Securely store and compare the fingerprint templates without the need for any
pre-alignment or pre-processing of multiple templates. In order to do this we use
translation and rotation invariant minutiae-based structures to build the fingerprint
templates used in secure matching algorithms. We call this the Structure based
Matching Approach. It is studied in depth in Chapters 6 and 7.
2. Create pre-alignment information from the the enrolled fingerprint that helps the
query pre-align with the enrolled template without revealing too much information
about the enrolled template. In this case pre-alignment of the query will precede
the secure comparison process. To do this we use a few of the minutiae based
structures to perform pre-alignment of the two templates being compared and then
use standard minutia based templates in a matching algorithm. We call this the
Pre-Alignment based Matching Approach. This is explored in Chapter 6.
Minutiae based matching can be viewed as a a non rigid point pattern matching prob-
lem. Such issues have been faced by astronomers in matching planetary positions and
geospatial engineers in identifying geographical sites [48]. Thus the results of this re-
search can be easily extended to benefit these disciplines when the non rigid comparison
must also be done securely.
The main research questions asked in this thesis are:
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1. How does quantisation affect the matching accuracy for minutiae-based templates?
2. Using public databases as samples of the population, what percentage of minutia
are in common between intra user templates?
3. Are there minutia representation schemes that have a great degree of distinctiveness
so as to achieve a good error performance?
4. Is it possible to construct secure authentication systems by storing minimal infor-
mation for pre-alignment?
5. Is it feasible to use minutiae-based translation and rotation invariant structures to
build practical secure fingerprint based authentication systems?
6. What bio-cryptographic constructs are more suitable for minutiae-based represen-
tations?
7. What is the minutia feature distribution across the whole sample? Are there minu-
tiae features that occur more often than others across the population?
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the concept of authentication
and explains the notion of Secure Biometric Authentication. It also introduces some key
terminology used in the field of Biometric Authentication. Chapter 2 describes the prin-
cipal mathematical concepts that are used throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 illustrates
the error tolerant cryptographic constructs studied in this thesis and explains the math-
ematical theory behind them. Chapter 4 introduces the minutiae based representations
studied in this thesis. Chapter 5 investigates the effect of quantisation on the accuracy of
the matching process for the templates built from each of the representation techniques.
Chapter 6 analyses the suitability of minutiae-based structures for use directly in a Fuzzy
Vault and for use in secure pre-alignment prior to secure comparison. Chapter 7 describes
the design, implementation and testing of authentication systems based on the PinSketch
construct for the different minutiae-based templates. Chapter 8 analyses the security and
practicality of the PinSketch constructs described in Chapter 7. The thesis concludes
with a summary of our observations and contributions and the directions of our future
work.
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1.2 Authentication
Authentication of an individual is the process of verifying if a person really is who he or
she claims to be. In today’s world an average person would authenticate themself to a
central entity several times a day in order to perform a range of tasks from routine email
to more high security applications like banking. Authentication works in two stages. The
first stage is called enrolment where a user enrols with an organization by presenting a
token and the enrolment process generates an identifier, which is a value derived from the
token which will help to verify the user’s identity to the organization. The second stage is
called verification where a person presents themself to the organization claiming to be a
validly enrolled user. The organization, using the token provided by the person, computes
a value called a query which is compared to the identifier of the user whose identity is
claimed. If the query matches the identifier, the person is accepted as the validly enrolled
user that they claim to be and the authentication is successful.
An ideal authentication token will have the following characteristics:
• Security: Hard for an attacker to acquire
• Ease: Easy for the user to produce
• Revocability : Easy to revoke if compromised
• Reusability/Versatility : Capable of creating multiple versions for different organi-
sations
• Non Transferability : Hard for the user to share the token with other people. A non
transferable token is also non repudiable.
As most authentication situations would not require all the above characteristics, good
authentication tokens need only have a large number of them.
The three main tokens that a person can authenticate himself by are:
1. something that he knows
2. something that he has
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3. something intrinsic.
Passwords and PINs are the most common authentication mechanisms of the first type.
The advantage is that if they are chosen well and remembered, they can be an extremely
secure, versatile and easily revocable means of authentication. However, not all pass-
words or PINs are strong (hard for an attacker to guess) and strong passwords or PINs
are likely to be hard to remember. In addition, it is quite hard for a person to remember
several strong passwords for different applications. This causes users of password based
authentication systems to store their ‘strong’ passwords in a physical location or use one
password for all their applications both of which undermine the true strength of a strong
password. A password is also quite easy to share. Hence a user can easily share his access
with un-authorised entities or deny being involved in a previous transaction.
The second mechanism involves presenting a physical token like a smartcard which
stores a strong password or PIN. The advantage of this mechanism is that the user does
not have to remember the strong passwords and therefore the token is easy to produce
when necessary. However, physical tokens can be lost or stolen by an attacker. In such
situations, most tokens can be effortlessly revoked and a new one reissued. A serious
drawback of physical tokens is that they can be easily shared and hence are not the best
way to bind a transaction reliably to a user.
The third mechanism is biometric authentication where a person is authenticated by
using something that he is. A biometric is a measure of a biological character or trait
which could either be a physical feature of the person or a behavioral feature. The most
important advantage is that it is easy for the user to produce since there is no need to
remember or carry anything. This token is not usually transferable. As many of the
commonly used biometrics are external features of the body, they are not secret and can
be acquired quite easily by an attacker. Although some biometrics are easier for an at-
tacker to acquire than others, spoofing, an attack mechanism whereby an attacker tries
to masquerade as a valid user, is an issue that all biometric authentication systems must
guard against. A biometric is not easily replaced if compromised, as a user has only a
finite number of alternatives. A biometric by itself is also not reusable across various
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organisations without the danger of the organisations colluding to violate the individual’s
right of privacy.
As a biometric is the only token which is non transferable, it is desirable to design sys-
tems which can generate for each user, biometric tokens which are revocable and reusable.
Realisation of such practical systems is one of the goals of our research.
1.2.1 Biometrics for Authentication
Biometrics that are commonly used for authentication can be classified into physiological
and behavioral. Physiological biometrics are features of the human body like fingerprint
pattern, face, voice, hand and finger geometry and iris. Behavioral biometrics measure a
person’s behavior established over time and common examples are signature, keystroke
dynamics and gait. Several new and innovative biometrics are currently being researched
for their suitability as an authentication or identification measure. Examples are ear lobe
geometry [72], vein pattern [71], palm pattern [31], tongue pattern [76] and human heart-
beat [10].
The characteristics that a biometric must have for it to be accepted as an authentica-
tion measure are [55]:
1. Uniqueness: The biometric measurements obtained from each person must be indi-
vidual enough to authenticate each person reliably at a later stage.
2. Ease of Use: It must be easy for the user to provide a valid biometric measurement.
3. Non-Invasiveness: The biometric measurement process must encroach as little as
possible into a user’s privacy and must not cause the user any discomfort.
4. Time to get Habituated: It must take the users a short time to be trained and
become comfortable with using the biometric for authenticating themselves.
5. Technology Maturity: The biometric technology must be well studied and tested in
the market for a long time.
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FINGERPRINT FACE VOICE IRIS
Uniqueness 3 2 1 4
Ease of Use 4 3 2 1
Non-Invasiveness 2 3.5 3.5 1
Time to Get Habituated 4 2.5 2.5 1
Technology Maturity 4 2.5 2.5 1
Technology Cost 4 2.5 2.5 1
Universality and Feasibility 4 1.5 3 1.5
Total Rank 25 17.5 17 10.5
Table 1.1: Comparison of Four Most Common Biometrics (derived from [55])
6. Technology Cost: It is desirable that the biometric system have minimal installation
and maintenance costs.
7. Universality of the feature and Feasibility of Deployment: Universality refers to
the presence of the feature in most of the human population. Feasibility relates to
the suitability of a biometric for a specific application. The required proximity of
the user to the capturing device, the enrolment time needed, the inconvenience to
the user, the failure to enrol due to human and environment factors, the failure to
capture a good image of the biometric and the percentage of the enrolling population
missing the biometric are all factors that determine which biometric to use for
particular applications.
The author of [55] compared four of the most commonly used biometrics - finger, face,
voice and iris against the above characteristics. A relative score for each biometric, derived
from that comparison, (1 for the lowest score, 4 for the highest score and ranks were split
in case of a tie) appears in Table 1.1. The final row sums the total relative rank of each
biometric. The table shows that the fingerprint biometric significantly scores over other
technologies in technology maturity, feasibility of deployment, ease of use and time to get
habituated and is considered by many as the most suited for biometric authentication.
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1.2.2 Key Biometric Terminology
The schematic of a typical Biometric Authentication system is shown in Figure 1.1. It
depicts the basic components of the enrolment and verification stages of the authentication
process. A brief explanation of each component (and their abbreviations used in the figure)
is given below.
1. Biometric Sample (BS) : This the raw sample of the biometric that is presented
at enrolment or verification. It is also called Biometric Data [1].
2. Acquisition Device (AD) :This is the equipment used to capture the Biometric
Sample. The acquisition devices are obviously different for different biometrics. Ex-
amples include scanners (capacitance, thermal, optical), cameras and microphones.
3. Feature Extractor (FE) : This is an algorithm that identifies and extracts the
salient features of a biometric sample acquired by the acquisition device.
4. Template Generation Algorithm (TGA) : It is an algorithm that constructs a
mathematical model of the biometric features extracted by the Feature Extractor.
Usually the Template Generation Algorithm and the Feature Extractor are housed
in the same equipment.
5. Template (T) : A digital representation of the Biometric Sample is called a Bio-
metric Template. It is the output of the Template Generation Algorithm.
6. Identifier (I) : The identifier for a biometric authentication system will either be
the template itself or something derived from the template. It is stored in a database
(DB) which may be public, or shared.
7. Matcher : This is the entity that compares the query (Q) determined during
verification with the identifier generated at enrolment to generate a Match Score
(MS). The Match Score measures the degree of similarity between the query and
the identifier.
8. Threshold (Th) : This is the minimumMatch Score between a query and identifier
for the biometric presented at verification to be successfully authenticated. If the
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Match Score calculated by the matcher falls below the threshold, the authentication
is deemed unsuccessful. The most important aspect of a biometric authentication
system is setting the Threshold at a value such that with a very high probability,
samples of a biometric from the same person will acquire match scores at or above
the threshold (to be successfully authenticated) and samples of the biometric from
different people will acquire match scores below the threshold (to be unsuccessful
at authentication).
9. Authenticator : This is the entity that permits or denies access to a resource
based on the success or failure respectively of the authentication process.
Biometric
      at
Enrolment
  Biometric
      at
Verification
AD
AD
BS
BS
FE
TGA
Enrolled Template 
T I
DB
VerificationTemplate 
T Q
Matcher
FE
TGA
Authenticator
      Is 
MS >= Th?
Y
N
Authentication Success
Authentication Failure
Th
MS
I
Key:
AD: Acquistion Device
BS: Biometric Sample
FE: Feature Extractor
TGA: Template Generation Algorithm
T: Template
I: Identifier
Q: Query
DB: Database
MS: MatchScore
Th: Threshold
Figure 1.1: Block diagram of a Biometric Authentication System
1.2.3 Accuracy Constraints when Matching Biometrics
An important characteristic of biometrics is that no two samples of the same biometric
are exactly the same. Even if the samples are taken from a user at successive instants of
time, there are bound to be some differences in the extracted features and resulting tem-
plates due to environmental and human factors altering the capture condition. Instead of
checking for an exact match, a biometric matcher will usually calculate the level of simi-
larity, called Match Score, between the templates and compare this level to a predefined
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threshold to make an authentication decision. The threshold will be set so that it permits
a certain degree of variation between two samples of the same biometric. However, this
flexibility may cause biometric samples from different people to be considered a match.
Conversely, if two samples from the same person vary by an amount greater than that
compensated for by the threshold, the two samples will fail to match. The variable nature
of the biometric sample causes two kinds of errors while making an authentication decision.
False Match : When comparing an identifier and query that are obtained from bio-
metric samples of different people, if the comparison generates a match score at or higher
than the Threshold of the authenticating system the two different biometric samples will
be declared a match and the person presenting the query will be falsely authenticated
(falsely matched) as the enrolled person who generated the identifier.
False Non Match : When comparing an identifier and query that are obtained from
the biometric sample of the same person, if the comparison generates a match score lower
than the Threshold, the biometric samples will be declared a Non Match and the person
presenting the query will falsely fail to be authenticated (falsely not matched) by the
authentication system.
The matching accuracy of a biometric authentication system is measured by the False
Match Rate (FMR), which is the probability that two different people will be falsely con-
sidered to be a match by the system and the False Non Match Rate (FNMR), which is the
probability that a valid user will be unable to authenticate himself using the system. An
accurate system endeavors to have a low FMR and FNMR. However, the variability of the
biometric data causes most systems to trade off between the two. A strict threshold will
decrease the FMR but increase the FNMR while a lenient threshold decreases the FNMR
and increases the FMR. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is the error rate at the threshold
where the FMR and FNMR are equal. A good biometric authentication system will have
a low EER. Often accuracy focussed systems are operated at the Equal Error Threshold
to ensure that there is equal probability of either error occurring. In security focussed
systems on the other hand, the system will be operated at thresholds where the FMR is
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very low (causing a higher probability of a false non match). In certain other systems
where user convenience is a high priority, the system will be operated at thresholds where
the FNMR is very low (causing a higher probability of a false match). Thus, the threshold
must be set at a level that is appropriate for the application for which the authentication
system is deployed.
The characteristics of a matching algorithm can be graphically described using a Re-
ceiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve [16]. The ROC curve is a plot of the FNMR
against the FMR for different operating thresholds. It very clearly shows the tradeoff
between the FMR and FNMR for an authentication system. The ROC curve can also be
defined as the plot of the Genuine Acceptance Rate (GAR) against the FMR [34]. In this
thesis we have chosen the former definition.
1.3 The Fingerprint Biometric
The biometric used to build authentication systems in this thesis is the fingerprint. The
fingerprint biometric, as seen from Table 1.1, has the most mature technology and has
a high user acceptance rating. In addition, it is nearly universal, i.e. there is a very
low probability that a user will not have a fingerprint for enrolment. It is also one of
the easiest biometrics for the user to present to an authenticating system. It was the
most common biometric used by commercial system vendors in 2006 [5] and its pop-
ularity is gaining momentum due to its incorporation into commercial equipment like
laptops, mobile phones and PDAs. The algorithms developed in this thesis all pertain to
the fingerprint biometric but the concepts can very easily be extended to other biometrics.
The fingerprint biometric sample is a reproduction of the surface of the finger placed
on the scanner during image capture. The image will be the pattern of ridges and valleys
on the finger surface and this pattern is not affected by superficial burns or abrasions "....
and the original pattern is duplicated in any new skin that grows" [35]. The ridge pat-
tern creates the distinguishing features of a fingerprint which are identified at three levels.
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Figure 1.2: Examples of Fingerprints in Five Fingerprint Categories
At a global level, the ridges tend to form shapes characterized by regions of high cur-
vature and numerous ridge terminations. These regions are termed Singularities and are
of three types - deltas, whorls and loops. The position and number of these singularities
have traditionally been used to classify a fingerprint into one of the five broad fingerprint
categories- Left Loop, Right Loop, Whorl, Arch and Tented Arch. Another global feature
in a fingerprint is the Core. Jain and Maltoni [35] define the core as "the center of the
north most loop type singularity". Often the core is used as a reference point to align
two fingerprints prior to matching. However, fingerprints that are classified as Archs and
Tented Archs do not possess loops. In such cases the point of maximum curvature is
chosen as the core.
Figure 1.2 shows examples of fingerprints for each of the five categories. Images (a),(b)
and (c) are from the fingerprint images used in the 2002 Fingerprint Verification Compe-
tition [3]. Images (d) and (e) are from the website of the New South Wales Police [23].
The Core and Singularities are useful to classify fingerprints but are not discriminating
enough to match two fingerprints. The second level of features that are used for feature
based fingerprint matching (described next) requires comparison of fingerprint features at
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a local level. The ridge patterns are not always smooth. The location where a ridge line
breaks or ends its path is called a Ridge Termination. Alternately the ridge could split
into two paths and this feature is called a Ridge Bifurcation. These local ridge features
are called Minutiae. Although a few other minutiae have been identified [6], the termi-
nations and bifurcations are the most common minutiae types used in commercial systems.
The third level of features are minute details of the ridges like the contour, shape,
width and the pattern of the sweat pores along the ridges. These features were used by
Jain et al [33] to increase the accuracy of matching over plain minutiae and ridge feature
based matching.
As mentioned previously, a number of environmental and human factors cause the
fingerprint image captured at enrolment and verification from the same person, to vary. A
fingerprint matcher must take into account all these factors when matching two fingerprint
samples. There are three commonly used matching techniques [35]:
1. Correlation-based Matching: The fingerprint images are compared by measuring the
correlation between the intensities of corresponding pixels in the two images after
alignment.
2. Minutiae-based Matching: The most common out of the three matching techniques,
it involves extracting the local features, i.e. minutiae, from an image using a Fea-
ture Extractor. For each minutia, the most common characteristics computed are
its two dimensional position coordinates in the scanner’s reference frame, the ridge
orientation of the ridge which terminates or bifurcates, the minutia type, the ridge
frequency around the minutia and minutia quality. The set of minutiae charac-
teristics extracted from the two images are compared to determine a measure of
similarity between the two images.
3. Ridge feature-based Matching: These techniques use characteristics of the ridge like
orientation, ridge frequency, shape and texture to compare two fingerprint images.
This research uses minutiae-based matching to evaluate the similarity between two
fingerprint samples. The template extracted from each fingerprint image will consist
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mainly of either the minutiae characteristics themselves or information derived from the
minutiae characteristics. In most applications the template is built on each minutia’s
position and ridge orientation with respect to the scanner’s reference frame. Variation
in the fingerprint sample acquired by the scanner at different capture instances and the
performance of the Feature Extraction algorithm will cause the following variations in the
minutia-based template extracted by the Feature Extractor.
• Variation in the position coordinates of the minutiae due to translation, rotation
and non linear distortion of the fingerprint image.
• Variation in the ridge orientation extracted at each minutia location due to trans-
lation, rotation and non linear distortion of the fingerprint image.
• Insertion of spurious minutiae when the Feature Extractor falsely identifies ridge
terminations or bifurcations.
• Failure of the Feature Extractor to detect valid minutiae due to poor image quality.
The last two variations are caused by dirt on the fingertip or scanner, mild abrasions on
the skin of the fingertip, change in skin texture (wet or dry) and poor quality images. If the
template incorporates the location and ridge orientation of the core, additional variation
can be introduced as experience shows that feature extraction algorithms struggle to
locate the core position accurately.
1.4 Secure Biometric Authentication
In the early days of biometric authentication systems, the digital template generated at
enrolment was used as the identifier. Vendors believed that the template creation was a
one-way process and that it was not possible to recreate the original biometric sample
from the template. However Ross et. al. in [57], [58] demonstrated that it was possible to
recreate a fingerprint image that was visually close to the original, by using information in
the template. Their reconstructed images gave a reasonable performance when compared
using a matcher in an authentication system. This has some serious implications in terms
of vulnerability to a masquerade attack (spoofing) and privacy violation.
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Secure Biometric Authentication is defined as a method of authentication using infor-
mation from a biometric as an identifier, where the identifier does not reveal the original
template or the identity of the enrolled user. The requirement for Secure Biometric Au-
thentication stems from the following considerations:
• A biometric is irreplaceable. If the digital template is compromised or stolen by an
attacker the user has very limited choice for a replacement. The digital template is
akin to a user’s identity in the digital domain and must be strongly protected.
• Biometrics measure characteristics of the human body. Hence they may reveal
sensitive information that the user is entitled to keep private.
• If the digital template is used to reconstruct a reasonable image of the original bio-
metric, the identity of the user can be determined by a third party. This violates
the privacy of the transaction between the user and the authenticating organiza-
tion. In addition, a third party could track all the biometric-based authentication
transactions that a user conducts with various organizations and compile a dossier
on the user’s associations. This is in violation of an individual’s right to privacy.
• Most envisaged applications where biometrics will play a key role (government ap-
plications, banks) will require that the data be stored for several years. It is even
more imperative in such cases to have an identifier that is cryptographically and
information theoretically secure against compromise as the attacker will be able to
launch attacks on the identifier for an indefinite amount of time.
Traditional (non-biometric) authentication systems protect the identifier by applying
a one way transform and storing the transformed or hashed identifier in a public database.
At verification, the query is also subjected the same one way transform and the trans-
formed query is compared with the transformed identifier stored in the database. If they
match exactly, the authentication is successful. Cryptographic one way transforms are
designed such that even slight variations in the input result in large and unpredictable
variations in the output. This implies that the identifier and query inputs to the one
way transform at enrolment and verification must be exactly the same for successful au-
thentication. The same principle cannot be applied to identifiers derived from biometric
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templates as inherent variation in the biometric sample due to human and environmental
factors at capture causes the enrolled template and hence the derived identifier to vary
from the verification template and its derived query.
From the above argument it is clear that conventional cryptography requiring equal-
ity of inputs at enrolment and verification cannot be directly used to protect biometric
templates. Research in solving this problem uses concepts from Error Tolerant Cryptog-
raphy where the query derived from the biometric template at verification is treated as
an error prone password. If the permissible errors in a valid password (in this case, the
identifier obtained at enrolment) can be modeled and corrected by error correcting codes,
then a standard error correction procedure can be applied to correct the errors in the
query so that it will be exactly equal to the identifier obtained at enrolment. In such a
scenario, the identifier can be protected using a cryptographic one way transform during
enrolment. At verification, the same one way transform can be applied to the query after
error correction. Then comparison of the transformed identifier with the corrected and
transformed query can be performed to make an authentication decision.
This is the basis of several proposed cryptographic constructs detailed in Chapter 3.
These constructs make innovative use of standard error correcting codes to correct limited
errors in a query without revealing too much information about the enrolled biometric,
hence protecting the biometric templates during error correction and comparison.
The significant issue in using these constructs, also termed bio-cryptographic constructs
due to their application to biometrics, is the modeling of the errors between the enrolled
and query template. Different biometrics suffer from different types of errors. In our
research we focus on the fingerprint biometric and the errors that can occur between
fingerprint templates obtained from samples of the same finger. We seek to model these
errors and identify the appropriate bio-cryptographic construct to correct these errors
securely.
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Chapter 2
Background Theory: Tools to Build
the Prototypes
This chapter highlights the theoretical concepts which form the building blocks of bio-
metrics based authentication systems investigated as part of this research. The chapter
begins with an introduction to metrics as a measure of distance and moves on to the
concept of error tolerant cryptography. The chapter then illustrates the principle of error
correcting codes and introduces basic linear algebra used in Coding Theory. It ends with
a description of linear block codes, polynomial and cyclic codes and BCH codes.
2.1 Metric Spaces
If S is a set and d : S × S → R is a function such that the following properties hold for
each a, b, c ∈ S [60]:
1. Positive Property: d(a, b) ≥ 0 and has equality if and only if a = b,
2. Symmetric Property: d(a, b) = d(b, a),
3. Triangle Inequality: d(a, b) ≤ d(a, c) + d(c, b),
then d is called a metric on the set S and (S, d) forms a metric space.
The most common metric over the set of Real vectors is the Euclidean distance metric
d : Rn × Rn → R. If a = (a1, a2, ....an) and b = (b1, b2, ...bn) are two Real vectors in n
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dimensions, the Euclidean distance between them is defined as
d(a, b) =
√
(a1 − b1)2 + (a2 − b2)2 + .....+ (an − bn)2. (2.1)
Most binary error correcting codes are defined over the Hamming metric. The Ham-
ming metric, or Hamming distance, named after its inventor Richard Hamming [30], is
defined over Fn2 , the space of all binary vectors of length n. Let W : Fn2 → N de-
note the Weight function, that is, W (x) is the number of non zero bits in x. Therefore
0 ≤ W (x) ≤ n. Let d : Fn2 × Fn2 → N denote the Hamming metric. Let a = (a1, a2, ..., an)
and b = (b1, b2, ..., bn) be two vectors from Fn2 . The Hamming distance between a and b is
defined by
d(a, b) = W (a− b) = W ((a1 − b1, a2 − b2, ..., an − bn)). (2.2)
The set difference metric measures the distance between two finite sets drawn from a
universe that could be finite or infinite. Let U be the universal set, assumed here to be
finite, from which the elements of the sets are drawn and let |U | denote its cardinality.
Let S denote the set of all subsets of U . Let A and B be any two elements of S. The
relative complement of B in A is denoted by
A\B = {x ∈ A|x /∈ B}.
Similarly, the relative complement of A in B is:
B\A = {x ∈ B|x /∈ A}.
The symmetric difference between A and B, denoted by A ª B, is a set of elements
defined as the the union of the relative complements, i.e.
AªB = A\B ∪B\A = {x ∈ A,B|x /∈ A ∩B} (2.3)
where ∩ denotes set intersection. Let SD : S × S → N denote the set difference metric
over S. The set difference metric between two sets A,B ∈ S is defined as the cardinality
of the symmetric difference between A and B i.e.
SD(A,B) = |AªB|. (2.4)
The set difference metric can be mapped to the Hamming metric by representing each
set as its characteristic vector, a binary vector of length equal to |U | in which each bit
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position is indexed by an element of U . The characteristic vector of a set has 1s in only
those locations corresponding to the elements in the set. As a result of the characteristic
vector representation, a set difference of t between two sets corresponds to a Hamming
distance of t between the corresponding characteristic vectors.
2.2 Error Tolerant Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of protecting information from being used or altered by un-
authorised parties [70]. Cryptographic algorithms are mathematical algorithms that help
in this protection. One area where cryptographic algorithms are applied is to protect the
identifier in an authentication system. As explained in Chapter 1, authentication is a
process that allows one entity (the authenticator) to verify the identity of another entity
(the claimant) by comparing the identifier generated by the user at enrolment with the
query presented by the user when verification is required. The security and integrity of
the identifier can be achieved using traditional cryptographic algorithms in two distinct
ways, both of which present significant drawbacks when applied to inherently error prone
identifiers.
In the first method, the identifier can be encrypted using a symmetric key encryption
scheme and stored for later use in a database. At the verification stage, the same secret
key will be used to decrypt the identifier when it needs to be used for comparison with the
query. The main drawback of this method is the security vulnerability of the identifier
when it is decrypted at verification. If the encrypting and decrypting key is generated
and stored by the system, the secured identifier will be decrypted to perform comparison
at any verification attempt. This leaves the identifier insecure as any random query will
cause it to be available in un-encrypted form. As an alternative, if the key is a password
provided by the user, then the security of the system is determined by the strength of the
user’s password. In addition, requiring the user to remember a password undermines the
advantage of using biometrics i.e. not needing to remember or carry any token.
The second and most common technique is to protect the identifier using a one-way
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transform like a cryptographic hash and store only the transformed version of the iden-
tifier. A cryptographic hash function derives its security from the fact that it is compu-
tationally easy to transform a message into the message digest (i.e output of the hash
function) but computationally hard to recover the message if given the message digest. In
this approach, the query will be transformed by the same hash function used to protect
the identifier and the digests of the identifier and query will be compared to make an
authentication decision. This method ensures that the identifier is never stored or used in
the clear (un-encrypted), thus overcoming the security disadvantage of the first method.
Such one way transforms are useful when a true claimant can generate a query that is ex-
actly identical to the identifier they generated at enrolment. Therefore, this is not suitable
for error prone tokens that vary every time they are presented at enrolment or verification.
Many real-life authentication scenarios use tokens (identifier or query) for which ex-
act replication is not possible. Below are a few examples (definitely not exhaustive) of
authentication tokens that tend to vary at enrolment and verification.
• When using very long passwords as the token, the user may forget or mistype a
few characters during verification. In such a scenario it is desirable to be able to
authenticate successfully despite the limited number of errors.
• When using a personal entropy authentication system (i.e. the user is asked several
questions about themselves and the answers are used to construct the identifier or
query), slight variation in the answers from a genuine user may occur and we must
still be able to generate a query that is identical to the identifier. Such a system
was proposed in [25].
• Authentication in a biometric system where even two instances of the same biometric
taken in successive instants will tend to have limited variation between them. Thus
tokens generated from genuine biometric measurements from the same user are
similar but never the same.
• Authentication using methods that strengthen passwords. For example, using sketches
instead of characters or passwords incorporating typing rhythm. These methods
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must compensate for the inability of humans to reproduce drawings and movements
exactly when generating identifiers and queries.
In all the above cases the query obtained from a genuine claimant in the verifica-
tion stage can be treated as if the uncorrupted identifier were passing through a noisy
channel before reaching the authenticator. In communication theory noisy messages are
corrected using Error Correcting Codes. The type of code used depends on the type of
error produced in the channel. Error Tolerant Cryptography is an area of study where
cryptographic security is sought from tokens that vary to limited degrees, by using error
correcting codes to model and correct the errors in the query so that it exactly resembles
the identifier. If such correction is possible, error prone inputs can be used in a secure
authentication system as follows. On enrolment, the generated identifier can be stored
securely by encrypting it with a hash function. In addition some identifier related infor-
mation is made publicly available to help with error correction at the verification stage.
This public information however, must not compromise the identifier. At the time of
verification, the error prone query, after it is corrected with the help of the public infor-
mation associated with the enrolled identifier and the appropriate Error Correcting Code,
can be encrypted by the same one-way transform or hash function used at enrolment. If
the errors in the query were successfully corrected by the chosen Code, then the corrected
query will be identical to the identifier. Hence, the digests of the identifier and corrected
query will be exactly the same and a successful authentication can be recorded without
having to store the identifier in the clear. Tuyls et al in [67] give a good exposition on
achieving security with noisy data.
2.3 Error Correcting Codes
Error Correcting Codes are combinatorial structures used for reliable transfer of informa-
tion over a communication channel [29]. The basic principle of Error Correcting Codes
is to append redundant information to the message being transmitted so that this redun-
dant information can be used at the receiving end to recover the transmitted message in
spite of errors during transmission. A communication channel is the term used to denote
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the medium through which the message is transmitted. Every communication channel by
virtue of its physical characteristics, introduces errors (noise) in the information trans-
mitted through it.
A binary channel is a medium through which binary messages are transmitted. The
errors in a binary channel will cause a 0 bit to be flipped to a 1 and vice versa. One of
the most common models for a binary communications channel is the Binary Symmetric
Channel (BSC). The properties of a BSC are:
1. If a bit is transmitted, then a bit is received i.e. no bits are lost in transmission and
the order of transmission is preserved.
2. An error occurs in a bit with a probability p, called the crossover probability of the
channel. The symmetric property of this channel implies that the probability of
an error occurring in a transmitted 0 and 1 is the same. This means that p is the
probability of receiving a 1 when a 0 bit was sent and vice versa. Also 0 ≤ p ≤ 1
2
and will be quite small for a good channel.
The channel Capacity was defined by Claude Shannon in [62] as the maximum units
of information per unit time that can be sent reliably over the channel. Shannon proved
in [62] that it is possible to transmit a message reliably over a channel at a rate (number
of information bits per unit time) below the channel capacity. The question of how best
to achieve such reliable transmission was left as an open question and it spawned the field
of Coding Theory.
The following are some of the basic terms used in Coding Theory. For more details
see [52].
• Message: This is the original information that we wish to transmit reliably over a
channel.
• Encode: This is a process by which redundant information is added to a message to
assist with error correction. Let M denote the set of messages that would be sent
over a channel. The encoding process is symbolised by a function E which maps
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each element m of the set M to an information string c containing the original
message m and its redundant information.
• Codeword: This is a string c resulting from the encoding process.
• Code: The set of all the codewords obtained from all possible messages when encoded
is the Code. This is usually denoted by C. Thus the encoding function is a bĳection
from the set M to the set C i.e. E :M → C.
• Decode: This is a function which deterministically or probabilistically maps the
received codeword to a valid message. It essentially performs the inverse operation
to the Encoding function. Let D denote the decoding function, then D : C →M .
• Distance of a Code: The distance or minimum distance is the minimum separation
between two codewords in a Code under some metric. For the binary codes that are
used for binary messages, Hamming distance is the usual metric employed.
It is common to consider messages as a block of symbols from some alphabet [52]. In
this research we mainly deal with codes for messages built from the binary alphabet (0
and 1) which need to to transmitted bit by bit over a BSC.
All Coding Theory computation is performed using certain algebraic structures, hence
a brief introduction of basic algebra is provided in the following section.
2.4 Groups, Rings and Fields
A non empty set G is said to be a group under the binary operation ∗, if for all a, b, c ∈ G
the following properties are satisfied:
• The group is closed under the operation ∗ i.e. a ∗ b ∈ G.
• The group is associative under the operation ∗ i.e. (a ∗ b) ∗ c = a ∗ (b ∗ c).
• There exists a (unique) element e ∈ G called the identity element such that a ∗ e =
e ∗ a = a.
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• For every element a ∈ G there is a (unique) element x ∈ G called the inverse of a
such that a ∗ x = x ∗ a = e.
If the above conditions are satisfied (G, ∗) is said to be a group.
In addition to the above conditions if the group is commutative under ∗ i.e. for any
a, b ∈ G, a ∗ b = b ∗ a, then (G, ∗) is said to be an Abelian group.
A non empty set R is said to be a ring under two binary operations + (addition) and
× (multiplication) if ∀a, b, c ∈ R the following conditions hold:
• (R,+) forms an Abelian group (with the identity element denoted by 0 and the
inverse of any element a denoted by −a).
• The set is closed under the multiplication operation i.e. a× b ∈ R.
• The set is associative under multiplication i.e. a× (b× c) = (a× b)× c.
• Multiplication is distributive over addition i.e. a × (b + c) = (a × b) + (a × c) and
(b+ c)× a = (b× a) + (c× a).
The ring R under addition and multiplication is denoted by (R,+,×).
A non empty set F is said to be a field under two binary operations + (addition) and
× (multiplication) if
• (F,+,×) is a ring and
• (F∗,×) forms an Abelian group, where F∗ denotes the set of all non zero elements in
F. The identity element is denoted by 1 and the inverse of any element a is denoted
by a−1.
Finite Fields Fq, also called Galois Fields GF (q), can only be defined over sets of
cardinality q = pn where p is a prime and n ∈ N. The simplest finite field is the binary
field F2 with elements {0, 1} with the operations of modulo 2 addition and multiplication.
If Fq is a finite field and β ∈ Fq is an element such that all the non zero elements of
the field can be represented as some power of beta (i.e. for any non zero element α ∈ Fq,
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α = βk, where k is an integer), beta is called the primitive element of the finite field Fq.
If F is a field, (V,+) is an Abelian Group under addition and if a scalar multiplication
is defined for each element of V by each element of F on the left such that ∀a, b ∈ F and
u,v ∈ V the following conditions are satisfied,
• The set V is closed over scalar multiplication i.e. av ∈ V .
• The scalar multiplication is associative i.e. ab(u) = a(bu).
• The scalar multiplication is distributive over addition i.e. a(u+ v) = au+ av.
• Addition is distributive over scalar multiplication i.e. (a+ b)u = au+ bu.
• The identity property of scalar multiplication holds i.e. 1u = u1 = u where 1 is the
identity element of F.
then, V is said to be a vector space over F.
A subset V1 of a vector space V over F is a vector subspace of V if V1 is itself a vector
space over F under the same multiplication operation.
A subset {v1,v2, ...,vk} of k elements of V is said to span V if all linear combinations
of the k elements generate the entire set of elements in V [56]. This is denoted as:
span(v1,v2, ...,vk) = {f1v1 + f2v2 + .....+ fkvk; f1, f2, ...., fk ∈ F}. (2.5)
The elements v1,v2, ...,vk of V are said to be linearly independent if for any f1, f2, ...., fk ∈
F
f1v1 + f2v2 + .....+ fkvk = 0
has no non-trivial solution.
If a subset {v1,v2, ...,vk} of k elements of V spans V and its elements are linearly
independent, then this subset is called a basis for the vector space V , and V is called a
k-dimensional vector space over F, denoted by dim(V ) = k.
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A point to note is that if F is a field and n is a non-zero natural number then Fn, the
set of all n-tuples over F, will be a vector space over F.
An Extension Field E of a field F is a field that contains the field F as a subfield [45].
The extension field will be a vector space over F. For any prime power q and any integers
m and n such that m ≤ n, the field Fqn will be an extension field of the field Fqm if and
only if m divides n. The extension field will have dimension n
m
. An extension field could
also have an infinite dimension.
A polynomial whose coefficients are from F is said to be a polynomial over F. For such
a polynomial, if its roots cannot be found in the field F, it is said to be irreducible over F.
An extension field E can be constructed as a vector space over F so that an irreducible
polynomial over F will have roots in E. If F is finite and the polynomial has degree d,
then E will have dimension d .
If E is an extension field over F and an element α ∈ E exists such that it is the root
of at least one irreducible polynomial over F, then the minimal polynomial, φ(x), of α is
the smallest degree monic polynomial over F such that φ(α) = 0. φ(x) is irreducible over
F and all other irreducible polynomials over F that have α as a root will be polynomial
multiples of φ(x) [26].
In this research all the implementations of secure authentication systems will be over
binary fields F2 or binary extension fields F2n where n ∈ N.
2.5 Linear Block Codes
A block coding scheme is a process where a message is broken up into blocks of fixed
length and each block is encoded separately using an encoding scheme. If the message
block length is chosen to be k, then an (n, k) binary Linear Block Code is a Code with
codewords of length n, defined over a binary alphabet F2, with the set of codewords form-
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ing a subspace of the vector space Fn2 . The vector space Fk2 over F2 consists of all the
possible k bit message words that can be sent over a channel and forms the message space
M . The encoding process will define a one-to-one linear mapping E, from each message
m ∈ Fk2 to a unique codeword E(m) = c ∈ Fn2 . The set of all codewords of all the messages
in M forms the code space C.
The mapping process is usually represented as a matrix multiplication process. Let G
denote the k × n matrix that has to be multiplied with the message m represented as a
1× k matrix to get the codeword c which is represented as an 1× n matrix. G is called
the Generator matrix and the encoding equation is:
mG = c, (2.6)
Let us assume c is transmitted over a noisy channel and is corrupted as a result. Let
r denote the n bit word received at the destination. Let e denote the error word of length
n bits with 1 in the positions where errors have been introduced in c. Then
r = c⊕ e, (2.7)
where ⊕ denotes the binary x-or operation on vectors.
Let R denote the received word space which will be the set of all n bit words. Thus
r ∈ R = Fn2 . Let D denote the decoding function which takes a word from the received
word space and maps it to the k bit message m′ that was most likely transmitted. Sym-
bolically D : R → M . The decoding process has two stages. The first is error correction
where the decoder maps r to the closest valid codeword c′ in terms of Hamming distance.
This is called maximum likelihood decoding where we assume that it is more likely that
fewer bit errors occur and hence that the transmitted codeword will be closest in Ham-
ming distance to the received word. The second stage is a deterministic mapping of the
codeword c′ to its corresponding message m′. There is no surety that m′ will be the
transmitted message. However, if the number of errors is less than t, the error correction
capability of the linear code, then m and m′ will be exactly the same. If the number
of errors is greater than t, no guarantee of accuracy can be given to the output of the
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decoding process.
Every error correcting code has a limit on the number of errors that it can correct.
For a linear code, if dmin denotes the minimum distance of the code, then
t = bdmin − 1
2
c. (2.8)
It must be noted that as the all zero word is also a codeword, the minimum distance dmin
is the same as the weight of the minimum weight codeword in C i.e.
dmin = d(cmin,0) = W (cmin), (2.9)
where cmin is the codeword with minimum weight and 0 is the all zero codeword.
2.5.1 Polynomial Codes and Cyclic Codes
There is a one-to-one correspondence between a q-ary m-tuple and a polynomial with
q-ary coefficients having degree less than m. In particular if (b1, b2, ..., bm−1) is a q-ary
m-tuple, it can also be represented as a polynomial b(x) in a single variable x having
degree less than m, according to the correspondence
b = (b1, b2, ....bm)←→ b(x) = b0 + b1x+ b2x2 + ...+ bm−1xm−1, (2.10)
where b0, b1, ..bm−1 ∈ Fq. Thus the q-ary string is represented either as an m-dimensional
vector or a polynomial in x.
In an (n, k, dmin) linear code, n is the codeword length, k is the message length and
dmin is the minimum distance of the code. Each n bit codeword c = (c0, c1, ...cn−1) is
represented as:
c(x) = c0 + c1x+ c2x
2 + c3x
3 + ....+ cn−1xn−1. (2.11)
The message word m = (m0,m1, ...,mk−1) can be represented as a polynomial m(x)
in x over the alphabet Fq of degree less than or equal to k − 1 :
m(x) = m0 +m1x+m2x
2 + ........+mk−1xk−1. (2.12)
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A polynomial code is a linear code with the additional property that every code poly-
nomial c(x) is divisible by a polynomial called the generator polynomial [28, Chapter 14].
Let g(x) denote the generator polynomial, which will be of degree less than or equal
to n− k with coefficients from Fq,
g(x) = g0 + g1x+ g2x
2 + g3x
3 + ......+ gn−kxn−k. (2.13)
The encoding process is a mapping from the message space M = Fkq to the code space
C using the generator polynomial g(x). Below are a couple of examples of polynomial
encoding.
1. The codeword c(x) = xn−km(x)−r(x) where r(x) ≡ xn−km(x) (mod g(x)). As r(x)
will be of degree less than n − k, the lower n − k bits of the shifted message word
xn−km(x) will be altered when r(x) is subtracted. The advantage of this method
is that the k higher order bits will be unchanged and will be the original message.
Thus the original message will be a sub-block of the codeword. The lower n − k
bits are also called check bits. A polynomial code with such a structure is called a
Systematic Code.
2. The codeword c(x) = m(x)g(x) with the multiplication and addition operations
performed over Fq. In this method the codeword does not explicitly contain the
message as a sub block of it. Thus it will be a Non-Systematic Code.
A cyclic code is a polynomial code where each codeword is a cyclic shift of another. In
an (n, k, dmin) cyclic code if c = (c0, c1, c2, ..., cn−1) is a codeword, the n − 1 cyclic shifts
of c i.e.
ci = (ci(mod n), ci+1(mod n), ....., ci+n−1(mod n)), 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 (2.14)
are also codewords of the code. An additional property of cyclic codes is that the gen-
erator polynomial g(x) of maximum degree n − k, divides the polynomial xn − 1. The
polynomial h(x) = xn−1
g(x)
is called the check polynomial.
Let us assume that the message polynomialm(x) over Fq is encoded using the mapping
c(x) = m(x)g(x) and that c(x) was transmitted through a noisy channel. Let v(x) be
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the received polynomial and let e(x) denote the error polynomial which has a non zero
coefficient in the positions where an error was introduced. If v(x) is divided by the
generator polynomial we get the quotient m′(x) and remainder r(x) i.e.
v(x) = m′(x)g(x) + r(x) (2.15)
h(x)(v(x)− r(x)) = h(x)m′(x)g(x)
= 0 (mod xn − 1)
(2.16)
Therefore v(x)− r(x) ∈ C. This principle can be used to decode cyclic codes.
By choosing the generator polynomial well, the algebraic properties of cyclic codes can
be used to devise efficient decoding algorithms. BCH codes, described next, are a very
good example of cyclic codes that have efficient decoding algorithms.
2.5.2 BCH Codes
The BCH class of cyclic codes was discovered by A. Hocquenghem in 1959 and inde-
pendently by R. C. Bose and D. K. Ray-Chaudhuri in 1960 and were named from the
initials of the founders. These codes are defined over an alphabet Fq where q is a prime
power. Each element of the field is called a symbol. Binary BCH codes are defined over F2.
To define a BCH code, we need parameters n,m, d where n is the length of each
codeword, gcd(n, q) = 1 and m is an integer such that qm ≡ 1(mod n). If in particular
qm = n + 1 the code is called a primitive code. All computations of the encoding and
decoding process are performed over the extension field Fqm . The code gets its special
properties due to the way the generator is defined.
Let α denote an nth root of unity i.e. α = β(qm−1)/n where β is a primitive element of
the field Fqm . Let φi(x) denote the minimal polynomial of the element αi in Fqm . The
generator g(x) is calculated as
g(x) = LCM(φc(x), φc+1(x), ....φc+d−2(x)), (2.17)
where d will be the designed distance of the code. Thus the generator is the Least Com-
mon Multiple of the minimal polynomials of d− 1 successive powers of α. The minimum
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distance dmin of a BCH code will be at least d, and can be greater than the designed
distance d. Equation (2.17) gives the generator for a general BCH code. If c = 1 we
obtain the generator for a narrow-sense BCH code. Note that in a binary BCH code,
φi(x) = φ2i(x) ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1.
Each minimal polynomial will have a maximum degree of m as a result of which the
generator will have a maximum degree ofm(d−1). Thus the degree n−k of the generator,
where k is the dimension of the code, is given by
n− k ≤ m(d− 1). (2.18)
The encoding of BCH codes is described in Section 2.5.1. Let c(x) = m(x)g(x) be the
transmitted codeword, with the multiplication and addition of coefficients occurring over
the field Fq from which the coefficients of m(x) and g(x) are drawn.
The first step in decoding is to determine the error polynomial e(x) and hence obtain the
correct codeword. Then the message can be retrieved by dividing the codeword by the
generator polynomial, with computations being performed over the extension field.
We will describe the decoding process for a narrow sense BCH code as given in [52] and a
similar principle can be extended to codes for which c > 1. Since g(x) has d−1 consecutive
roots i.e. g(αi) = 0 ∀1 ≤ i ≤ d− 1, c(x) also has these d− 1 elements of Fqm as its roots.
As v(x) = c(x) + e(x),
v(αi) = c(αi) + e(αi)
= 0 + e(αi).
(2.19)
The i’th syndrome is
Si = v(α
i+1), 0 ≤ i ≤ d− 2. (2.20)
The decoding process involves the following steps.
1. Compute the d− 1 syndromes using equation (2.20). The Syndrome polynomial is
defined as
S(x) =
∑
0≤i≤d−2
Six
i. (2.21)
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2. Let τ = {j : ej 6= 0}, the set of all indices where the error polynomial has non-zero
coefficient. The error locator polynomial is defined as :
σ(x) =
∏
j∈τ
(1− αjx). (2.22)
The indices of the inverses of the roots of this polynomial will give us the location
of the errors, hence the name.
3. The third polynomial of interest is called the error evaluator polynomial and is
denoted by
ω(x) =
∑
j∈τ
ejα
j
∏
k∈τ,k 6=j
(1− αkx). (2.23)
This polynomial is used to determine the values of the non-zero coefficients in Fq of
the error polynomial.
4. Decoding a BCH code involves solving an equation involving the above three poly-
nomials. The equation, called the key equation is :
σ(x)S(x) = ω(x)(mod xd−1). (2.24)
Given the syndrome polynomial, a decoding scheme will attempt to find a pair of
polynomials σ(x) and ω(x) which satisfy the key equation. In the case of a binary
BCH code (where the coefficients of v(x) will be from F2), only the locations of the
errors need to be determined. The error prone vector is corrected by simply flipping
the bit value at the error locations.
2.5.3 Reed Solomon Codes and Generalised Reed Solomon Codes
Reed Solomon Codes (RS Codes) are a special case of primitive BCH codes where m = 1
i.e. n = q− 1 and we perform computations over the field Fq. In order to have long codes
we need to work over large fields. However, the construction of the codes is relatively
simple as all the minimal polynomials in Fq are linear.
Generalised Reed Solomon Codes (GRS Codes) are a general case of the primitive
Reed Solomon Codes and these codes need not be cyclic [53]. If n is any integer such that
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1 ≤ n ≤ q − 1, α = (α0, α1, α2, ...., αn−1) is an ordered set of n distinct elements of Fq ,
v = (v0, v1, v2, ...., vn−1) is an ordered set of n elements of Fq, not necessarily distinct and
if k is an integer such that 1 ≤ k < n, then a Generalised Reed Solomon Code GRSk(α,v)
with message space of dimension k is given by the set of n tuples
GRSk(α,v) = {(v0f(α0), v1f(α1), v2f(α2), ......, vn−1f(αn−1))|f ∈ Fq[x]k}, (2.25)
where Fq[x]k is set of all polynomials in x over Fq of degree less than k. A GRS Code is
defined by Fq, n, k, α and v, is a linear code and has minimum distance dmin = n−k+1.
Therefore it is a Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) Code [53]. It can correct any
t = n−k
2
symbol errors. When n = q − 1 and v = 1 = {1, 1, 1, ...., 1}, the GRS reduces to
a primitive Reed Solomon Code.
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Chapter 3
Error Tolerant Cryptographic
Constructs
This chapter first introduces the concepts that were a precursor to Error Tolerant Cryp-
tography. It then illustrates the key contributions to the field of error tolerant cryptog-
raphy and traces the development and refinement of these cryptographic constructs by
researchers wishing to build practical fingerprint authentication systems. The chapter
ends with a comparison of existing practical systems and the questions our research seeks
to answer.
3.1 Secret Key Agreement using Correlated Data
As explained in Section 2.2, error tolerant cryptography involves using error correcting
codes in conjunction with cryptographic primitives. One of the first instances of using
Error Correcting Codes in Cryptography was in the area of Secret Key Agreement where
two parties that shared correlated data sought to establish a secret key efficiently between
themselves in the presence of an eavesdropper. The two parties, traditionally called
Alice and Bob, each have a data string with limited differences. They want to use this
data to establish a secret key between themselves that is unknown to the eavesdropper
(traditionally called Eve). Alice and Bob can communicate over a reliable (noiseless) and
public channel that Eve can also access. It is assumed that Eve can only listen to the
transmission and not alter or add to it without detection. Alice and Bob undergo three
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processes to achieve a common secret [41]:
1. If Eve knows more about Alice’s data than Bob does, Advantage Distillation must
be performed to increase Bob’s knowledge of Alice’s data over Eve.
2. Information Reconciliation must then be done so that Bob has exactly the same
information as Alice.
3. In the process of Information Reconciliation, Eve will obtain some more knowledge
of Alice’s data. Privacy Amplification techniques are used to generate a secret key
from Alice and Bob’s data so that Eve, in spite of possessing some information
about Alice’s data, will be unable to guess the secret key faster than a brute force
approach.
The processes involved in Advantage Distillation, Information Reconciliation and Privacy
Amplification, when placed in the context of an authentication system that uses error
prone keys, form the inspiration for several Error Tolerant Cryptographic constructs that
will be introduced in Section 3.3. Therefore a brief discussion of the above three concepts
is appropriate to set the stage for the constructs to follow.
Advantage Distillation is used in a scenario where Eve knows much more about Al-
ice’s data than Bob does. The aim of Advantage Distillation is to use the public noiseless
channel to increase Bob’s knowledge of Alice’s data over Eve’s. The desirable result at the
end of the procedure is that Alice and Bob have greater mutual information than Alice
and Eve i.e. I(A;B) ≥ I(A;E) where I(A;B) is the mutual information between Alice
and Bob and I(A;E) is the mutual information between Alice and Eve. The guiding idea
behind Advantage Distillation is that Alice sends some error correction information to
Bob about her string. Bob will use this information to determine which parts of his string
are definitely different from Alice’s string. Bob then informs Alice about the parts of
his string that are different from hers and they drop out those bits from their respective
strings. The bits that might correspond are retained by both. From the retained bits
some bits might be purposely dropped out to compensate for the information leaked to
Eve through the error correction information sent by Alice. The resulting strings that
Alice and Bob have will have greater mutual information than the information between
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Alice and Eve’s strings. The process can be repeated several times (also called rounds)
and at the end of each round of the algorithm Alice and Bob will possess strings of shorter
length but with greater correlation than the previous round.
One of the first Advantage Distillation protocols was proposed by Maurer in [43] where
he used a repetition code as the error correction tool. The repetition code protocol has a
very poor efficiency (number of distilled bits to number of bits publicly exchanged) when
Eve starts out with significantly more information than Bob. This is because a very large
repetition code will be needed to gain an advantage over Eve at the end of the protocol.
An analysis of this situation is given in [41]. Maurer suggested an improved Advantage
Distillation protocol called the iteration protocol in [44] where a string could be split up
into small blocks and a small repetition code is used on each block. As in the previous
case, a block is dropped from Alice’s and Bob’s strings if they are definitely different. If
a block is retained, some bits of the retained block are dropped to compensate for the
information leaked to Eve by the repetition code. At the end of one round all the blocks
have been subject to the protocol. The process is continued for several rounds and in
each round the bits remaining from the previous round are divided into small blocks for
processing in the next round. Gander and Maurer in [27] proposed the bit pair iteration
protocol, which is the same principle as the iteration protocol but with block length 2.
This has the best efficiency amongst the three protocols.
Advantage distillation is an interactive process where the mutual information between
correlated parties can be improved over an adversary. An interesting question is if a simi-
lar idea could be applied in a biometric authentication scenario. For example, in [11, 12],
in order to protect a biometric only a fraction of the elements in the template are retained
and the rest are purposely altered. This fractional template is then stored in the database
as the identifier. When a claimant presents his query template, there will be much more
correspondence of the enrolled identifier with a random string than with the query tem-
plate. In order to increase their correlation, an advantage distillation protocol could be
performed to bring the query template closer to the fractional identifier without giving
away too much information to an attacker who can watch this process. The important
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aspect is the true claimant must be able to reconcile with the fractional template faster
than an attacker with a random bit string.
The starting point of the Information Reconciliation process is when Bob has a bit
string which has greater correlation with Alice’s string than Eve’s string has with Alice’s.
The aim of Information Reconciliation is for Bob to correct the errors in his string so that
it becomes exactly the same as Alice’s. The correction is possible by the exchange of error
correction information between Alice and Bob on the public channel which Eve can view.
In Information Reconciliation the aim is to correct Bob’s string by exchanging as little
error correction information as possible, as the error correction information gives away
some information about Alice’s string to Eve. In contrast to Advantage Distillation no
bits are dropped from Alice or Bob’s string during Information Reconciliation. Therefore
the length of the strings before and after the protocol remains the same. Reconciliation
protocols can be interactive or non interactive. In a non interactive case, Alice would send
error correction information once over the public channel and that will be used by Bob
to attempt to correct his bit string to Alice’s. In an interactive case, the error correction
information can be sent in several rounds, improving the closeness of Bob’s string with
Alice’s in each round. Algorithms for Information Reconciliation have been proposed by
Brassard and Salvail in [17] and Cachin and Maurer in [18].
Liu et al in [41] recognised the similarity in concept of Advantage Distillation and
Information Reconciliation. Advantage Distillation drops bits that are definitely different
between two parties while Information Reconciliation locates errors and corrects them;
the processes are achieved by using error detection and error correction strategies respec-
tively. They proposed an interactive algorithm that achieves both Advantage Distillation
and Information Reconciliation simultaneously.
From a biometric authentication viewpoint, the non interactive information recon-
ciliation schemes have motivated the creation of relevant constructs. It is an interesting
question if interactive schemes could be used to create similar constructs from a biometric
authentication viewpoint. We observe that the interactive scenario can be mapped to bio-
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metric authentication. The enrolled identifier will be the bit string that Alice possesses.
With interactive constructs, the assumption is that Alice’s information, as long as it is
with Alice, is safe from observation by Eve. In a biometric scenario, Alice’s original string
is stored in a database and is not secure from observation by an attacker or evesdropper
Eve. As a biometric contains sensitive personal information, it must be stored in a secure
way. If Alice’s bitstring could be modified to a form so that it did not give away any
information about the original bitstring and if it was relatively easy to perform the same
transform on Bob’s original string (query biometric) without exacerbating the differences
between Alice and Bob’s bit strings, we could in fact use Advantage Distillation and Infor-
mation Reconciliation to create different secrets for different applications. To successfully
achieve this, we need a transform whose output is statistically independent of the input
and still preserves the key matching criteria of the input.
The third stage in secret key exchange is Privacy Amplification. In the process of the
exchange of redundant information between Alice and Bob during Information Recon-
ciliation and Advantage Distillation, Eve has gained some information about Alice’s bit
string. The aim of Privacy Amplification is for Alice and Bob to use the left over infor-
mation in their common string to generate a shorter common secret about which Eve’s
uncertainty is very high. This is achieved most commonly by Alice selecting a mapping
function and communicating the function to Bob on the public channel. Alice and Bob
will then use the mapping function on their strings to generate exactly the same shorter
key independently. The mapping functions are designed specially so that their input can-
not be easily guessed by Eve although she has some information about Alice’s bit string
and knows the mapping function. Universal Classes of Hash Functions proposed in [19]
have been identified by Bennett et.al in [13] as a class of functions that could be used
to achieve Privacy Amplification. Cachin and Maurer in [18] proved that if the mapping
function was chosen such that the length of the resulting secret is less than the entropy
left over in Alice and Bob’s strings after the reconciliation stage, the information leaked
to Eve about the secret is negligibly small, even if Eve knows the function that maps the
reconciled string to the secret.
Privacy Amplification has been incorporated as a part of error tolerant cryptographic
38
constructs to generate secret keys from biometric information which are prone to error.
These constructs will be discussed in Section 3.3.
3.2 Secret Sharing
Secret sharing is another area from which error tolerant cryptographic constructs are in-
spired. Secret Sharing arose from the need to store backup cryptographic keys securely
in case a key was lost. It also enables decryption power to be distributed among a group
of people instead of being vested with an individual. All Secret Sharing schemes break a
secret into several parts. Each part or share is given to a separate user. The schemes are
designed in a such a way that either all or a certain proportion of the shares must come
together to recover the secret. In the latter case, even if a few shares are lost, the rest of
the users could come together to decrypt the secret. If a secret is divided into n shares
and a subset of size t from those n shares is needed to recover the secret such that any
subset of size less than t would be unable to do so, the scheme is called a (t, n)-threshold
scheme.
Secret Sharing schemes were first independently proposed by Shamir in [61] and Blakly
in [15]. Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme has inspired a very popular error tolerant cryp-
tographic construct that will be introduced in Section 3.3.2. Hence it is appropriate to
elaborate on it now. Shamir’s scheme is based on Lagrange’s formula for polynomial in-
terpolation. Lagrange’s technique relies on the fact that a unique t− 1 degree polynomial
with coefficients from a field is completely specified by a set of t of its values at distinct
abscissae from the same field. If (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ......., (xt−1, yt−1) are the t points, the
unique t− 1 degree polynomial they represent is given by
f(x) =
∑
0≤i≤t−1
yi
∏
0≤j≤t−1, i 6=j
x− xj
xi − xj . (3.1)
In Shamir’s scheme, let m be the secret that needs to be protected. Let n be the number
of shares the secret has to be divided into. Let t be the number of shares that can combine
to recover the secret. The secrets are divided as follows:
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1. Choose a number q which is a prime or a power of a prime and with q > max(m,n).
All computations are performed over the Galois Field Fq.
2. Create a polynomial of degree t− 1,
f(x) =
∑
0≤i≤t−1
aix
i (3.2)
where a0 = m, a1, a2, ..., at−1 are chosen at random from Fq and at−1 6= 0.
3. Choose n distinct elements of Fq, say x1, x2, ...., xn and evaluate f(x) at each of
these points.
4. Distribute one share (xi, f(xi)), 1 ≤ i ≤ n to each of the n shareholders of the secret.
If a group of t shareholders want to come together to recover the secret, they plug
their shares into the Lagrange Interpolation Formula given in equation (3.1). As the t
shares can uniquely determine a t − 1 degree polynomial, the recovered polynomial will
be exactly the polynomial f(x) that encoded the secret. Evaluating f(0) = a0 = m will
give the secret.
Shamir’s scheme is called a perfect threshold scheme [47] as knowledge of t − 1 or fewer
shares is equivalent to knowing none of the shares, in terms of ease of determining the
secret. In other words the entropy of the secret if none of the shares are known and if
fewer than t − 1 shares are known, is the same. Only when t shares are known can the
secret be recovered.
Blakely’s scheme [15] is not a (t, n)-threshold scheme. It divides a secret into t parts
and requires all t parts to recover it. It is also not perfectly secure as knowledge of a
few parts decreases the entropy of the secret; the more parts are known, the lower is the
entropy of the secret. This scheme uses the principle that in any t-dimensional space
t non parallel (t − 1)-dimensional hyperplanes will intersect in exactly one point. That
t-dimensional point will encode the secret. In particular, one of the dimensions will be the
secret and the other t− 1 dimensions will be random numbers. Let m denote the secret.
Let t denote the number of shareholders. The secret distribution scheme is as follows [47]:
1. Choose a number q that is a large prime or power of a prime and q > m. All the
operations are performed over Fq.
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2. Create a t-dimensional point (m1,m2, ....,mt) such that m1 is the secret m and the
remaining coordinates m2,m3, ...,mt are chosen at random from Fq.
3. For each of the t shareholders create a t− 1 dimensional point. The random point
for shareholder i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t will be (ni1, ni2, ..., nit−1).
4. For shareholder i, 1 ≤ i ≤ t, compute
ci ≡ mt −
∑
1≤j≤t−1
mjn
i
j (mod q).
5. Each shareholder’s share will be in the form of the equation of a hyperplane
xt ≡ ci +
∑
1≤j≤t−1
nijxj (mod q). (3.3)
6. The t hyperplanes will intersect at (m1,m2, ....,mt).
As each shareholder has the equation of a hyperplane, they must all combine their
shares in order to retrieve their point of intersection and hence their secret. In order to
retrieve the secret, they solve the set of equations obtained by putting their hyperplane
equations together. Rewriting the equation of the shareholder i:∑
1≤j≤t−1
nijxj − xt ≡ −ci (mod q), 1 ≤ i ≤ t (3.4)
There are t independent equations and t unknowns i.e x1, x2, ..., xt. Thus there exists a
unique solution (x1, x2, ..., xt) = (m1,m2, ....,mt) to this set of t equations. Once this t
dimensional point is retrieved, the value x1 in the first dimension will be the secret m.
Asmuth and Bloom in [9] proposed a secret sharing scheme based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem. It is also a (t, n)-threshold scheme. Several secret sharing and
multi secret sharing schemes have been subsequently proposed using modifications of
these basic schemes. However, the main scheme that inspired error tolerant cryptography
is Shamir’s secret sharing scheme based on Lagrange Interpolation.
3.3 Error Tolerant Cryptographic Constructs
This section introduces the various cryptographic constructs proposed for error prone
data such as biometrics. These constructs vary in the assumptions about the nature of
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the data (discrete or continuous), the nature of the errors that occur in the data (insertion
or deletion, modification) and as a result the metric spaces over which they are built.
3.3.1 The Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
One of the first constructs that used error correcting codes to achieve cryptographic goals
was the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme proposed by Juels and Wattenberg in [39]. Let x
denote an error prone input like a biometric. In the proposed scheme x is a binary string
of a certain length. The fuzzy commitment scheme will allow the user X to commit to
a secret using x as a witness and decommit the secret using a bit string x′ which is a
permissible Hamming distance away from x. The commitment is concealing in that the
result of the commitment process, which is publicly stored, does not give away the value
of x. The commitment is binding in that it is very unlikely that the same user (with an
x′ within permissible Hamming distance of the witness x) can decommit to two different
secrets.
During the enrolment process, the authenticator (refer Fig. 1.1) picks a binary linear
block code C of dimension k and length n, at least as long as the length of the user
X’s biometric bit string x. Let t denote the error correction capability of the code and
dmin = 2t + 1 be the minimum distance of the code. The user X randomly picks one
codeword c as the secret out of the 2k possible codewords in C and computes δ = x− c.
X then employs a publicly known one-way hash h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l function like SHA1
or MD5 to transform c by computing h(c). The commitment to the secret is the pair
(h(c), δ) and is publicly stored in a database or a smartcard for use during verification.
The hash function h and the linear code C used are public information.
At the verification stage, assume that a user Y makes a claim on the identity of the
enrolled user X. The system retrieves the commitment (h(c), δ) from the database or
smartcard. Let x′ be the query bit string that Y presents. Y computes c′ = x′ − δ. Let
correct : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n denote the error correction function in the decoder of the lin-
ear code. This function maps an n bit string to the closest valid n bit codeword in C. Y
gives c′ as an input to the correct function. The system then performs h(correct(c′)) and
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compares it with h(c) which is stored. If the two images of the hash functions are exactly
the same, user Y has decommitted the secret, the authentication is deemed successful and
Y is authenticated as the genuine enrolled user X.
If x and x′ have a Hamming distance of less than or equal to the error correcting capability
t of the code, then the bit string x′ can successfully decommit the secret [39, Lemma1].
This is because if |x− x′| ≤ t, |c− c′| ≤ t and correct(c′) = c.
As pointed out in [39], the Fuzzy Commitment scheme never makes explicit use of the
message space.
The security of this scheme is based on the following:
1. The assumption that the biometric bit string has a uniform or nearly uniform dis-
tribution.
2. The code C has a dimension k large enough to ensure that the ability of the attacker
to perform a brute force search for c is computationally infeasible.
3. The hash function h is collision free with high probability.
As δ is a random n bit string, the amount of information about x leaked by δ is log2(n).
The left over entropy in x after commitment is performed will be k − log2(n).
The Fuzzy Commitment scheme treats the input as discrete data. There are three
important considerations which must apply if the fuzzy commitment scheme is to be used
to protect biometric data.
1. The biometric information must be converted to discrete data so that it can be
represented as binary string.
2. The types of errors that occur as a result of intra biometric sample variation can be
well modeled using the Hamming metric.
3. The number of errors that occur as a result of intra biometric sample variation set
the value of t for the linear code used. We must be able to find linear codes with the
desirable n and t value that has a dimension k large enough to ensure computational
security of the commitment.
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The Fuzzy commitment scheme when looked at from a different perspective is equiv-
alent to non-interactive information reconciliation discussed in Section 3.1. In this case x
can be considered as the message to be sent over an insecure noise free channel and the
commitment (h(c), δ) is the transformed version of the message sent to the receiver. As
the aim of the receiver is to retrieve the original message x, the scheme is modified so
that after the receiver successfully decommits the secret c, c + δ will then be computed
to get the original message x.
Fuzzy commitment can also be used for symmetric encryption schemes, public key
encryption schemes and challenge response authentication scenarios using biometric data
and as demonstrated in [39].
3.3.2 The Fuzzy Vault Scheme
The Fuzzy Vault is an error tolerant cryptographic construct based on the set difference
metric that was introduced by Juels and Sudan in [38]. An improved Fuzzy Vault scheme
that had a reduced entropy loss and storage requirement compared to the scheme by Juels
and Sudan, was proposed by Dodis et al in [24]. For ease of exposition we will describe
the original Fuzzy Vault scheme by Juels and Sudan. This construct is particularly useful
when the witness (the biometric) is a set of elements without any predefined order.
The basic idea is that a user X encrypts or locks a secret κ using a set of elements A as
a key. The set A along with κ is used to generate a ‘Vault’, a structure that holds the
secret in an encrypted form. The Vault is publicly stored and the key A can be destroyed.
During verification, a claimant on the identity X, presents a set B as the key to attempt
to unlock the vault. If B differs by no more than a prescribed set difference from A, then
the claimant will be able to retrieve κ with very high probability. The structure is termed
a Fuzzy Vault as it can be unlocked by a sufficiently similar key and not necessarily the
exact key used to lock it.
The scheme proposed in [38] uses the Generalised Reed Solomon Code (see Section
2.5.3) to build the Fuzzy Vault. A brief description of their specific scheme is given below.
Let A denote the set of elements derived from a biometric measurement at enrolment. Let
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|A| = N denote the cardinality of the set. The elements of A are assumed to be derived
from a universe U , whose cardinality q can be assumed to be a prime power, without loss
of generality. Thus all computations will be performed over the field Fq. The following
steps are performed as part of the enrolment process:
• Choose a polynomial κ(x) ∈ Fq[x]k at random such that k < N . This is called the
secret polynomial and is the secret that a user commits to at enrolment.
• The secret polynomial is evaluated at each distinct point xi ∈ A; 1 ≤ i ≤ N to get
a set of N points {xi, yi = κ(xi)} that lie on the secret polynomial.
• As a result of the evaluation, we obtain a codeword c = (κ(x1), κ(x2), κ(x3), ....., κ(xN)),
which will be a codeword from GRSk(A,1).
• The N points (xi, κ(xi)), 1 ≤ i ≤ N obtained from the evaluations at the secret
polynomial represent the secret and these points are called genuine points. The
points must be made public to help during verification, but must be published in a
secure manner.
• To protect these N points from an attacker, a set of r points, where r >> N , are
generated such that none of these r points lie on the secret polynomial. The r points
(ui, wi), 1 ≤ i ≤ r are created such that ui ∈ U\A and wi 6= κ(ui). These r points
are called chaff points. They are mixed randomly with the genuine points on the
polynomial and this mixture of genuine and chaff points is called a ‘Vault’.
• The Vault along with the parameters r, N and k are stored publicly for use at the
verification stage and the original set A can be destroyed.
At the verification stage when a claimant makes a claim on the identity of X, the cor-
responding Vault and its parameters are retrieved. The claimant surrenders his biometric
measurements as an unordered set B = {bi; 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, where B also has exactly N
elements from Fq. The aim of the verification process is to be able to recover the secret
polynomial.
In [38], Generalised Reed Solomon decoding is used to retrieve the secret κ(x) using
the following steps:
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• The most important point to note is that during the decoding process the decoder
works on an (N, k) Generalised Reed Solomon Code GRSk(B,1). This is not ex-
plicitly mentioned in the paper by Juels and Sudan [38] and is a deduction we have
worked out to explain the decoding process. To our knowledge we are the first to
explicitly describe the steps in the use of Generalised Reed Solomon codes in the
decoding process for the Fuzzy Vault.
• For each element bi ∈ B, the claimant searches through the Vault for a point whose
abscissa value is exactly equal to bi. If such a point is found, then the ordinate of
that point is considered as one of the symbols of the codeword. If no abscissa is
found from the vault, the ordinate for that element is set to 0. Thus we obtain an
N -tuple c′1 which can be considered as an error affected codeword in GRSk(B,1).
• The vector c′1 is given to a Reed Solomon decoder to decode to the closest codeword.
Most standard decoding algorithms can correct up to N−k
2
symbol errors in c′1, i.e.
up to the error correcting capacity of GRSk(B,1). Therefore, if sets A and B
differed by no more than N − k elements i.e. they have at least N+k
2
elements in
common, then at least N+k
2
of the symbols in c′1 will correspond with c. The GRS
decoder is designed so that it corrects c′1 to a codeword c1 that corresponds to a
polynomial κ1(x) of degree less than k that passes through the maximum number
of points indicated by c′1. Maximum Likelihood decoding ensures that as enough of
the points in c′1 lie on κ(x), the closest codeword c1 will be the evaluation of κ(x)
on all the elements of B. In other words with very high probability κ1(x) = κ(x)
i.e. the secret polynomial κ(x) can be retrieved exactly as the result of decoding.
• If c′ varied by greater than the error correction capability of the GRS code, either
a null (∅) will be output by the decoder or with very low probability, a different
polynomial.
In this scheme, if the decoder outputs a non null polynomial, an authentication process
based on this scheme will be successful with high probability, as most likely the polyno-
mial will be the original secret that the user X committed to.
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The secret polynomial can be recovered without using Reed Solomon decoding in the
following manner.
In order to recover the secret polynomial directly, the claimant must be able to pick out
points from the Vault that lie on κ(x) and use those points to interpolate and obtain κ(x).
For a k − 1 degree secret polynomial, at least k points that lie on it must be correctly
identified. The claimant uses the elements of his set B to do the selection. If fewer than k
points are short listed from the vault with help from set B, the verification is aborted and
is declared as a failed attempt. If k or more points are short listed then an appropriate
interpolation process can be used to interpolate the set of short listed points to get the
secret polynomial. If the sets A and B have an intersection of at least k it is possible
to retrieve the secret κ(x) by using the Lagrange interpolation method. The Lagrange
Interpolation process has been used to implement a Fuzzy Vault for fingerprint templates
[69, 49]. However, this process will be very inefficient, especially if N and k are very
large as several candidate secrets could be obtained out of which one may the true secret
polynomial. Thus, using an error correcting code with a known error correction capability
as in [38] is a more efficient and sophisticated process of retrieving the secret κ(x) from
the short listed points, at the expense of being able to correct fewer errors when compared
to the direct Lagrange Interpolation process.
The number of set difference errors that can be tolerated between B and A is depen-
dent on the method used to retrieve the secret polynomial. If as suggested in [38], the
classical decoding algorithm of Peterson [51], Berlekamp [14] and Massey [42] is used, the
maximum number of set difference errors between B and A that could be corrected is
N − k. If set or list decoding algorithms are used, where a set of candidate polynomials,
each of which pass through a majority of the points short listed by B, is output by the
decoder, we would be able to tolerate more errors between A and B, at the expense of
greater computation cost.
The Fuzzy Vault scheme differs from the Fuzzy Commitment scheme in that here,
no commitment on the secret is performed. The Vault is akin to publishing δ in a com-
mitment scheme. Thus the user or an attacker will not know if the recovered secret is
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the genuine one. The Vault is designed so that a genuine claimant will have a very high
probability of retrieving the original secret. However, the Vault can be used to perform
commitment to a secret by storing a one-way hash of the secret polynomial coefficients.
The retrieval of the estimate of the secret polynomial can be followed by hashing the coef-
ficients and comparison with the stored hash of the original secret coefficients to make an
authentication decision. The Vault can also be used for symmetric encryption algorithms
where the key is a set of elements in which a limited number of elements are prone to
error. The Vault can be used for mutually binding authentication protocols, an example
of which is illustrated in [38].
A drawback of using GRS decoding is that the length of the secret (k) is bounded by
the amount of error that can be corrected by the code. Thus if a larger number of symbol
errors must be tolerated, for a fixed length of the code, the size of the secret that can be
protected and hence the entropy of the secret drops.
The security of the Fuzzy Vault is dependent on the number of chaff points in the
vault, as this increases the complexity for an attacker with no knowledge of the set A.
Thus one more drawback of this scheme is the large storage space (N log2(q) + r log2(q)
bits) needed for a sufficiently secure system. The improved Fuzzy Vault Scheme proposed
in [24] significantly reduces the storage space and the entropy loss due to publishing the
vault to t log2(q).
The last disadvantage is that the the sets A and B must have the same size and this
is not always practical in a biometric system.
At the conclusion of this section, we note the contribution we have made in the clear
description of the decoding of the Fuzzy Vault using GRS codes. To our knowledge, no
GRS decoding based Fuzzy Vault to protect biometrics has been implemented in current
biometrics literature. Explicit steps involved in the decoding process were not given in
the original scheme by Juels and Sudan [38]. This might be one of the reasons for no prac-
tical Fuzzy Vault having been constructed so far. Uludag and Jain in [68] stated that “...
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there are serious difficulties to achieve error-correction with biometric data. Developing
the necessary polynomial reconstruction via error-correction has not been demonstrated
in the literature...". They eventually implemented a Fuzzy Vault using the Lagrange In-
terpolation method for list decoding several candidate secrets. Qiong et al [40] claimed
that the use of RS decoding in the error correction stage of the Fuzzy Vault is wrong.
To quote from [40] “..it is proved that the special use of the Reed Solomon code in the
UNLOCK algorithm of the scheme is not appropriate". We have demonstrated above
that their statement is not true. Generalised Reed Solomon decoding as was indicated
by Juels and Sudan in [38] is a valid and more efficient means of implementing the error
correction required in the Fuzzy Vault.
3.3.3 Fuzzy Extractors
Dodis et al in [24] generalised the principles of the fuzzy commitment scheme and the
fuzzy vault scheme and proposed two cryptographic constructs for discrete data: a Secure
Sketch and a Fuzzy Extractor.
A Secure Sketch is a primitive that allows secure reconstruction of an error prone
input w drawn from some metric space M with a distance metric d. It consists of two
randomised procedures, SS used at enrolment and REC used at verification.
The first is termed SS and is used in the enrolment stage to generate the Secure Sketch
of the input. SS takes the error prone data w as input and outputs a sketch of w, usually
a bit string SS(w) ∈ {0, 1}n. This sketch is a transformed representation of w which
reveals very little about w but helps to recover w at the verification stage. That is why
the sketch is called a secure sketch. Once the sketch is computed, it is stored publicly
and w can be destroyed.
The second module is termed REC and is used at the verification stage to recover the
error prone input securely. It takes w′, a corrupted version of w and the publicly stored
secure sketch SS(w) as input. If w′ does not vary from w by more than a prescribed
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distance in metric space M i.e if d(w,w′) is below a prescribed value then REC can re-
construct w exactly. Thus w can be reconstructed when needed, without having to store it.
Secure Sketches can be used when error prone data are used as keys in symmetric
encryption schemes. If the key presented at decryption varies by a prescribed distance
in some metric space from the encryption key, successful decryption can be achieved by
using a secure sketch.
If the distribution of the input w is not uniform, then w cannot be used as a key in
a cryptographic framework. The Fuzzy Extractor is a primitive that extracts random-
ness from error prone and non uniformly distributed data w such that the same random
string can be extracted from an input w′ that varies from w by no more than a prescribed
distance in metric space M. A Fuzzy Extractor is also made up of two randomised pro-
cedures, ‘Gen’ used at enrolment and ‘Rep’ used at verification.
The first function ‘Gen’ is used to generate a random string from the error prone in-
put. It takes as input the non-uniform and error prone data w and a random seed x and
outputs a public string P and a random string R. The string P along with x are stored
publicly and w can be destroyed. R can be used as a key in a cryptographic application.
The second function, termed ‘Rep’, takes w′, a corrupted version of w, the public string
P and x as inputs. If d(w,w′) is within the prescribed value, ‘Rep’ can exactly reproduce
R. The string P must reveal minimum information about w but still help ‘Rep’ to repro-
duce R given a suitable w′. Thus Fuzzy Extractors can ensure that random strings can
be repetitively extracted from data which is prone to slight variations and these random
strings can be used in a cryptographic scenario.
The authors of [24] demonstrated that the Fuzzy Extractor is built using a combination
of a Secure Sketch and a strong randomness extractor. The public string P is nothing
but the secure sketch of w and R is the result of passing w through a strong random-
ness extractor. The ‘Rec’ module of the secure sketch is used during the ‘Rep’ process
to reconstruct w exactly from w′ before using a randomness extractor to reproduce R
50
exactly. Dodis et al in [24] showed that the Fuzzy Vault is an example of a secure sketch
over the set difference metric and that the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme is an example of
a Fuzzy Extractor over the Hamming metric if the input bit string is uniformly distributed.
Several constructions of Secure Sketches and Fuzzy Extractors were provided by the
authors of [24] over the Hamming, set difference and edit distance metrics. The con-
struction used in this thesis is a Secure Sketch over the set difference metric in a large
universe setting. This construct is called PinSketch and uses BCH decoding to perform
error correction. A brief description of PinSketch is given below.
PinSketch:
Let w be a set of elements that are error prone and non uniformly distributed drawn from
a universe U of cardinality q. It is required to securely recover w from any w′ that is
within a prescribed set difference from w. Let t be the maximum set difference that is
permissible between w and w′. This maximum permissible set difference will determine
the minimum distance of the BCH code used in implementing the PinSketch construct.
Here, as with the Fuzzy Commitment scheme, the encoding function of the code is not
used. Instead, the error correction part of the decoding process is primarily used in the
construct. In this construct the set difference metric is mapped to the Hamming metric
by representing each set as its characteristic vector.
• ENROLMENT :
– Represent the set w as its characteristic vector W . (W could be used as a key
in a symmetric encryption scheme or as an authentication token).
– Compute the Syndrome of W , denoted by SS(W ), with respect to the closest
codeword in the BCH code chosen for the PinSketch implementation. SS(W ),
which is the secure sketch of W , is publicly stored and takes into account the
maximum tolerable set difference t.
– The set w and its characteristic vector W can now be destroyed.
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• VERIFICATION :
– Represent the corrupted set w′ by its characteristic vector W ′. This is given
as input to REC module where the following steps are performed.
∗ Compute the Syndrome of W ′, SS(W ′), from the closest codeword in the
BCH code.
∗ Compute the difference between the syndromes ofW andW ′ i.e. Compute
SS(W ) − SS(W ′) which will actually be the syndrome of some binary
vector e where e = W−W ′. This follows from the fact that SS(W−W ′) =
SS(W )− SS(W ′), as the syndrome function is additive.
∗ Use the BCH decoding algorithm on SS(e) to try to recover e. If W and
W ′ varied by a Hamming distance of no more than t, then e would have a
Hamming weight less than or equal to t. The BCH decoder is designed so
that it can recover the vector e exactly from SS(e) if the Hamming weight
of e is less than or equal to t.
∗ If e is recovered, then recover W by adding W ′ to e i.e W = W ′+ e. Thus
the original set w is reconstructed exactly.
– Now the reconstructedW can be used as the decryption key or can be compared
with the authentication token to make an authentication decision.
The storage requirement and the entropy loss due to publishing of the sketch are both
t log2(q + 1).
Tuyls and Goseling in [65] presented a general construct for discrete and continuous
data. They defined Secret Extraction Codes as a set of mappings between the possible
values of input data and the possible corrupted values. Each mapping comprised of a
set of mutually exclusive encoding and decoding regions. The original input w would be
part of one of the mutually exclusive encoding regions and the index of the region was
the secret. During verification the decoding regions are searched to find the one where
the corrupted word w′ will belong. If the index of this decoding region matches with the
index of the encoding region, authentication is achieved successfully. In the context of
discrete data, it is equivalent to a Fuzzy Extractor.
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3.3.4 Attacks on Biocryptographic Constructs
Scheirer and Boult in [59] pointed out three types of attacks on the biometric templates
which are stored securely using any error tolerant scheme.
1. Attack via Record Multiplicity (ARM): When a user enrols with his biometric in
multiple organisations and all the organisations use the same cryptographic con-
struct to achieve secure authentication, then an attacker can analyse the publicly
stored data of the user from each organisation to retrieve enough of the original bio-
metric to identify or masquerade as the user. From another perspective, different
organisations can collude to retrieve the biometric data of a user which could then
be misused.
2. Surreptitious Key Inversion Attack (SKIA): If a user-specific key was used along
with each enrolment to construct the secure biometric template or public data and
if that key was guessed by the attacker, then the attacker can invert the template
creation process to determine the user’s biometric data. Thus the security of such
a system is dependent on the entropy of the user specific-key.
3. Blended Substitution Attack (BSA): If the public data used to aid in secure recon-
struction of the biometric data at verification is structured in a way that an attacker
could blend his template with that of a valid user while still making the public data
look genuine, both the user and the attacker can be validated using the same public
data. It must be noted that this attack assumes the attacker can modify the con-
tents of a database without detection. However, as there are standard techniques
to test the integrity of the data, this attack seems pretty easy to protect against.
A brief analysis of the robustness of the three main schemes discussed in Sections
3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 is given below. Again, BSA is a good attack to be aware of from
a system design viewpoint, but it can be easily protected against. In the analysis for
the three constructs to BSA, we assume that the attacker can in fact secretly modify the
contents of a database.
The Fuzzy Commitment Scheme described in Section 3.3.1 is robust against ARM if
the input biometric bit strings are uniformly distributed. The public information δ used
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for secure verification is computed by the x-or of the biometric string x with a random
codeword c. If c is drawn randomly from the code space C, the distribution of δ will also
be perfectly random irrespective of the distribution of x. However, if some biometric bit
strings or substrings of the biometric bit string are more likely than others, it will greatly
reduce the brute force search space for an attacker determined to decipher valid biometric
strings for use in masquerade attacks. When multiple enrolments are performed and x
has substrings that occur with high probability, the attacker’s uncertainty about those
portions of x will be greatly reduced if he is able to analyse the δ values submitted to
different organisations.
This scheme will be vulnerable to SKIA if the codeword space is small enough for it
to be computationally feasible for an attacker to guess the random codeword by a brute
force search.
The Fuzzy Commitment scheme is vulnerable to a brute force attack, just as is any
error tolerant cryptographic scheme. In the Fuzzy Commitment scheme, let x1 be the
biometric string of a genuine user. Let c be the random codeword chosen so that the
public information stored is δ = x1 − c. The attacker needs to find another x2 such that
δ− x2 = (x+ c)− x2 = c+ e where the error vector e has weight not more than the error
correction capability of the code C. If the biometric string is an n bit vector and the code
C can correct up to t errors, the probability that an attacker can choose such an x2 where
|x1 − x2| ≤ t is:
P (x = x2) =
(
n
0
)
+
(
n
1
)
+
(
n
2
)
+ ...+
(
n
t
)
2k
(3.5)
Thus the stricter the error correction bound, the less likely it is than attacker can acquire
a template which will also successfully authenticate using the same δ. The attacker can-
not do better than this brute force search.
The Fuzzy Vault Scheme as proposed in [38] and described in Section 3.3.2 is vul-
nerable to ARM. This is because the vault is a combination of the chaff points and the
genuine points on the secret polynomial, the abscissae of which form the biometric data
of the user. If the user enrols with several organisations using this Fuzzy Vault scheme to
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perform secure authentication, an attacker can observe the points in the vaults and make
an educated guess as to which of the points are likely to be part of the user’s biometric by
observing the points whose abscissa occurs repeatedly in vaults from different enrolments.
The more enrolled vaults of a user there are, the lower is the entropy of the user’s original
biometric data.
The SKIA attack is trivial, as if the attacker guesses the secret polynomial, the au-
thentication is successful. Thus the number of possible secrets must be large enough to
computationally strain an attacker.
The Fuzzy Vault scheme of [38] is vulnerable to BSA, as pointed out by Scheirer and
Boult in [59]. As the vault contains a large number of chaff points, it is quite easy for an
attacker with access to the vault to evaluate the projections of his biometric on another
secret and add his genuine evaluations to the vault. The genuine evaluations of the at-
tacker will appear to a user as the chaff in the vault. Thus, both the attacker and the user
can be authenticated using the same vault. If some sort of commitment (eg. hashing the
coefficients of the secret polynomial) is performed during authentication, this problem can
be averted as in spite of successful decoding, the hashes of the secret polynomials will not
match. However, if the attacker manages to guess the secret, he can evaluate the elements
from his biometric data set B at the secret polynomial and mix those evaluations as chaff
in the vault. In this way, he has blended his template with that of a genuine user and this
breach cannot be detected even if commitment to the secret is done. This was termed
insidious blending in [59]. In the vault implementation of [24] this might be a bit more
difficult for the attacker as the stored polynomial is closely tied to the user’s biometric
data. The attacker might have to store another polynomial’s coefficients in the vault of
the genuine user which might not go undetected by the system.
A PinSketch based Fuzzy Extractor will be not be vulnerable to ARM if multiple
enrolments of the user’s biometric are performed with different organisations. This is
because the sketch is essentially the syndrome of the biometric string with respect to the
closest codeword in the chosen BCH code C. However many times this information is
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stored and viewed, it does not give any more or any less information than the first time
it was stored.
In terms of the SKIA, no private secret is used to build the extractor. The R extracted
by the strong extractor only takes the corrected biometric string and a public seed as
inputs. The only attack by guessing the secret could be for the attacker to guess R.
However, strong extractors have very high information theoretic bounds on the ability
to invert them, therefore the biometric data is reasonably protected. Another form of
secret key guessing attack would be for the attacker to guess the codeword which the
biometric is closest to. If the biometric data is not uniformly distributed, there may be
some codewords that are close to a majority of biometric strings. The attacker could then
use the more commonly occurring codewords to shorten the brute force search space for
the genuine biometric data of the user.
The scheme is resistant to BSA when the attacker will try to use his biometric to generate
R. However if the attacker wishes to guess a bit string W2 that will enable him to per-
form insidious blending with the template of a genuine user whose characteristic vector
of the biometric data set is W1, the attacker must guess W2 such that |W1 −W2| ≤ t,
where t is the error correction bound of the BCH code. Thus its vulnerability to insidious
blending is as weak or as strong as its bound on the maximum permissible error correction.
3.4 Fingerprint based Constructions
In the past three years, several attempts have been made to build secure fingerprint based
authentication systems using the constructs described above. The biggest implementation
challenge is to represent the fingerprints in a manner such that it is consistent with the
data format needed for a particular construct. There are two primary approaches taken
by researchers, one representing the fingerprint as a set of minutiae and the second, using
a frequency domain representation of the fingerprint image.
Table 3.1 compares the scheme we developed in this thesis with comparable existing
fingerprint based implementations. Our scheme is the first to implement a PinSketch-
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Author Error Rates Merits Drawbacks
Tuyls et al EER of Large left-over Preprocessing
[66] 4.2% template entropy of templates
Nandakumar et al 14% FNMR, Good Preprocessing,
[49] 0% FMR Performance Long decoding time
Our Scheme 20− 50% FNMR, No Preprocessing, Higher error
0% FMR Fast Decoding rates
Table 3.1: Comparison of our scheme with existing fingerprint-based Implementations
based scheme while existing implementations use the Fuzzy Commitment scheme [66] or
The Fuzzy Vault Scheme [49], [74]. Implementations using both schemes require templates
to have a fixed size while this is not a requirement for our PinSketch based scheme.
As template size flexibility is important for practical use of biometrics, our PinSketch
based implementation is an important proof of concept of the feasibility of a practical
authentication system. It is important to note that the high error rates in our scheme are
mainly caused by the template creation techniques prior to encryption. Our encryption
scheme itself adds negligible error to the system. Therefore better template representation
and registration techniques can be explored to obtain matching performances comparable
to the best in published work for minutiae-based templates.
In 2005, Tuyls et al in [66] use the frequency domain approach to create the fingerprint
template. They extract a fixed length binary vector from a fingerprint image using a com-
bination of the squared directional field of the fingerprint and the Gabor filter response
of the fingerprint image. In order to compensate for translation and rotation effects, the
core is taken as the reference point. Their approach involves significant pre-processing at
the enrolment stage in order to create the enrolment template. Several samples of the
user’s fingerprint are taken and a vector is created for each sample. Statistical analysis of
these samples is performed to compare the user’s fingerprint pattern with the average of
the rest of the enrolled population. The results of the statistical analysis are then used
to determine the components of the binary bit string that are reliable and the reliable
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components are used to form the enrolled template.
The secure comparison is achieved using a Fuzzy Commitment Scheme and using a bi-
nary BCH code for error correction. Their tests were performed on the FVC2000 database
and a privately collected database. In both cases around 20% of the bits needed to be
corrected to achieve an equal error of approximately 4.2%. The authors claim that the
template is secure; however, the operating parameters chosen cause the public informa-
tion to reduce the entropy of the biometric. For example for their tests on the FVC2000
database, the BCH code (511, 76, 171) was chosen with the ability to correct 85 bit errors
in the 511 bit length codeword. The Fuzzy commitment scheme using a linear code with
a uniform input is equivalent to a Fuzzy Extractor over a Hamming metric. The entropy
loss in this case as defined in [24] is 511 − 76 = 435 bits. This implies that the left over
entropy in the fingerprint after the public information is published is 76 bits only. This
represents an issue that is common to all fingerprint biometric implementations. In order
to achieve reasonable accuracy in matching, we need to choose a linear code with sufficient
error correction capability. However, that amount of error correction significantly reduces
the left over entropy of the fingerprint when the public information is published.
The frequency domain approach has the advantage that the template accommodates
some non linear distortion and does not suffer from insertion and deletion of feature
points to the same extent as that occurring in a minutiae based representation. Therefore
there is significantly less error to correct. As well, such a frequency domain represen-
tation could provide a higher entropy template than that with minutiae representation
only. The disadvantage is that most standard fingerprint feature extractors extract the
minutiae location, orientation and associated details. When using the frequency domain
approach separate dedicated software to perform the frequency domain transform or filter
operations need to be added after the fingerprint acquisition from the scanner. Thus it is
not as modular and inter-system compatible as using a minutia-based approach.
Yang and Verbauwhede, also in 2005, [74] proposed a methodology to realise a se-
cure fingerprint authentication system using minutiae-based templates. They proposed
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to use the Fuzzy Vault for secure comparison of templates. They achieved pre-alignment
of templates by taking multiple samples of the fingerprint at enrolment and identifying a
reliable reference point. They then describe all the minutiae in a polar coordinate system
with respect to the reference point. In addition, they store the local structure of the ref-
erence point to assist with pre-alignment at the verification stage. The local structure is
a two nearest neighbour structure defined by the distances, angles subtended at the ridge
orientation of the reference point and relative ridge orientation of the neighbours with
respect to the ridge orientation of the reference point. The authors analysed the propor-
tion of chaff with respect to genuine points that must be in the vault for sufficiently hard
unlocking complexity for an attacker while keeping reasonable unlocking complexity for a
genuine user. However, a clear description of the implementation of Fuzzy Vault decoding
is not provided. The main drawback in their pre-alignment method is that in cases where
the reliable reference point or the points that make up its local structure are absent in
the query fingerprint, authentication failure will occur even if all the other minutiae are
present.
Very recently, in 2007, during the course of this thesis, Nandakumar et al [49] im-
plemented a minutiae-based bio-cryptographic fingerprint authentication system. The
fingerprint template was considered as a set of three dimensional points, the three dimen-
sions being the two cartesian coordinates of the minutia position and the ridge orientation.
Secure comparison was performed using a modified version of the Fuzzy Vault Scheme.
Citing infeasibility of the polynomial reconstruction via error correction in the scheme
proposed by Juels and Sudan in [38], the authors in [49] used successive Lagrange In-
terpolation steps to substitute for the single decoding step. The important process of
pre-aligning the enrolled and query templates was performed using a trimmed ICP al-
gorithm, a modification of the ICP algorithm described in [68], that made use of high
curvature points in the fingerprint ridge pattern. The locations of these high curvature
points were made public and were used at the verification stage to pre-align. The authors
claim that these curvature points do not reveal any information about the minutiae dis-
tribution of the fingerprint. During decoding, the query minutia point set was used to
filter out around 80% of the chaff and a matching algorithm was carried out between the
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filtered points of the vault and the query point set to determine the ‘unlocking set’ for
the Fuzzy Vault. The unlocking process involves selecting a subset of the unlocking set
to interpolate in an attempt to recover the original secret. A Cyclic Redundancy Check
process is used to verify if the unlocked secret is actually the real secret. The system
achieves very good accuracy parameters. However, the significant pre-processing and La-
grange Interpolation leads to a longer decoding time. In terms of security it is still much
harder for an attacker to use a brute force attack to recover the secret than a genuine
user with a valid set of query minutiae points.
Also in 2007, Ratha et al [54] propose Cancelable Fingerprint Templates, a different
biocryptographic construction, where instead of the original template, a transformed ver-
sion is used and different transformed versions are used for different applications. This
protects the original because the original template is never used directly. It is always
transformed and if the transformed version is stolen, a new one can be issued. The orig-
inal template is transformed by a one way non invertible function such that even if the
transform and the transformed template are available in public, it is extremely difficult to
obtain the original biometric. They proposed three different methods of transformation:
1. A cartesian transform where the quantised cartesian frame of the fingerprint un-
dergoes a surjective mapping which is essentially a re-ordering of the quanta. This
mapping is specifically designed to be non injective so that the transform cannot be
inverted.
2. A polar transform where the quantised polar reference frame undergoes a re-ordering
which is strictly non-injective and hence non-invertible.
3. A functional transform which is locally smooth but globally not smooth so that
minor changes in minutiae position due to non linear distortion in the finger do not
adversely affect the matching result.
With the cartesian and polar transforms, as the surjective function is designed so that
multiple quanta or points in the domain map to the same points in the codomain, this
mapping might increase the FMR. Points at the border of quanta might appear in an
adjacent quantum in the query fingerprint and may be very far apart in the transformed
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versions of the fingerprint templates. These two transforms are not local distance preserv-
ing for minutiae at the quanta borders, thus increasing the FNMR. The actual ability of
an attacker to launch a brute force attack has not been rigorously explored in [54]. The
complexity for the attacker will increase as the number of multiple mappings of elements
in the domain to a single element in the codomain increases and will vary from transform
to transform. If different transforms are used for different enrolments, the security for
each enrolled template will be different.
A similar case can be made for the folding transform, an example of the functional trans-
form given in [54]. A simplified first order approximation for the folding transform is
analysed for security. It is an open question to find such locally smooth and globally
not smooth functions that can handle the non linear distortion in fingerprints, which are
additionally non invertible and to establish bounds on their non invertibility. Cancelable
biometrics also require the enrolled and query templates to have a common reference
point, so the success of the transform will also depend on the quality of the enrolment
process.
Fractional biometrics is a concept proposed by Bayly [11] in 2004 which has some
similarity to Cancelable Biometrics. According to this concept, instead of using all the
information in a fingerprint to form a template, only a portion of the information is used
and the rest is filled with false information. This idea has a strong potential to be used
to create revocable biometric templates. An analysis of the security of fractional tem-
plates to collusion when multiple templates are generated from the same user, has been
conducted in [12].
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have clearly listed the steps involved in the GRS decoding stage of a
Fuzzy Vault scheme thus discounting claims by Qiong et al [40] that the use of GRS codes
in the UNLOCK algorithm is wrong.
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We have analysed the three main bio-cryptographic constructs, the Fuzzy Commit-
ment Scheme, the Fuzzy Vault and the PinSketch scheme against three attacks put forward
by Scheirer and Boult [59]. Of the three attacks, the most pertinent is the ARM. The
PinSketch construct was found to be robust to the ARM attack whereas the Fuzzy Vault
of Juels and Sudan [38] was found to be vulnerable to ARM.
We have surveyed the current fingerprint based implementations of secure authenti-
cation systems. Although minutiae based templates are the easiest and most compatible
templates to use, we found that no comprehensive resource existed that analysed the dis-
tribution, commonality, error and entropy of minutiae-based templates. It is important to
understand the behaviour of minutiae based templates before they can be used in existing
bio-cryptographic primitives.
The next chapter will introduce 8 different minutiae-based representations studied in
this thesis.
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Chapter 4
Minutiae-based Templates:
Translation and Rotation Invariance
This thesis focusses on fingerprint templates built from minutiae-based information. In
this chapter we will 8 different minutiae-based representations for fingerprint templates
that were developed and analysed as part of this research. All the representations are de-
scribed in a coordinate system intrinsic to the fingerprint, allowing the resulting templates
to be invariant to translation and rotation of the finger when placed on the scanner. The
first five representations are fairly common and have been used for un-encrypted minutiae
based fingerprint matching [77, 46]. The last three representations are new and developed
for the thesis.
It must be noted that most commercial matchers use much more information than
simple minutiae location and orientation. Several matchers compare information derived
from the images of the fingerprint after several image processing operations. However the
actual template used by each commercial matcher is different and proprietary. Moreover
all commercial matchers require the enrolled image to be available for alignment prior to
matching. The purpose of this research is to create templates that are inherently transla-
tion and rotation invariant so that the enrolled image need never be stored once enrolment
is complete. The principles outlined in this chapter for minutiae-based templates can be
extended to templates created from additional fingerprint features.
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The set of minutiae extracted from a fingerprint can be considered as a point pattern
distribution. Matching two fingerprint images can then be reduced to matching two sets
of minutiae ‘points’ and can be considered as a non rigid point pattern matching problem.
The representations and constructs developed here can be extended to any field where
such pattern matching is required.
When a fingerprint image is provided to a feature extractor, it locates the position of
the minutiae in the image and also extracts some features associated with them. The most
common extracted features are listed in Chapter 1.3. We build fingerprint templates based
on only two of those features from each minutia, both features described in a coordinate
system based on the scanner’s reference frame:
1. The position of the minutia described usually in a cartesian coordinate system.
2. The ridge orientation of the ridge where the minutia occurs.
If, at different capture attempts of the same fingerprint, the fingerprint was placed in a
different position or orientation on the scanner, the coordinates and orientation of the
minutiae extracted will be different although the actual point patterns may correspond
very closely. We seek to overcome this problem of translation and rotation between the
extracted minutiae features from different fingerprint samples by describing the minutiae
in a reference frame intrinsic to the fingerprint.
There are two ways we create translation and rotation invariant minutiae-based templates:
1. Reference Point Based Templates: The coordinates and orientation of all the minu-
tiae are described with respect to a common reference point that can be reliably
located in different samples of the same finger. The reference point we use in our
research is the fingerprint core. The core is the location of the center of the most
recurving ridge [35]. Most feature extractors extract the location and ridge orien-
tation of the core of a fingerprint as well. Thus, the position coordinates and ridge
orientation of the set of minutiae and the core of the fingerprint are used to define
translation and rotation free minutiae-based fingerprint templates.
2. Reference Point Free Templates: The template is described as a set of minutiae-
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based structures, each structure described in a reference frame intrinsic to the minu-
tiae that comprise it.
We describe eight different minutiae-based templates. Three of them, the FNN , V OR
and TRI representations are reference point free templates and the rest use the core as
the reference point. It must be noted that the core is not the most reliable reference point
as fingerprints that are classified as arches do not possess cores and cannot be enrolled
in the system. We use the core in this thesis as its location and orientation can be easily
obtained from standard feature extractors. However, the reference point based templates
described in this thesis can be constructed using other reliable reference points like high
curvature points used by Nandakumar et al [49].
4.1 Standard Three Dimensional Polar Representa-
tion (3DPolar)
A fingerprint template T can be defined as a set of three dimensional points, each dimen-
sion being a real number. Each three dimensional point is defined by a triplet (R,Θ, α),
with one point defined for each minutia extracted from the finger. Each point is a minu-
tia’s location and orientation described in a polar coordinate system centered on the core
with the 0◦ axis of the coordinate system aligned with the ridge orientation at the core.
The first two dimensions (R,Θ) will be the polar coordinates of its position with respect
to the core and the third dimension (α) will be the ridge orientation of the minutia relative
to the ridge orientation at the core. This is what we call the standard three dimensional
Polar (3DPolar) representation of fingerprint minutiae. The 3DPolar representation for a
minutia Mi in a fingerprint, giving rise to the point Pi is shown in Figure 4.1(a). In the
figure β is the ridge orientation at the core and χ is the ridge orientation at Mi extracted
by the feature extractor with respect to the scanner’s reference frame. This representation
is translation and rotation invariant as all dimensions are expressed relative to the core.
Let N be the total number of minutiae extracted from a fingerprint and hence the to-
tal number of 3DPolar points in the template. Then the template T defined using the
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3DPolar representation is defined as:
T = {Pi = (Ri,Θi, αi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (4.1)
where Ri ∈ R and 0 ≤ Θi, αi < 360◦.
4.2 Standard Three Dimensional Cartesian Repre-
sentation (3DCartesian)
A fingerprint template can also be defined as a set of three dimensional points with the
first two dimensions of each point describing the position of each minutia in a cartesian
coordinate system centered on the core and with the x-axis of the coordinate system
aligned with the ridge orientation at the core. Thus each minutia gives rise to a point
defined by a triplet (X, Y, α), where X is the x coordinate of the minutia’s position from
the core, Y is the y coordinate of the minutia’s position from the core and α as before is
the ridge orientation of the minutia relative to the ridge orientation at the core. This is
the standard three dimensional cartesian (3DCartesian) representation of a minutia and
is shown in Figure 4.1(b).
If N is the total number of minutiae and hence 3DCartesian points in a template T of a
fingerprint,
T = {Pi = (Xi, Yi, αi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (4.2)
where Xi, Yi ∈ R and 0 ≤ αi < 360◦.
α = χ − β,  χ >= β
α = 360 + χ − β, χ  < β
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Figure 4.1: Three Dimensional Representation Relative to the Core
We looked at core-independent methods of creating the minutiae-based templates.
66
These methods involved describing each minutia in terms of its relationship to other
minutiae points surrounding it. These structured patterns of points called minutiae-based
structures were specifically chosen as each pattern could be described in a coordinate
system intrinsic to its structure, independent of the scanner’s frame of reference. We
investigated three distinct minutiae-based structures for template creation; A Five Nearest
Neighbour representation, a Voronoi representation and a triangles based approach. The
first two of the three following representations describe each minutia in the minutiae
point set in terms of the distribution of the minutiae points surrounding it. Hence they
are called local structure representations.
4.3 The Five Nearest Neighbours Representation (FNN)
A fingerprint template T is defined as a set of structures. Each structure Si is associated
with a minutiaMi. Every minutia pointMi in the fingerprint is described by the five minu-
tiae that are closest to it, called its five nearest neighbours. Each minutia’s structure Si is
defined by this local description and is given by Si = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, ri4, θi4, ri5, θi5),
where ri1 to ri5 are the Euclidean distances of the five closest neighbours from the central
minutia Mi and θi1 to θi5 are the angles made by the lines joining each neighbour to Mi,
relative to the ridge orientation of Mi. As a result we call them relative angles. A local
structure based on five nearest neighbours is shown in Figure 4.2(a). Nearest neighbour
local structures were used by [46] and [77] in their minutia matching algorithms.
If N is the total number of minutiae and hence the total number of FNN structures in
the template,
T = {Si = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, ri4, θi4, ri5, θi5); 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (4.3)
where rij ∈ R and 0 ≤ θij < 360◦.
4.4 The Voronoi Neighbours Structure (VOR)
This representation technique is very similar to the five nearest neighbour structure except
that the neighbours are determined by constructing a Voronoi diagram. In constructing
the Voronoi diagram, the spatial point pattern of minutiae is divided into regions. Each
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region, called a Voronoi region or Voronoi polygon, is associated with one minutia point
and contains all the points in the plane that are closest to it. For a particular minutia
point, the minutiae that share a Voronoi polygon boundary with it are called its Voronoi
neighbours. An example is shown in Figure 4.2(b). Every minutia point Mi will be
described by the position and relative orientations of its Voronoi neighbours. The local
structure Si of Mi is represented as (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, ......, rini , θini), where ri1 to rini
are the Euclidean distances of its ni Voronoi neighbours and θi1 to θini are the angles
made by the lines joining these neighbours to Mi, relative to the ridge orientation of Mi.
Voronoi based structures were used by [75] and [20] in their minutia matching algorithms.
If N is the total number of minutiae and hence the total number of VOR structures in
the template,
T = {Si = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, ......, rini , θini), 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (4.4)
where rij ∈ R and 0 ≤ θij < 360◦.
4.5 Triangle-based Structures (TRI)
The two previous representations describe each minutia point in terms of its relationship
to other neighbouring minutiae. These approaches are inherently local, while the triangle
based representation is global. Triangle structures have been used in the fingerprint
matching algorithm of Chen et.al. in [21]. In the triangle-based approach, a fingerprint
template is described as the set of triplets of distinct minutiae. Each triplet forms a
triangle, and the shape of this triangle is described in an orientation and translation
invariant manner. Let p1, p2, p3 be the positions of each minutia in a triplet, ordered
so that they trace around the vertices of a triangle in an anti-clockwise direction. Let
u1, u2, u3 denote the displacement vectors from p1 to p2, p2 to p3 and p3 to p1 respectively.
Added to this information is also α1, α2, α3, the ridge orientation of the fingerprint at p1, p2
and p3 respectively, represented as a relative angle with respect to the core’s orientation.
The shape of the triangle is represented by the TRI structure Si = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3),
as shown in Figure 4.2(c), where rij is the length of uj and θij is the angular difference
between uj and uj−1.
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(a) Five Nearest Neighbors Structure (b) Voronoi Neighbors Structure (c) Triangle based Structure
Figure 4.2: Minutiae-based Structures
An important difference of the triangles based representation is that here there is no one-
to-one correspondence between a minutia and a TRI structure. In fact if there are N
minutiae extracted from a fingerprint, there will be NTRI =
(
N
3
)
possible TRI structures.
In constructing the template we could either select N ′ ≤ NTRI structures randomly from
all the possible structures or define a restriction to use only triangles having certain
parameters. In any case let N ′ denote the number of TRI structures used to build the
template. Then a fingerprint template T is defined as,
T = {Si = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ′}, (4.5)
where rij ∈ R and 0 ≤ θij < 360◦.
The experiments and results reported in this thesis using this representation have been
performed by Dr. Jason Jeffers.
4.6 Four Dimensional Representation using FNN or
VOR Structures, (FNN4D) or (VOR4D)
This representation scheme converts the set of three dimensional minutiae points mea-
sured in the scanner’s reference frame to a set of inter-dependent four dimensional points,
described in a reference frame intrinsic to the fingerprint. The transformation is done as
follows.
A structure Si is created for each minutia in the extracted minutia point set, using the
FNN or VOR representation. We now shift the focus from the structure center to each
neighbour of each structure Si and define a four dimensional point for every neighbour of
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every minutia in every Si. The first two dimensions define the position of the neighbour
with respect to the central minutia of Si and the next two dimensions define the position
of the neighbour with respect to the core of the fingerprint. These positions are described
in the polar coordinate system.
A four dimensional point generated by a neighbouring minutia Mi in an FNN structure
Si when using a polar coordinate system is shown in Fig.4.3(a). The first two dimensions
(r, θ) will be the polar coordinates of Mi with respect to a coordinate frame defined by
the position and ridge orientation of the minutia at the center of the FNN pattern. The
next two dimensions (R,Θ) will be the polar coordinates of Mi in a coordinate system
defined by the position and ridge orientation of the core of the fingerprint. The resulting
four dimensional point will be Pi = (r, θ, R,Θ). Note that the accuracy of R and Θ are
affected by the accuracy of the location of the core whereas r and θ do not suffer from
that problem.
The set of Four Dimensional Points when the neighbours of a minutia are determined by
a Voronoi diagram are obtained in exactly the same manner. Here, each four dimensional
point will be obtained from every neighbour of every Voronoi neighbour structure in the
minutia point pattern.
If N is the total number of minutiae extracted from a fingerprint, the number of 4D points
will be much more than N . This is because a neighbour minutia in a structure Si could be
a neighbour in several other structures and every instance of being a neighbour generates
a four dimensional point. Let N ′ be the total number of four dimensional points in the
template T , then,
T = {Pi = (ri, θi, Ri,Θi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N ′}, (4.6)
where ri, Ri ∈ R and 0 ≤ θi,Θi < 360◦.
4.7 Five Dimensional Representation using FNN or
VOR Structures, (FNN5D) or (VOR5D)
This scheme converts the set of three dimensional points extracted from a fingerprint to
a set of inter-dependent five dimensional points. The transformation is done as follows.
As in the Four Dimensional representation, a structure Si is created for each minutia in
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Figure 4.3: Four and Five Dimensional Representation Using the Five Nearest Neighbours
the extracted minutia point set, using the FNN or VOR representation. We now shift the
focus from the structure center to each neighbour of each structure Si. A five dimensional
point (r, θ, R,Θ, α) is defined for every neighbour of every minutia in every Si generated
from the minutiae. The neighbours could be one of the Five Nearest Neighbours (FNN)
or one of the Voronoi neighbours, depending on the type of neighbour selection strategy
used. The first four dimensions are exactly the same as in the 4D representation strategy.
The fifth dimension α is the ridge orientation of the neighbour in the FNN or VOR pattern
relative to the ridge orientation of the core. A five dimensional point obtained from one
of the Five Nearest Neighbours Mi of a minutia in a fingerprint is shown in Fig.4.3(b).
Let N ′ be the total number of five dimensional points in the template T , then,
T = {Pi = (ri, θi, Ri,Θi, αi), 1 ≤ i ≤ N ′}, (4.7)
where ri, Ri ∈ R and 0 ≤ θi,Θi, αi < 360◦.
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4.8 Combined Local Pattern (FNN or VOR) and Global
Position (Polar Coordinates), (FNNLocalPlusGlobal)
or (VORLocalPlusGlobal)
A minutiae based template defined using this method will be a described as a set of struc-
tures where a structure Si is created for each minutia Mi extracted from the fingerprint.
A structure will describe the local pattern of the minutiae around it using the FNN or
VOR representation and also will describe its position from the core which is used here
as a reference point. This representation method is a combination of the 3DPolar with
the FNN or VOR representations. A structure Si will be defined by two components:
1. A set of two dimensional points Ploci = (ri1, θi1, ri2, θi2, ri3, θi3, ......, rini , θini), where
ri1 to rini are the Euclidean distances of its ni FNN or VOR neighbours and θi1 to
θini are the angles made by the lines joining these neighbours to the central minutia
Mi, relative to the ridge orientation of Mi.
2. A two dimensional point Pglobi = (Ri,Θi) describing the location of Mi in a polar
coordinate coordinate system centered on the core.
Therefore Si = (Ploci , Pglobi). If N is the total number of minutiae, the template thus
formed is given by
Ti = {Si; 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (4.8)
where rij ∈ R, 0 ≤ θij < 360◦, Ri ∈ R and 0 ≤ Θi < 360◦.
An example of an FNNLocalPlusGlobal structure for a minutia Mi in a fingerprint is
shown in Figure 4.4.
The primary factor that distinguishes the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlus-
Global representations from the FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D and VOR5D representations
is that in the former, the structure shape is retained. Although this makes matching of
the former templates a bit more complicated, it retains structure shape information that
is lost in the latter representations.
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Figure 4.4: Combined Local FNN Plus Global Structure (FNNLocalPlusGlobal)
Thus a fingerprint template could be represented as a set of multi-dimensional
points as in the 3DPolar, 3DCartesian, FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D and VOR5D
representations or as a set of structures, each structure comprising of several
two dimensional points as in the FNN, VOR, TRI, FNNLocalPlusGlobal and
VORLocalPlusGlobal representations.
The next chapter demonstrates the working of a fingerprint matching algorithm where
the fingerprint templates are described as a set of points or structures.
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Chapter 5
Fingerprint Template Matching,
Quantisation and the Effect of Non
Linear Distortion
This chapter conducts the preliminary analysis on intra sample variation and inter finger
distinction for each of the template types, that is needed before any secure authentication
system can be built. It describes how error prone inputs, like minutiae based templates,
must be compared. In addition, as the cryptographic constructs considered in this thesis
work over the discrete domain, the elements in the templates must be digitised. Quantisa-
tion is the first step to creating digital templates. This chapter studies how the matching
performance is affected when the different minutiae-based templates are quantised.
In all the minutiae-based representation techniques described in the previous chapter,
each element (points or structures) of the set that makes up the template is described in
a coordinate system intrinsic to the minutiae that form part of that element. Thus each
element is individually translation and rotation invariant. However, non linear distortion
due to varying finger pressure results in significant change in some minutiae’s relative
position to the minutiae around it. As a result of non linear distortion, when we com-
pare two similar elements in different samples of the same fingerprint, we need to allow a
certain degree of variation in the components of the element that describe its shape. The
allowed variation in each dimension of an element is described as an ordered set called
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tolerance limits. Tolerance limits are important to reduce the False Rejection of genuine
query samples whose elements vary from the elements in the enrolled samples as a result
of non linear distortion.
For any matcher, it is important to choose the right tolerance limits that correctly
models the kind of intra sample variation that exists in a biometric population. In this
chapter we determine the most suitable tolerance limits for each type of template built
from fingerprint minutiae. As mentioned in Chapter 4 a minutiae based template T is
comprised of either a set of multi-dimensional real valued points (3DPolar, 3DCartesian,
FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D, VOR5D) or a set of structures, where each structure consists
of several multi-dimensional real valued points (FNN, VOR, TRI, FNNLocalPlusGlobal,
VORLocalPlusGlobal). Non-quantised matching of templates is essentially a tolerance
limit based comparison of the corresponding dimensions of the real valued points in the
templates.
We next describe the main features of the matcher used in this thesis. We introduce
a new measure for determining a match between templates that takes into account the
sizes of the sets being compared. We show that in every representation, this new measure
gives a better matching performance than the standard measures that do not take set
sizes into account. We describe the matcher algorithm used in this thesis, that uses this
new measure to make matching decisions between templates.
For each representation (except TRI), we run a matching algorithm at different tol-
erance limits to determine the best tolerance limit (TOLbest) for each representation to
be used in a secure authentication system. As the aim of this thesis is to build a secure
authentication system, we must incorporate a matcher that operates at a threshold where
the FMR is very low. This will decrease the likelihood that an attacker can spoof the
system by simply trying to authenticate using random fingerprints. As an example of this,
if the FMR of a system is 25% then one in four random fingerprints will match a valid
enrolled fingerprint. Such a system will be extremely vulnerable to masquerade attack. A
system secure against masquerade attack will require that the FMR be 0 or very close to 0.
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Once the best tolerance limits are identified for each representation, we use the tol-
erance limits as the quantisation steps to quantise each dimension of the elements that
build the template. Thus the best tolerance limits are used to define the Quantisation
Parameters. We then carry out a matching algorithm on the quantised templates. The
main questions we seek the answer to, in this chapter are:
1. Is there a significant change in matching performance on quantisation?
2. Will the best tolerance limits TOLbest used to set the quantisation parameters, be
the best performing (lowest FNMR at 0% FMR) parameters for quantised matching?
In this chapter, we introduce the fingerprint databases that are used in this thesis to
build minutiae-based templates.
5.1 Fingerprint Databases
At the start of this research matching algorithms were tested using a private database.
Subsequently a commercial Software Development Kit (SDK) for feature extraction was
acquired which meant the matching algorithms could be tested on publicly available stan-
dard databases. This section gives a brief description of all the fingerprint databases used
in this thesis.
The first database used was a pre-existing privately collected fingerprint database
consisting of 74 distinct fingerprint impressions with 5 samples of each. The fingerprints
were rolled, off-line, inked impressions scanned using a Mitsubishi Diamond View DV648U
flatbed scanner set at 600 dpi. The database was collected by Bayly [11] as part of the
research for his thesis. The core and minutiae were identified by eye and their Cartesian
coordinates were recorded by a software tool developed by him. On an average 28 minu-
tiae were identified for each fingerprint sample. In these samples, 10 pixels corresponded
to approximately 0.5mm. For ease of reference, we shall refer to this as database 1 (DB1).
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A commercial SDK from Neurotechnologĳa [4] was used to extract the minutiae loca-
tions and orientations from the fingerprint images in the private database. We refer to
this as database 2 (DB2).
The second database we used was one of a publicly available database of fingerprint
images used for the FVC2000 competition. The competition used four databases of finger-
print images, three were scanned using three different types of scanners respectively and
the fourth was a set of synthetic fingerprints. After the competition these images were
made publicly available at [2]. Each database has 110 distinct fingerprints with 8 samples
of each. The fingerprints in each database numbered 1 to 100 are denoted as SetA and
those numbered 101 to 110 are denoted as SetB. For this research we used a database
of fingerprint images that were scanned using a low-cost optical sensor ‘Secure Desktop
Scanner’ by KeyTronic. The images had a resolution of 500dpi and were of size 300× 300
pixels [2]. We used only the SetA of this database, containing 100 fingerprints and 8
samples of each. We used Neurotechnologĳa’s feature extractor to extract the minutiae
locations and orientations. We refer to this as database 3 (DB3).
The third database we used was one of the publicly available databases used in the
FVC2002 competition. The images used in the competition were made available at [3]. Of
the four databases available, we used a database where the images were scanned using the
optical sensor ‘FX2000’ by Biometrika. The images had resolution of 569 dpi and a size
of 296× 560 pixels. Again, we used the SetA of that database which had 100 fingerprints
and 8 samples of each. For every fingerprint, out of the 8 samples, only samples 1, 2, 7, 8
were used in the experiment. Nandakumar et al in [49, Section V], reported that the
impressions numbered 3, 4, 5, 6 were obtained by asking users to consciously exaggerate
the translation and rotation displacement. As a result we follow their principle of choosing
the samples 1, 2, 7, 8 that are more truly representative of co-operative users enrolling in
high security applications. Neurotechnologĳa’s feature extractor was used to extract the
minutiae features from these samples. This database is referred to as database 4 (DB4).
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5.2 Tolerance Limits
This section defines the tolerance limits used when matching templates built from minutiae-
based points and structures.
• 3DPolar: In order to match two templates with elements described as 3DPolar
points, we need to first set tolerances on the amount two minutiae in the two finger-
prints can vary in their position from the core in the core-centered polar coordinate
frame and still be matched. A Point Match occurs between two 3DPolar points in
two different templates if the difference in their distance from the core lies within
the distance threshold δR, the difference in the angle that they make with the 0◦
axis lies within the angle threshold δΘ and the difference in their relative ridge ori-
entations is within the orientation threshold δα. The tolerance limit for a 3DPolar
Point Match is described by the triplet (δR, δΘ, δα).
• 3DCartesian: On similar lines, a Point Match occurs between two 3DCartesian
points from two different fingerprint templates if the difference in their cartesian
distance along the x axis from the core lies within the distance threshold δX, the
difference in their cartesian distance along the y axis from the core lies within the
distance threshold δY and the difference in their relative ridge orientations is within
the orientation threshold δα. The tolerance limit for a 3DCartesian Point Match is
described by the triplet (δX, δY, δα).
• FNN: Templates defined as a set of FNN structures derived from the extracted
fingerprint minutiae are compared by comparing the individual structures that com-
prise the templates. In order to match the five nearest neighbour local structures
we need set tolerance limits on the distance and relative angle of each neighbour
in the structure. A neighbour match occurs between the neighbors of two FNN
structures if the difference in distance from the structure center falls within the
distance threshold (δr) and the difference in relative angle falls within the angle
threshold (δθ). A match between two Five Nearest Neighbour structures, called a
structure match, occurs if the number of neighbour matches is greater than the local
match threshold l which is the minimum number of neighbors that must match for
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a structure match to occur. Each combination of tolerance limits is represented by
the triplet (δr, δθ, l).
• VOR: In matching Voronoi based structures, the same matching technique as the
five nearest neighbors’ structure is applied. Each combination of tolerance limits is
defined by the triplet (δr, δθ, l).
• TRI: Two triangles from two different templates are regarded as a match if the
Cartesian difference between each displacement is within a specified edge threshold
δr, each ridge orientation is within a specified direction threshold δθ and each rela-
tive ridge orientation is within a specified orientation threshold δα after a possible
cyclic reordering of edges. Each combination of tolerance limits is represented by
the triplet (δr, δθ, δα).
• FNN4D and VOR4D: Templates that are a set of four dimensional points based
on the FNN or VOR structures can be compared by comparing the individual four
dimensional point. Two FNN4D or VOR4D points are said to match if the dif-
ference in radial position from the structure center varies by no more than the
distance threshold δr and the difference in the angle subtended at the structure
center varies by no more than the angle threshold δθ. In addition, the difference
in the radial position from the core must be no more than the distance threshold
δR and the difference in the angle subtended at the core must be no more than the
angle threshold δΘ. The tolerance limit for matching two four dimensional points
is given by quadruplet (δr, δθ, δR, δΘ).
• FNN5D and VOR5D: On similar lines the tolerance limit for matching two five
dimensional points obtained from a set of FNN or VOR structures is given by the
quintuplet (δr, δθ, δR, δΘ, δα), where δα is the maximum allowable difference in the
relative ridge orientation of the neighbour relative to the ridge orientation of the
core.
• FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal: Two templates built using
either of these structures can be compared by comparing the corresponding struc-
tures. Two structures Si = (Ploci , Pglobi) and Sj = (Plocj , Pglobj) are said to match if
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both the conditions below are satisfied:
1. The difference in their local structures is within the local structure tolerance
limit (δr, δθ, l).
2. The difference in their corresponding global positions is within the global po-
sition tolerance limit (δR, δΘ).
Thus their tolerance limit is given by (δr, δθ, l, δR, δΘ).
5.3 Match and Set Difference Percentage Thresh-
olds : A new proportional threshold for authen-
tication
In this thesis we define two types of Thresholds to declare two templates as a match.
When the threshold for a match decision between two templates is based on the min-
imum number of elements (points or structures) in the two sets (templates) that must
be in common or be similar (in other words, based on the cardinality of the intersection
between the two sets), such a threshold is called a Match Threshold (MTh).
If the threshold for a match decision between two templates is determined on the basis
of set difference i.e the threshold is defined as the maximum set difference that can occur
between two templates, for them to be registered as a match, it is called the Set Difference
Threshold (SDTh).
When the sizes of the templates being compared are not always the same and partic-
ularly when large variations in template size can occur, it is often disadvantageous to set
the same threshold for every pair of templates being compared. Instead, if the threshold
takes the individual sizes of the compared templates into consideration we can greatly
improve the manner in which errors between templates are modeled. Thus the match and
set difference based thresholds can be redefined to be expressed relative to the size of the
union of the two templates being compared.
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A relative match based threshold can be defined as the minimum number of matches
between two templates expressed as a percentage of the size of the union of the two sets
(templates) being compared. This is called the Match Percentage Threshold (MTh%). A
set difference based threshold that takes set sizes in to account will define the maximum
permissible set difference between two templates as a percentage of the size of the union of
the two template sets. This is called the Set Difference Percentage Threshold (SDTh%).
In these cases, the actual match threshold or set difference threshold for the pair of tem-
plates being compared will vary depending on the sizes of the sets being compared. To
our best knowledge we are the first to carry out fingerprint matching on a relative set
difference based threshold.
5.4 Test for Best Tolerance Limits
In the design of any matching algorithm it is important to determine the tolerance limits
that best model the variations that occur between different samples of the same finger.
The tolerance limits will differ for different minutiae-based representation schemes. For
each representation scheme (except TRI) listed in Chapter 4, we designed and encoded
a matcher in C++. We ran a matching algorithm at different combinations of tolerance
limits and noted the matching performance in terms of the FMR and FNMR at different
Thresholds (Th). We also noted the match performance using the absolute set difference
SDTh and compared it to the performance using the relative set difference threshold
SDTh%. The tests reported in this chapter were written in C++ and run on high perfor-
mance parallel computers of the Victorian Partnership for Advanced Computing (VPAC)
using the Message Passing Interface (MPI) protocol.
A description of the matching algorithm when a template is expressed as a set of points
follows. A similar logic applies if the template is made up of structures which are each
a set of two dimensional points. Let Tenr = {Pi; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr} be the enrolled template
where each Pi is a multi-dimensional point and Nenr is the number of points that make
up the enrolled template. Let Tver = {P ′k; 1 ≤ k ≤ Nver} be query template made of Nver
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multi-dimensional points P ′k.
As the metric used in cryptographic constructs for templates represented as sets is the
set difference, we use the relative Set Difference Threshold to make a matching decision
when comparing two templates. Let SDTh% be the maximum set difference percentage
threshold that can be allowed between the two templates Tenr and Tver for them to be con-
sidered a match. Then the Set Difference Threshold SDTh for that pair being compared
is given by
SDTh =
SDTh%
100
× |U |, (5.1)
where |U | is the size of the union of Tenr and Tver.
When a user enrols, the enrolled template Tenr is created and stored in a database.
When a claimant wishes to verify themself as the enrolled user, they present their finger
to the scanner and the template generation algorithm creates the query template Tver.
The idea behind the matching algorithm is to determine how many points in the enrolled
template find a matching point in the query template. Then, we count the number of
points in the query that found a match in the enrolled template. The results of this two
way matching process is used to make a matching decision. A two way matching process
is used to take into account situations where an element in the enrolled template matches
two or more elements in the query or vice versa. As a result the number of matches
obtained both ways may be different. Such multiple matches occur when two or more
elements in a single template are close to each other in all the dimensions. A step by step
description of the matching algorithm follows.
1. The first step is to determine the number of points in the enrolled template that
find a match in the query template. Every point Pi ∈ Tenr, is compared to each
point P ′k ∈ Tver to check if P ′k matches Pi. A point P ′k ∈ Tver matches Pi ∈ Tenr if
for every coordinate dij of Pi and dkj of P ′k where 1 ≤ j ≤ n, the following condition
is satisfied:
dij − tolj
2
≤ dkj ≤ dij + tolj
2
, (5.2)
where tolj is the tolerance limit of the jth dimension.
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2. For every Pi ∈ Tenr, every point in the query template is compared successively
with it and if the condition in Equation 5.2 is true for all the n dimensions, when
comparing with point P ′k, then P ′k is said to match Pi. The comparison of Pi with
points in the query template stops. A counter that records the number of elements
in the enrolled template that find a match in the query template, is incremented and
the same test is carried out for the next point in Tenr i.e. Pi+1. If no match for Pi
was found, a counter that records the number of elements in the enrolled template
that did not find a match, is incremented and the test is now carried out for the
next point Pi+1. The test continues until all Pi; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr have been tested.
3. Let NMatchenr denote the number of points of the enrolled template that found
matches in the query template and let NFailenr denote the number of points in the
enrolled template that failed to find a match in the query template.
4. The matching test is now reversed i.e. we count the number of points in the query
template that found a match in the enrolled template. Thus for every P ′k ∈ Tver a
point Pi ∈ Tenr matches if for every dimension j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n of the two points, the
following condition is true:
dkj − tolj
2
≤ dij ≤ dkj + tolj
2
, (5.3)
where dkj and dij are the coordinates of P ′k and Pi in the jth dimension.
5. Let NMatchver denote the number of points of the query template that found
matches in the enrolled template and let NFailver denote the number of points in
the query template that failed to find a match in the enrolled template.
6. The number of matches NMatch recorded between the two templates is given by
NMatch =
NMatchenr +NMatchver
2
. (5.4)
7. The set difference SD between the two templates is given by
SD = NFailenr +NFailver. (5.5)
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8. The two templates will be considered a match if
SD ≤ SDTh
=
SDTh%
100
× |U |
=
SDTh%
100
× Nenr +Nver + SD
2
.
(5.6)
Rearranging the equation gives us the condition for a match as
SD ≤ (
SDTh%
100
)(Nenr+Nver
2
)
1− 0.5SDTh%
100
. (5.7)
The Set Difference Percentage Threshold (SDTh%) will usually be a parameter that is
fixed in the matcher. Equality in Equation 5.7 gives the maximum permissible set differ-
ence i.e the Set Difference Threshold (SDTh) as a function of SDTh%, Nenr and Nver.
If a template is comprised of structures, i.e. if Tenr = {Si; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr} and
Tver = {S ′k; 1 ≤ k ≤ Nver}, each structure Si or S ′k will be a set of of two dimensional
points. In order to compare such templates, the structures in the two templates are
compared by comparing the dimensions of the corresponding points that comprise it as
described in Equation 5.2 in the algorithm above. A structure match decision is made
based on the local match threshold l as described in Section 5.2. In this thesis, the lo-
cal match threshold l was defined both as a Match Threshold and as a Set Difference
Threshold for different matching algorithm implementations. The matching algorithm
determines the number of structures in the enrolled template that found matches in the
query NMatchenr and hence computes NFailenr. The reverse matching process is per-
formed to determine NMatchver and NFailver. The Equations 5.5 and 5.7 along with
Nenr, Nver and SDTh%, will be used by the matcher to decide if the two templates match.
A matching algorithm was run on fingerprints from DB4 for all the representation
strategies except TRI. The matching algorithm described above was run at different com-
binations of tolerance limits. Each distance dimension of the tolerance limit was varied
from 20 pixels to 40 pixels, in steps of 10 pixels. Each angular dimension was varied
from 20◦ to 40◦ in steps of 10◦. At each tolerance limit, the matching algorithm was
performed at set difference percentage thresholds varying from 0% to 100%, in steps of
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1% and the FMR and FNMR at each threshold were noted. Thus for every combination
of tolerance limits we had a list of FMR and FNMR values at SDTh% values from 0
to 100. This list was used to plot the ROC curves and determine the performance char-
acteristics of the system at each of the tolerance limits. From the ROC curves for each
tolerance limit, we identified the tolerance limit that gave the best matching performance.
In this thesis the tolerance limit giving the best matching performance TOLbest is
chosen as the tolerance limit that has the lowest FNMR value at a SDTh% where the
FMR is 0%. This is called the FNMR at 0% FMR. Note that in theory 0% FMR cannot
be achieved. When reported here, it just means that no false matches were recorded in
the comparisons between fingerprints in the experiment. The ROC curve for the 3DPolar
representation at its best tolerance limit TOLbest = (20, 30, 40) is shown in Figure 5.1.
The vertical line cutting the x axis at 0 indicates the threshold where the lowest FNMR
occurs when the FMR is still 0. This lowest FNMR is 24.19% as seen in the figure. If we
wish to operate at any lower FNMR, the FMR of the system becomes non zero.
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Figure 5.1: ROC curve for the 3DPolar representation over DB4 at (20,30,40) tolerance
limits
The best tolerance limits as a result of the experiment for each of the representations
is given in the Table 5.1. The SDTh% column indicates the set difference percentage
threshold corresponding to which the FNMR is lowest at 0% FMR.
In order to test if the performance of a matcher when the threshold takes set sizes
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TOLbest SDTh% FNMR FMR
(of 4465 comparisons)
3DPolar (20,30,40) 68 24.19 0
3DCartesian (20,20,30) 82 25.63 0
FNN (20,20,2) 96 6.14 0
VOR (20,20,2) 92 12.55 0
FNN4D (20,20,20,40) 87 18.41 0
VOR4D (20,20,20,40) 90 15.48 0
FNN5D (20,20,20,40,40) 91 16.25 0
VOR5D (20,30,30,40,40) 88 14.64 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,30,40) 95 11.19 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,30,40) 95 9.62 0
Table 5.1: Tolerance Limits for Best Matching Performance on DB4 using Set Difference
Percentage Threshold SDTh%
into account is better than using a single absolute threshold for all set sizes, we ran a
test for the best tolerance limits on DB4 for every representation using the absolute Set
Difference Threshold SDTh to make the matching decision. The results of that test are
in Table 5.2. It is plain that SDTh% is a superior measure in all cases.
The results of the test for best tolerance limits show that the FNN representation
with tolerance limits (20, 20, 2) gives the lowest FNMR of slightly over 6%. However this
occurs at a set difference threshold percentage of 96. This means that if we require only
4% of all the FNN structures of two templates to match for successful authentication,
the probability of recording a false match is 0 and the probability of recording a false
non match is 0.061. This statement assumes that the results recorded on DB4 can be
extrapolated to a real scenario. The VORLocalPlusGlobal representation also recorded
a FNMR of under 10% with 0% FMR at a SDTh% of 95. If we relax the constraint of
operating at 0% FMR i.e we allow a greater probability for false matches, then we can
operate the system at lower SDTh% values for similar or lower FNMR values. Thus the
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TOLbest SDTh FNMR FMR
(of 4465 comparisons)
3DPolar (30,30,40) 35 25.99 0
3DCartesian (40,40,30) 33 29.24 0
FNN (30,40,2) 41 38.99 0
VOR (30,40,2) 38 28.03 0
FNN4D (40,40,40,40) 158 41.15 0
VOR4D (40,40,40,40) 154 46.44 0
FNN5D (40,40,40,40,40) 166 50.9 0
VOR5D (40,40,40,40,40) 160 56.48 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (30,40,4,40,40) 41 27.44 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (40,40,4,40,40) 38 24.69 0
Table 5.2: Tolerance Limits for Best Matching Performance on DB4 using Set Difference
Threshold SDTh
operating threshold really depends on the requirements of the system. In this thesis, as
we are working with secure systems, we seek to make the probability that a fake user
(attacker) is validated, as close to 0 as possible. Thus we always design and evaluate our
systems at 0% FMR.
Comparing the FNMRs in Tables 5.1 with 5.2 for every representation tested, the
FNMR at 0% FMR is significantly better when a relative threshold is used. This proves
that the SDTh% models the natural variations in the templates better than an absolute
set difference SDTh. By taking set sizes into consideration, we ensure that sets of ex-
tremely small size are not disadvantaged, as would be the case when a single absolute
threshold is used to make authentication decisions for fingerprint matching across the
entire database.
It must be noted that the error rates obtained in Table 5.1 are comparable with
published work on matching of minutiae-based templates on DB4. The best performances
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in literature, at 0% FMR, are under 10%. Our matcher has slightly higher error due to
the use of the core as a registration point. The accuracy of our matcher is dependent on
the accuracy of the commercial feature extractor in determining the coordinates of the
core.
5.5 Quantisation and its Effect
Every practical error tolerant cryptographic scheme described in Chapter 3, where the
templates are stored in a transformed manner and protected while matching, works on
discrete data. As a result, to build a practical minutiae-based secure authentication sys-
tem, we need a mechanism to convert real valued continuous data to discrete data. In
other words we need to convert templates that are sets of real valued n-dimensional points
into templates that are sets of discrete data.
Quantisation is the first step in converting continuous data to discrete data. Note that
there is already a very fine grained quantisation imposed on the image of the fingerprint
and hence the minutiae locations by the pixels or resolution of the scanner. However,
without loss of generality, we assume the points that form the templates or the structures
are points in a real valued coordinate system.
A quantization process uses a function Q : Rn → N that maps n-dimensional real data
into a discrete domain D as follows:
Each of the n dimensions is quantised using the corresponding tolerance limit of the
dimension in TOLbest from Table 5.1 as the quantisation step. This set of n tolerance
limits forms the Quantisation Parameter of the resulting quantised reference frame. For
example, the Quantisation Parameter for the 3DPolar representation is (20, 30, 40). The
quantised reference frame will be a finite set of n-dimensional regions, each called a quan-
tum or a quantisation bin. These quanta will be indexed from 1 to |D| where |D| denotes
the total number of quanta in the quantised reference frame. For the 3DPolar representa-
tion, if the maximum value that the radial dimension of a 3DPolar point can take is 300
pixels and the maximum angular dimension is 360◦, the total number of quanta that the
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quantised frame will have, |D| = 300
20
× 360
30
× 360
40
= 15 × 12 × 9 = 1620. The quanta will
be indexed in a pre-defined manner from 1 to |D| and D denotes the set of the indices of
all the quanta in the quantised frame.
As a result of quantisation an n dimensional real valued point will be mapped to an
index i of a quantum Qi. Every dimension j of a quantum Qi will have a lower limit LLij
and a step size SSij. We use a uniform bounding box technique for quantisation where
the step size of a quantum in a dimension is constant i.e. for every dimension j; 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
SSij = SSj ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ |D|.
An n-dimensional real valued point (r1, r2, ..., rn) will be mapped to quantum Qi and
hence index i if
LLij ≤ rj < LLij + SSij, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n. (5.8)
As a result of quantisation, a template Tenr = {Pi; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr}, where Pi =
(di1, di2, ..., din) is an n-dimensional point, will be converted to a quantised template TQenr
which will be a set of indices i.e. TQenr = {m|m ∈ |D|;LLmj ≤ dij ≤ LLmj + SSj ∀1 ≤
j ≤ n}.
Similarly if the template comprises of structures where each structure Si = {Pil; 1 ≤
l ≤ ni}, where each Pil = (dil1, dil2) is a two dimensional point, then the quantised
structure will be a set of l indices indexing the l two-dimensional bins associated with the
l quantised points in Si. Therefore the quantised structure SQi = {m|m ∈ |D|;LLmj ≤
dilj ≤ LLmj + SSj ∀1 ≤ j ≤ 2}. The quantised fingerprint template TQ will be given by
TQ = {SQi ; 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, (5.9)
which is a set of quantised structures, each quantised structure being a set of indices.
A matching algorithm on the quantised templates was carried out for each structure
representation using the best tolerance limit TOLbest to define the Quantisation Parame-
ter. The SDTh% was varied from 0 to 100 in steps of 1% and the FMR and FNMR was
noted for each threshold. Using this list, the FNMR at the SDTh% where FMR was 0%
is noted. The results are given in Table 5.3. The column |D| gives the maximum number
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TOLbest SDTh% |D| FNMR FMR
|Dl|, |Dg| (of 4465 comparisons)
3DPolar (20,30,40) 73 1620 38.26 0
3DCartesian (20,20,30) 80 10800 41.88 0
FNN (20,20,2) 90 270 42.24 0
VOR (20,20,2) 92 270 32.63 0
FNN4D (20,20,20,40) 87 36450 31.41 0
VOR4D (20,20,20,40) 91 36450 17.57 0
FNN5D (20,20,20,40,40) 93 328050 24.18 0
VOR5D (20,30,30,40,40) 91 145800 21.76 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,30,40) 94 270, 90 20.21 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,30,40) 93 270, 90 17.99 0
Table 5.3: Matching Performance on Quantisation using TOLbest as the Quantisation
Parameter on DB4
of quanta in the quantised frame for each representation type. To calculate |D|, for the
3DCartesian representation, the maximum values for the linear dimensions was taken as
600 pixels. For all the radial dimensions (measured from the core or structure center), the
maximum value was taken as 300 pixels. The maximum value for any angular dimension
was taken as 360◦. Note that for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal
representations, two maximum quanta values are defined, |Dl| and |Dg|, for the local and
global frames respectively as they both have different quantisation parameters.
A comparison of the FNMR in Tables 5.1 and 5.3 shows a marked increase in the
FNMR on quantisation. This additional error, called quantisation error, is caused by
non-linear distortion in the positions of minutiae. Non linear distortion causes a point
in the non quantised template to be mapped to two different quanta in the enrolled and
query templates as a result of inconsistent variation in one or more of the point’s dimen-
sions. This increases dissimilarity between quantised templates from the same finger and
hence there is an increase in the FNMR.
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Another cause for the increased error is that minutiae that are close to each other in
the non quantised frame might all fall into the same quantum on quantisation. This will
particularly affect representations which use local structure shapes (FNN, VOR, FNNLo-
calPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal). The minutiae contained in a local structure
will, by construction, be close to each other and on quantisation a couple of neighbors in
a structure might collapse into a single quantum. This tends to reduce the information
present in each template and hence decrease the discrimination between templates.
Some representations appear to handle non linear distortion better than others. Com-
paring the FNMR values of the representations in Tables 5.1 and 5.5, we find that the
VOR4D representation suffers a drop by only 2% in its FNMR and operates at roughly
the same SDTh%. That means only 2% of the genuine comparisons that successfully
matched when not quantised, failed to match when quantised. The FNN5D, VOR5D,
FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal representations suffered a degradation of
7 − 10% on quantisation. The FNN4D and 3DPolar representations suffered a rise in
FNMR by 13− 14% while the 3DCartesian representation suffered a rise in error rate by
16%. The two worst performing representations were the VOR, which saw an increase in
error rate by 20% and the FNN, whose error rate increased by 36% on quantisation. Not
surprisingly, the worst performing representations were the two reference point free, local
structure based representations, FNN and VOR, which will be very sensitive to variation
in position of their neighbors.
Therefore we deduce that quantisation error contributes to degradation in the match-
ing performance, but its effect varies greatly across representation types. This answers
the first question posed in this chapter.
From Table 5.3, the 3DPolar representation appears to suit minutiae based templates
better than a 3DCartesian representation as its lowest FNMR is around 3% better than
the lowest FNMR for the 3DCartesian representation. However, on observing the |D|
value for the 3DCartesian representation, we find that the cartesian reference frame is
91
3DPolar 3DCartesian
Quantisation Parameters (20, 30, 40) (30, 60, 40)
FMR (%) 0 0
FNMR (%) 38.26 48.08
Maximum Set Difference (%) 73 60
Table 5.4: Comparison of Matching Performance of the Cartesian and Polar Representa-
tions on DB4
quantised to a much finer level than the 3DPolar frame. In order to compare the two
representations fairly, we must quantise the 3DCartesian frame so that it has roughly the
same number of quanta as the 3DPolar frame. The Quantisation Parameter (30, 60, 40)
for the 3DCartesian representation gives 600
30
× 600
60
× 360
40
= 20×10×9 = 1800 quanta which
is comparable to the 1620 quanta in the 3DPolar quantised frame. We ran a matching
algorithm on DB4 using the 3DCartesian representation at the Quantisation Parameter
(30, 60, 40). The results are in Table 5.4. Although δy = 60 is not a valid step size for
any of the tests in this thesis, we use it here in order to make the cartesian quantum
comparable to the polar quantum. The results show that the performance of the 3DPo-
lar representation is better in terms of lower FNMR at 0% FMR, than the 3DCartesian
representation for comparable |D|.
We conclude that whether or not quantisation is used, the polar representation of minu-
tiae outperformed the cartesian representation for matching performance at 0% FMR.
Apart from the 3DCartesian representation, all the representations in this thesis are de-
fined in a polar coordinate system. The above result in Table 5.4 supports our decision
to describe all the other representations in a polar reference frame.
Now we consider the second question posed at the beginning of this chapter. We
wanted to determine if the best non quantised tolerance limits do give the best perfor-
mance in quantised matching. To test this we ran a quantised matching algorithm at
different Quantisation Parameters and noted the parameters that gave the best matching
performance for each of the representation techniques. The results are given in Table 5.5.
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QUANTbest SDTh% |D| FNMR FMR
|Dl|, |Dg| (of 4465 comparisons)
3DPolar (20,40,40) 73 1215 33.57 0
3DCartesian (20,30,30) 79 7200 32.49 0
FNN (20,20,2) 90 270 42.24 0
VOR (20,20,2) 92 270 32.64 0
FNN4D (30,20,20,30) 89 32400 25.63 0
VOR4D (20,20,20,30) 93 48600 16.32 0
FNN5D (20,30,20,50,30) 93 233380 19.86 0
VOR5D (20,20,20,30,40) 96 437400 16.32 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (30,20,4,40,40) 93 180, 68 17.69 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,40,40) 93 270, 68 15.06 0
Table 5.5: Best Matching Performance on Quantisation on DB4
We denote the best quantisation parameters obtained in Table 5.5 as QUANTbest.
It is clear from the results that the best quantisation parameters and the best non
quantised tolerance limits vary significantly. Every representation except the FNN and
VOR (whose QUANTbest and TOLbest turned out to be the same) improved on their
FNMR by around 5% when operated at QUANTbest . Also note that the best performing
representation schemes are the LocalPlusGlobal representations. The results from Table
5.5 show that non linear distortion has a significant effect on the properties of templates
consisting of minutiae-based structures. In the design of an authentication system, as the
templates based on any representation will always be used in their quantised form, it is
advantageous to design the system using the tolerance limit that gives the best perfor-
mance on quantisation. The secure authentication systems developed in this thesis will
be designed at the QUANTbest parameters obtained for each representation in Table 5.5.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. We introduced new measures, Set Difference Percentage Threshold SDTh%
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and Match Percentage Threshold MTh%, to determine when two tem-
plates match. These measures take into account the sizes of the sets
being compared so that sets of smaller sizes are not disadvantaged by a
single fixed threshold for all set sizes.
2. We described the working of a minutiae matcher using this new propor-
tional threshold.
3. Using matching tests over DB4 we proved that using a relative threshold
significantly improves match performance when compared to using a fixed
threshold.
4. We define the best tolerance limits TOLbest for any minutiae-based match-
ing process and use the matching algorithm over DB4 to determine
TOLbest for each of the representations except TRI.
5. We show that quantisation significantly degrades the matching perfor-
mance of minutiae based templates for all minutiae structures except
VOR4D.
6. We show that irrespective of quantisation, a description of the minutiae
in a polar reference frame represents minutiae characteristics better than
in a cartesian reference frame.
7. We find that the best tolerance limits TOLbest do not always yield the
best quantisation limits QUANTbest. Designing a system at QUANTbest
can improve the matching performance by around 5% when compared to
that when using quantisation parameters derived from TOLbest.
In the next chapter we will study the Fuzzy Vault construct’s applicability to minutiae-
based secure authentication systems and describe the two approaches we put forward to
build a secure authentication system using the Fuzzy Vault.
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Chapter 6
Minutiae-based Structures for a
Fuzzy Vault
One of the first schemes to be analysed for secure authentication was the Fuzzy Vault. At
the initial phases of research in 2005, the Fuzzy Commitment Scheme [39] and the Fuzzy
Vault Scheme [38] described in Chapter 3 were studied for their applicability to build
fingerprint biometric authentication systems. Of the two constructs, the order invariance
property of the fuzzy vault appeared to suit minutiae-based templates.
The Fuzzy Vault enables secure comparison of templates described as a set of ele-
ments and compensates for a limited set difference error between the templates. The set
difference can be considered to arise from quantisation error due to non linear distortion
of the minutiae locations in the two dimensional frame of the scanner, spurious minutiae
inserted by the scanner and missing minutiae not captured by the scanner. However,
the quantised minutiae-based query template needs to be aligned into the same reference
frame as the quantised enrolled fingerprint template before they can be securely and suc-
cessfully compared using the fuzzy vault construct.
In this thesis, two approaches are put forward to realise a fuzzy vault based authenti-
cation system using minutiae-based templates:
1. Pre-alignment free realisation of a Fuzzy Vault based authentication system.
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2. Secure Pre-alignment using a fraction of the genuine template followed by secure
authentication using the Fuzzy Vault.
The first idea that was studied was the suitability of the FNN, VOR and TRI based
templates for a fuzzy vault based authentication system free from pre-alignment. The
details of this test and the results are described in Section 6.1. The second idea that was
studied was the use of a fraction of the FNN, VOR and TRI structures as public data
to assist with pre-alignment at the verification stage prior to secure comparison using a
fuzzy vault. We explored the suitability of the three templates to achieve pre-alignment
by leaking minimal information about the enrolled template and quantified the impact of
pre-alignment on the false match rate of the system. The details are presented in Section
6.2. The results from each of the approaches were published in two papers “Minutiae-
based Structures for a Fuzzy Vault" [37] and “Fingerprint Alignment for a Minutiae-based
Fuzzy Vault" [36]. The work on TRI structures for both the approaches and the definition
and analysis of mortality rate of minutiae based structures (Section 6.2.3) was conducted
by Dr. Jason Jeffers. All the software has been implemented in C++ on an Intel Pentium
1.86 GHz machine.
6.1 Reference Point Free Secure Matching using Minutiae-
based Templates
A feature extractor normally extracts the cartesian coordinates and ridge orientation of
the minutiae in a reference frame defined by the scanner. Variation in the finger position
at a subsequent capture will cause the extracted coordinates of the minutiae to be sig-
nificantly different although their pattern is very similar to the point pattern extracted
from the enrolled image. The minutiae based representations defined in Chapter 4 all
are translation and rotation invariant. All of them other than the FNN, VOR and TRI
representations use the fingerprint core as the reference point. For a fingerprint image, if
the extractor cannot identify a core, wrongly extracts the coordinates of the core or lo-
cates double cores, an authentication algorithm based on those core dependent structures
will suffer from a Failure to Enrol, Failure to Capture or a False Non Match condition
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for that enrolment or authentication attempt. The FNN, VOR and TRI representations
do not require any reference point to define the template. Each structure that forms the
template is defined in a coordinate system intrinsic to the minutiae that comprise it.
We first studied the templates built from the three representations using DB1 as at
that time, we had not acquired a commercial feature extractor to enable us to use the
public Fingerprint Verification Competition (FVC) databases. For each representation,
we first determined the tolerance limits that would give the lowest equal error rate on
non-quantised matching. We assumed that the authentication system would base its
match decision on the number of minutiae in common between the enrolled and query
templates. We used the results of the non quantised matching to evaluate the suitability
of the structures to build a fuzzy vault based authentication system. A point to note
here is that as this was one of the first ideas to be studied, the significant alteration to
matching performance caused by quantisation of templates, as described in Chapter 5,
had not been studied at the time. This is why the analysis was based on the non quantised
matching performance.
Towards the end of 2005, an SDK from a commercial fingerprint system vendor “Neu-
rotechnologĳa" was acquired. The SDK was used to develop a feature extractor that then
allowed us to extract features from publicly available standard fingerprint databases. The
second part of this section performs the analysis of the three structures on DB4, whose
features could now be extracted. The analysis differs from that in the first section in two
ways:
• The understanding gained from the effect of quantisation elaborated in Chapter 4 is
used to perform analysis of the structures using the results of a quantised matching
process.
• The match decision was based on a relative set difference threshold to synchronise
with the set difference metric used in a Fuzzy Vault construction.
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6.1.1 Tests on DB1
There are two main questions for which answers are sought in this section:
1. For each minutia structure type, what tolerance limits must be chosen while per-
forming matching so that sufficient discrimination between true matches and false
matches of fingerprints can be made?
2. When comparing fingerprint templates from same finger using the selected tolerance
limits, are there sufficient elements in common in the locking and unlocking set, for
the fuzzy vault to work?
In order to answer these questions an experiment was performed in two steps. In the
first part of the experiment, tolerance limits to obtain the lowest equal error for structure
matching on DB1 were determined. In the second part, a performance test was run
using the selected tolerance limits to investigate the feasibility of using each structure
representation in the fuzzy vault.
6.1.2 Test for Best Tolerance Limits on DB1
For every fingerprint in DB1 we created templates from the minutiae features using the
FNN, VOR and TRI representation strategies. For this database, as the ridge orienta-
tions could not be extracted using the software tool mentioned in Chapter 5.1, the angle
subtended by each minutia at the core was assigned as its ridge orientation. A template
constructed using the FNN or VOR structures would have as many structures as there
were minutiae. With the triangles representation, we pick a random set of triangles from
the
(
N
3
)
possible triangles where N is the number of minutiae extracted from a finger-
print, to form the template. In order to have a comparable number of elements in the
TRI templates we picked 30 triangles from the
(
N
3
)
possible.
A matching algorithm, at different combinations of tolerance limits for each dimension
of the structure, was carried out as follows. For each template representation strategy,
we compared each fingerprint template in the database with the templates from samples
of the same finger to determine the average number of minutiae structures that were in
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common between them. We also compared templates of every fingerprint in the database
with templates of impressions of different fingers to evaluate the average number of struc-
tures that were in common between two different fingerprints.
The template matching process was carried out as described in Chapter 5.2 - 5.4.
When comparing FNN and VOR structures, the match decision was based on the local
match threshold l, which was set in this experiment as a ‘match threshold’ i.e when two
structures had more than l neighbour matches, they were said to match. When comparing
two TRI structures, if all three displacement and angle vectors were within the respec-
tive thresholds, the structures were said to match. During the process of comparing two
templates we noted the number of structures that matched and the number that failed to
match. Finally for each tolerance limit, the average number of structures that could not
be matched, when comparing different samples of the same finger and when comparing
different fingers were noted. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 6.1(a), (b)
and (c) for the FNN, VOR and TRI structures respectively. Each graph shows the per-
centage of structures that failed to match in samples of the same finger (white bars) and
samples of different fingers (dark bars) for different tolerance limits. The tests described
above give an average case analysis of the commonality between any two fingerprint sam-
ples.
In Figure 6.1, the x axis represents the different tolerance limits used when matching
structures. The tolerance limit triplets (δr, δθ, l) are along the x axis in Figure 6.1(a) and
(b) and the tolerance limit pair (δr, δθ) are along the x axis in Figure 6.1(c). In all these
figures, the y axis represents the percentage of the number of structures that failed to
match. The white bars represent the percentage of the number of structures that failed
to find a match when comparing each fingerprint in the database with versions of itself.
The dark bars represent the results obtained when each fingerprint was compared with
all the other different fingerprints in the database.
These graphs were used as an indicator of the most suitable tolerance limits for each
type of structure representation. Ideally, the best tolerance limit will yield the lowest
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number of rejects when comparing with impressions of the same finger and highest num-
ber of rejects when comparing with impressions of other fingers. In the graphs we picked
out tolerance limits that gave the greatest difference in heights in the white and black
bars. Of those selected, we prefer those with the lowest reject rate overall, for these will
yield the greatest number of structures in common between impressions of the same finger.
In Figure 6.1(a) all the tolerance limits, except (20, 20, 5), gave a difference of 40%
between the white and dark bars. In this case, we picked the tolerance limit giving the
lowest percentage rejects of structures when comparing impressions of the same finger,
(20, 20, 4) in this case, to be the most suitable.
For the Voronoi representation, as seen in fig Figure 6.1(b), the tolerance limits with a
difference of 40% in their bar heights had the white bar height too great to warrant their
selection for the second half of the experiment. (20,10,3) was the only tolerance limit that
looked likely to give a good performance. Hence, we chose tolerance limits that gave a
low level on the white bars and at least 20% difference with the dark bar height.
With the triangle based structures, from Figure 6.1(c) we see that as the edge threshold
is increased from 10 to 25, the percentage of structures that failed to match in samples
of the same finger drop significantly. However, the difference in bar heights in every case
remains almost the same. This implies that a larger tolerance for the edge threshold could
be used without affecting the matching performance significantly.
6.1.3 Non Quantised Matching Performance on DB1
Once the tolerance limits were chosen, we ran a matching algorithm using the non quan-
tised templates at the chosen tolerance limits for each representation technique and at
different match thresholds MTh and noted the FMR and FNMR in each case. The match
thresholds were varied from 0 to 30 in steps of 1 and the FMR and FNMR were plotted on
a graph at each threshold. Figure 6.2 shows the FMR and FNMR curves for the match-
ing carried out with the most promising tolerance limit, for each structure representation
type.
The Equal Error Operating Point is the threshold at which the FMR and FNMR are
equal. In Figure 6.2(a), for the FNN based template representation, an equal error of
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(a) Percentage failures using the Five Nearest Neighbor representation.
(c) Percentage failures using the triangle representation.
(b) Percentage failures using the Voronoi neighbor representation.
Figure 6.1: Structure Matching Results at Different Tolerance Limits on DB1
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Figure 6.2: Matching Performance when using different minutiae-based representations
on DB1
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14% occurs at a match threshold of 16. This means that if an authentication system
using the FNN template representation has MTh set at the equal error operating point
of 16, 86% of the time, at least 16 structures out of 28 will be in common between two
fingerprints from the same finger and 86% of the time two different fingers will not have
at least 16 structures in common. Similarly for the Voronoi representation in Figure
6.2(b), an equal error of 10% occurs at a threshold of 23, while for the triangle based
representation in Figure 6.2(c), an equal error of 20% occurs at a threshold of 23. Note
that if implemented in a Fuzzy Vault, the actual equal error will be expected to be higher
due to errors generated by the process of quantisation of the templates as indicated by
the test results over DB4 in Chapter 5.
6.1.4 Suitability of FNN, VOR and TRI structures for a Fuzzy
Vault based Authentication System, tested on DB1
Before implementing a fuzzy vault based system, it is important to determine if an authen-
tication system using the three structure representations studied is feasible in practice.
In a fuzzy vault, let N be the template size, i.e. number of structures in the template
from the enrolment or query fingerprint and k denote the degree of the secret polynomial.
As described by Juels and Sudan in [38], for Reed Solomon decoding to be successful, the
enrolled and query templates must have at least N+k
2
elements in common. The maxi-
mum number of insertions and deletions of structures permissible between the enrolled
and the query fingerprint, that will still allow the successful reconstruction of the secret
polynomial is N − k. Assuming that N is fixed, designing the vault with a larger value of
N+k
2
, will allow a larger degree polynomial to encrypt the secret, hence providing a higher
degree of security.
Let MTh denote the operating match threshold of the authentication system, the
minimum number of common structures between two templates needed for a match, which
for a fuzzy vault is N+k
2
. Therefore, the corresponding degree of the secret polynomial is:
k = (2×MTh)−N. (6.1)
We use the results in Figure 6.1 to estimate the degrees of the secret polynomial that can
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be obtained for different structure representations and at different operating thresholds.
For each structure type we determine the degree of the secret polynomial that can be
used in the fuzzy vault at the equal error operating thresholds. For the FNN and VOR
templates we have set N = 28 and for the TRI template, we have set N = 30. Using
these parameters in Equation 6.1, operating at the equal error threshold, the value of k
for the FNN representation strategy is 4, for the VOR representation is 18 and for the
triangles based strategy is 16. The size of the secret that can be protected is thus strongly
dependent on the number of common structures naturally occurring between samples of
the same finger. The greater this is, the higher that MTh can be set and the higher the
value of k will be. From the results above, we conclude that the VOR representations
appear to have most promise to be used for minutiae based templates in a Fuzzy Vault
based authentication system.
It is to be noted that the analysis above was carried out using a match thresholdMTh,
which corresponds to a Set Difference Threshold SDTh = 2(N −MTh) as the set sizes
are fixed and known. However, this correspondence will not be the case if the enrolled
and query sets could have different sizes as the cardinality of the query set will be un-
known at enrolment. Therefore it is advantageous to analyse a representation’s suitability
to any cryptographic scheme using the same metric that the scheme works over. In the
latter part of this section, the feasibility of using the FNN, VOR and TRI templates of
fingerprints in DB4, in a fuzzy vault based matching algorithm based on a set difference
threshold is studied.
6.1.5 Suitability of Minutiae based Structures for the Fuzzy
Vault: Experiment on DB4
In this section we use the results for DB4 from Chapter 5 to obtain criteria needed to build
a practical Fuzzy Vault based authentication system using templates built from minutiae
structures. For every representation (except TRI), although the number of minutiae and
hence the number of structures in each template vary, we will assume here that there
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will be some mechanism to select N best structures thus allowing every template to be
of a fixed size N . Our first task will be to determine the average size of a template for
each representation in DB4. Using this average size as N we will evaluate the maximum
set difference that can be tolerated if we are to build a Fuzzy Vault based system with
a secret of size k symbols. The number of bits each symbol is represented by depends
on the quantisation which decides the Galois Field of operation. We will show that as
the size k of the secret that must be protected increases, the maximum permissible set
difference allowed between templates will be proportionately lower.
We will first derive an expression for the maximum set difference percentage threshold
SDTh% between two templates in terms of the template size N and the secret size k. As
before, we treat each template as a set of elements.
In a fuzzy vault scheme, as N is the size of the template, it is also the length of the
Generalised Reed Solomon Codeword that encodes the secret of length k symbols. In
order to be able to correct errors in a codeword successfully using a standard decoding
procedure for GRS codes, the error affected codeword must not have more than N−k
2
symbols different from the valid codeword. In other words, the query template, which
gives rise to the error affected codeword, can have a maximum set difference of N − k
with respect to the enrolled template. Let SDmax denote the maximum set difference
permissible, then,
SDmax = N − k. (6.2)
Let |U |max denote the maximum cardinality of the union of two sets of size N elements
each which occurs when they have a set difference of SDmax between them. Then,
|U |max = N +N + SDmax
2
=
2N +N − k
2
=
3N − k
2
.
(6.3)
The maximum set difference percentage threshold SDTh% between the two sets that
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can be corrected is given by the GRS decoding procedure is:
SDTh% =
SDmax
|U |max × 100
=
N − k
3N−k
2
× 100
=
2(N − k)
3N − k × 100.
(6.4)
If N >> k then SDTh% ≈ 2
3
× 100 ≈ 66.67%. If N is fixed, as the secret size k in-
creases, the value of the fraction decreases almost linearly. As k approaches N , SDTh%
approaches 0. When the template sizes are large compared to the secret, they must have
a minimum of 100 − 66.67 = 33.33% of the elements in common with each other to be
used in a Fuzzy Vault with GRS decoding. Keeping N fixed, if we wish to protect larger
secret sizes, the number of elements that must be in common between the templates from
the same fingerprint must be greater than 33.33% of the size of their union.
An important conclusion is that for a feasible Fuzzy Vault system that
uses GRS decoding to perform secure comparison, the minimum number of
elements that must be in common between templates of samples from the
same fingerprint, is 33.33% of their union size.
In order to evaluate the feasibility of using the fuzzy vault to protect the minutiae-
based templates that were introduced in Chapter 4, we first determined the average
number of elements in a template for each template representation. We ran the exper-
iment on fingerprint samples from DB4. For each enrolled sample we built templates
using each representation and counted the number of elements in each template set. For
each representation, we averaged this number over the number of enrolled samples. The
average number of elements in templates built using the different representations at the
tolerance limits chosen in Chapter 5 is listed in Table 6.1. This value is taken as N for
each representation type.
We also estimated the value of SDTh% required to protect a secret of size k = 1 sym-
bol. In order to protect a secret of greater size, the maximum set difference percentage
threshold allowable becomes smaller. We find that for all the representations, the value of
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SDTh% is close to 0.6667 or 66.67% as expected. Next, we ran a matching algorithm at
the set difference percentage threshold of 0.6667 and noted the FMR and FNMR which
indicates the performance at that threshold. The results in the last two columns of Ta-
ble 6.1 indicate that although the FMR is 0 in every case, the FNMR is too high to be
practical.
The best performing representation is the 3DPolar whose FNMR at 66% SDTh% is
just below 48%. It is evident from the results in Table 6.1 that none of the represen-
tations could be operated at a SDTh% of 0.6667 for a useful system as the FNMR for
every representation is too high to be practical. In order to get lower FNMRs we must
allow the correction of a larger number of errors between two sets as the results indicate
that different samples of the same fingerprint tend to differ by much more than 66%
of the union size due to alignment issues and the additional differences introduced due
to quantisation error. In fact, the best matching performance at the given quantisation
parameters for each of the representations occurs at SDTh% values that are all greater
than 70% and many have the thresholds above 90% as shown in Table 5.3 in Chapter 5.
This indicates that most minutiae based templates of samples from the same fingerprint,
when quantised, have only 10− 30% of all the elements between them in common.
For k = 1, which is the smallest secret that can be locked using a set, we can de-
sign a fuzzy vault based on the Generalised Reed Solomon Code to correct a maximum
of 66% of the union size number of errors. However, the high false non match rates
make it impractical. It is not possible for the GRS code to decode more than 66% of the
union size errors. For higher values of k, the error correction bound becomes even stricter.
Thus, none of the minutiae-based constructs in this thesis, out of which two (3DPolar
and 3DCartesian) are commonly used for minutiae-based matching, can feasibly be used
to design a GRS code based fuzzy vault authentication system that keeps the template
secure during storage as well as during matching.
Nandakumar et al [49, 50], implemented a Fuzzy Vault using Lagrange Interpolation
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QUANTbest N SDTh% FNMR FMR
at k = 1
3DPolar (20,40,40) 38 66 47.65 0
3DCartesian (20,30,30) 41 66 62.45 0
FNN (20,20,2) 44 66 97.11 0
VOR (20,20,2) 43 66 96.65 0
FNN4D (30,20,20,30) 197 66 92.42 0
VOR4D (20,20,20,30) 216 66 93.31 0
FNN5D (20,30,20,50,30) 187 66 94.95 0
VOR5D (20,20,20,30,40) 220 66 95.4 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (30,20,4,40,40) 45 66 80.51 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,40,40) 43 66 82.85 0
Table 6.1: Matching Performance at the Maximum Set Difference Percentage Threshold
instead of GRS decoding. They described the minutiae in a cartesian coordinate system
and pre-aligned the template using the locations of high curvature points as the public
reference information. Their implementation achieves an FNMR of 9% at an FMR of
0.01%, where the match threshold was set to 8 minutiae. The results from [50] on DB4
state that the number of minutiae selected in their templates was between 14 and 24.
This implies that even for their system, which has one of the best accuracy rates of all
existing Fuzzy Vault implementations, when the cardinality of the sets is greater than 15,
the SDTH% will be greater than 66%, thus making a GRS decoding based Fuzzy Vault
impractical.
Table 6.1 shows that at SDTh% = 66%, only the 3Dpolar representation would match
over 50% of the genuine comparisons successfully, if a Fuzzy Vault with secret size of k = 1
symbol is used for matching. This indicates that at a given SDTh%, 3DPolar templates
have more points in common between genuine samples when compared to other represen-
tations. The reason could be that each point is only affected by the non linear distortion
in the minutia related to it. All the other polar based representations are interdependent
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in nature and many minutiae affect more than one point or structure in the template.
Thus distortion in a minutia may cause several elements to not match between templates,
thus greatly increasing the set difference between templates due to non linear distortion.
This brings us to the second approach to build a Fuzzy Vault: Secure Pre-alignment.
If we want to achieve pre-alignment independent of the core, we need to store some
information regarding the enrolled fingerprint to use for pre-alignment. Often, this is
the most vulnerable point of a Fuzzy Vault as the pre-alignment information could leak
significant information about the enrolled template. The goal of the next section is to
investigate if the three structures, FNN, VOR and TRI could be used to pre-align the
enrolled and query templates so that a Fuzzy Vault based authentication system can be
built using a simple 3DPolar or 3DCartesian template representation, the representations
that are least affected by non linear distortion.
6.2 Secure Pre-alignment for a Minutiae-based Fuzzy
Vault
Previous attempts to realise fingerprint based Fuzzy Vaults [69, 73, 22, 68] used a vari-
ety of pre-alignment methods. One of the first attempts at building a fingerprint based
Fuzzy Vault was by Uludag and Jain [69] in 2005, where the cartesian coordinates of
the minutiae were pre-aligned manually. The availability of the whole enrolled minutia
point set for pre-alignment before verification, made the fingerprint template vulnerable
to identity attacks at the pre-alignment stage. Yang and Verbauwhede [73] handled the
alignment issue by determining a reliable reference point based on similarity indices of
minutia pairs between several enrolment templates of the same person. This reference
point was then used as the basis of a polar coordinate system, using which the minutiae
were defined and used in the Vault. The paper did not indicate how the reference point
would be determined reliably if the reference point of the enrolment finger found multiple
matches in the verification finger. Chung et al. in [22] address the pre-alignment issue by
using a hash table. However, no actual results on the success rate of the pre-alignment
strategy was published. Uludag and Jain [68] in 2006, used the high curvature points from
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the ridge orientations of the fingerprint samples to perform pre-alignment. This requires
additional processing to extract the locations of the high curvature points.
We aim to resolve the pre-alignment issue by using only properties intrinsic to minutiae
sets themselves. This means that we desire a pre-alignment algorithm based purely on
properties derived from
{(p1, v1, t1), (p2, v2, t2), ..., (pn, vn, tn)},
where pi is position of the i-th minutia, vi is the ridge orientation at pi and ti is minutia
type, which we ignored in this thesis. We investigate pre-alignment algorithms based on
the FNN, VOR and TRI representations for templates and compare their performance.
It should be noted that the role of these structures in matching algorithms, even if not
explicitly stated, is to align the enrolment and verification minutia sets. The main dif-
ference is that for use in pre-alignment for a Fuzzy Vault construct, it is necessary that
through the use of these structures, as little as possible is revealed about the pattern of
the minutiae sets themselves.
The key question then is: can any of these structures be used in a pre-alignment
algorithm without revealing too much about the underlying minutiae sets?
6.2.1 The Fuzzy Vault and Fingerprint Pre-Alignment
The realisation of a Fuzzy Vault construct using minutiae location and ridge orientation
(as in 3DPolar or 3DCartesian representations) as elements of the locking and unlocking
sets requires two largely independent steps: pre-alignment, and then application of a
Fuzzy Vault construct. We test the use of the FNN, VOR and TRI representations,
which are minutia based structures derived directly from the minutia set, as the basis of
pre-alignment. Each instance of a minutia structure Si unambiguously specifies a point pi
and vector vi within the fingerprint which may be used to define a coordinate system. If
a correct match of this structure is found in another sample of the fingerprint, the same
coordinate system can be recovered in the new sample. In this way the two samples may
be aligned on an agreed coordinate system. The overall Fuzzy Vault based system to
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secure a secret with fingerprint minutiae will work as follows:
• Minutia structure instances S1, S2, ..., SN will be selected systematically or at ran-
dom from the enrolment fingerprint. Each will define a coordinate system through
the specified point-vector pairs (p1, v1), ..., (pN , vN).
• A Fuzzy Vault Vi is constructed for each structure instance Si based on the corre-
sponding coordinate system. The set of pairs {(Si, Vi)} become the public informa-
tion for the overall fuzzy vault system.
• During verification, matches are sought for the published minutia structure in-
stances. Any such match, Sj then specifies an alignment so an attempt is made
to unlock Vj with this alignment.
• If at least one of the structures Si matches accurately enough to provide an alignment
within the tolerance of its vault Vi, the secret will be recovered.
Note that this general procedure is not the most efficient use of this type of pre-alignment,
given the need to construct a vault for every structure. Nevertheless, it is a useful clarifying
simplification, as it makes the criteria for successful pre-alignment very clear. The key
questions are:
• For a given minutia structure type, and pre-alignment accuracy, how many en-
rolment structure instances N are required to ensure an acceptable pre-alignment
success rate?
• For the required number of enrolment structure instances N , does the pre-alignment
algorithm leak too much information about the enrolment fingerprint?
We perform an experiment to address the first of these questions directly. The second
question is discussed in the analysis of the results.
6.2.2 Experimental Method
We used fingerprint images from DB1 to test our algorithms. The features extracted also
included the location of the fingerprint core in each fingerprint. This core location was
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used to measure the accuracy of the pre-alignment algorithm.
The experiments performed required a notion of alignment accuracy to determine how
well the pre-alignment algorithm actually managed to align a given sample. For this we
used the recorded locations of the fingerprint core. The Euclidean distance d measured
in pixel units between the core predicted by the alignment and the core recorded in the
data, was used as a simple method of measuring accuracy. Given a choice of the number
of minutia structures N , required alignment accuracy d, and tolerance limits (δr, δθ, l)
(for FNN and VOR) or (δr, δθ) (for TRI), each run of the experiment involved:
• One of the five samples of a given finger is used as an enrolment template. For this
template N minutia structures are selected at random.
• Each of the remaining four samples are selected in turn.
• The selected sample is searched for minutia structures that match within the spec-
ified thresholds. If one or more of the matches produces an alignment within d, the
sample is marked as successfully aligned.
• This is repeated over the combinations of samples from the same finger.
Several experiment runs were performed with different tolerance limits in order to deter-
mine the tolerance limit that gave the lowest equal error rate. Note that here, we do not
worry about the FMR as this is a test for pre-alignment of valid samples of the same
fingerprint. Once the best threshold choices were determined, multiple experiment runs
were performed with a range of values for d and N . The results are shown in Figure 6.3
and Figure 6.4.
6.2.3 Results and Analysis
The threshold parameters (20, 10, 3) were found to be optimum for both VOR and FNN
representation. The parameters (15, 6) were found to be optimum for the TRI representa-
tion. The graphs in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 display the most important results obtained
from the experiment runs using the FNN, VOR and TRI structures with optimum thresh-
old values. Figure 6.3 shows the pre-alignment failure rates for the three minutia structure
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Figure 6.3: Percentage of fingerprint samples that failed to align within an accuracy of
d = 10.
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Figure 6.4: Percentage of fingerprint samples that failed to align within an accuracy of
d = 5.
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types over a range of values of N where d = 10, that is the pre-alignment is required to
successfully align the samples within 10 pixels. The horizontal axis indicates the number
of minutia structures employed and the vertical axis indicates the percentage of samples
that failed to align adequately. Figure 6.4 shows the pre-alignment failure rates for the
three minutia structure types for d = 5. In effect, this failure rate is the contribution of
pre-alignment to the FNMR of the overall biometric system.
As may be expected, each of the graphs in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4 display the
characteristics of geometric decay as N increases. These trends are confirmed by plotting
the results on a logarithmic scale, as shown in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6. In each of
these graphs, the vertical axis shows the natural logarithm of the failure rate. In all
but perhaps the case d = 5 for the TRI structures in Figure 6.6, the result shows a
clear linear trajectory. If the trends were to continue past the measured experimental
data for Figure 6.5, the TRI curve would be expected to cross the horizontal axis at
approximately N = 11, and both the VOR and FNN curves at approximately N = 15.
This graph is plotted with logarithmic scale on the vertical axis, so at the intersection
with the horizontal axis the failure rate is e0 = 1%. This would mean that to achieve a
failure rate of 1%, or better, at least 11 TRI structures are required, or at least 15 VOR
or FNN structures.
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Figure 6.5: Percentage of fingerprint samples that failed to align within an accuracy of
α = 10 on a logarithmic scale
The results indicate, at least in terms of the number of structures involved, that TRI
structures significantly outperform both VOR structures, and FNN structures. More
importantly, these experimental results allow us to determine the number of minutia
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Figure 6.6: Percentage of fingerprint samples that failed to align within an accuracy of
α = 5 on a logarithmic scale
structures that are likely to be required for acceptable pre-alignment performance. The
overarching aim is to produce a secure biometric scheme that is capable of performing
at an equal error rate of 5% or better. (An EER of 5% was chosen in the analysis as
at the time this research was conducted, it was considered an acceptable performance.)
Therefore, the pre-alignment failure rate must be at least better than 5%. By inspecting
Figure 6.3, we see that 6 or more TRI structures are required. For VOR structures, or
FNN structures, 10 or more structures are required, provided that an alignment accuracy
of d = 10 is sufficient. If an alignment accuracy of d = 5 is required, at least 9 TRI
structures need to be employed to achieve an EER of 5%.
As indicated above more than 5 or more FNN or VOR structures must be publicly
available to pre-align to obtain an acceptable EER result. As the structures are comprised
of 4 or more neighbouring minutiae, 5 structures would provide the relative positions of
around 20 minutiae. This would in essence reveal the minutiae distribution of the fin-
gerprint. Therefore, in order to achieve the desired accuracy, we would have to trade off
on security. To maintain security by reducing the nuber of minutiae available publicly,
we must compromise on accuracy. This answers the first major question posed in Section
6.2.1.
The remaining question is whether the number of structures required to pre-align
the fingerprint sample reveals more information about the enrolled fingerprint than is
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tolerable? In the case of the FNN structures and VOR structures, the answer is that they
almost certainly do reveal too much information about the enrolment fingerprint. Recall
that at least 10 FNN structures are required for adequate pre-alignment. Therefore, a
total of 10 × 6 = 60 individual minutia point samples are indirectly recorded in the
public structures S1, ..., SN . This means any given minutia of the approximately 28 in
the enrolment template is likely to be found in two of these structures and, in addition,
some of the structures are likely to overlap. It is reasonable to expect that a determined
attacker will be able to piece together local neighborhoods into a global minutia pattern
for significant portions of the enrolment fingerprint. It may be possible for an attacker
to recover much of the enrolment fingerprint minutia template, or at least significantly
compromise the Fuzzy Vault if not. VOR structures suffer from the same problem.
TRI structures were found to significantly outperform the local FNN and VOR minutia
structures, and the global nature of these structures ensure that the same issues don’t
arise. Six triangle structures were required to align samples with an accuracy of α = 10
pixels. Therefore a total of 6×3 = 18 individual minutia points are indirectly recorded in
the structures S1, ..., SN . In this case, minutia points are unlikely to be found in multiple
triangles, and the probability of two triangles sharing an edge is negligible. It is difficult to
image how an attacker might piece together the triangles into a coherent global pattern.
Some further analysis of the TRI failure performance is warranted. It was found that
in any given sample approximately 50 − 60% of the enrolment triangle structures failed
to match any triangle structure in the sample. This relatively high match failure rate is a
significant component in the failure rate. Within the original fingerprint sample data, it
is not unusual to observe over 20% of the minutiae present in one sample of a fingerprint
to be absent in another sample of the same fingerprint. Theoretically, then, we expect the
probability of any given triangle surviving from one sample to another to be 0.83 = 0.51.
We call the probability a structure does not survive its mortality rate. FNN structures
experience a similar mortality rate. Figure 6.7 plots the theoretical impact of these match
failures as N increases for both TRI and FNN structures. Figure 6.8 shows this impact
using a logarithmic scale. Also shown in Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 is the impact of a
hypothetical minutia structure that only suffers a mortality rate equivalent to the sample
minutia points themselves, ie. 20%.
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Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 suggest that, while TRI structures may significantly out-
perform the FNN and VOR structures, it ought to be possible to significantly outper-
form the TRI structures by using a minutia structure that has a low mortality rate.
Overall, the above analysis strongly suggests that a global structure with some inherent
error-correcting capability ought to provide the most sound base for a minutia based pre-
alignment algorithm. The low mortality rate ensures that only very few such structures
are required for alignment. The global nature ensures that it remains difficult for an
attacker to piece structures together into a coherent whole.
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To summarise the results from this chapter, we found that templates built from in-
terdependent points and structures are very susceptible to quantisation error caused by
non linear distortion. This causes genuine samples of the same fingerprint to have a very
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small number of elements in common. In other words, they have a very large set difference
between them. This makes them unsuitable for use in a GRS code based Fuzzy Vault as
the decoding ability and size of the secret is limited by the number of errors the GRS code
can correct. In order to achieve acceptable levels for FNMR, the correction of a large set
difference between templates is required. There are no GRS codes that can correct the
required large set difference and still be able to securely encrypt or decrypt a secret using
the Fuzzy Vault. As a consequence current implementations do not use the Fuzzy Vault
as it was designed.
An attempt to use a commonality based approach to realise a Fuzzy Vault, which we
call a ‘Modified Fuzzy Vault’, has been implemented first by Uludag and Jain [68] and later
by Nandakumar et al [49], where instead of using GRS decoding, Lagrange Interpolation
for list decoding was used to obtain a list of candidate secrets and a CRC check was
used to verify if the recovered secret was correct. This allows them to correct for a larger
number of errors than possible using GRS decoding. However this implementation has
three main drawbacks:
1. The decoding time increases significantly with the size of the sets.
2. The user with a valid template uses the same algorithm as the attacker to attempt
to recover the secret. In other words a user a with sufficient number of elements
does not recover the secret immediately in a single step as with maximal likelihood
decoding. A valid user still must perform multiple interpolations though, and they
may recover the secret faster than an attacker by virtue of having enough valid
points.
3. Uniform quantisation causing a non uniform distribution of minutiae across the
quanta will give the attacker an edge in such an attack.
An approach to pre-align templates without revealing information about the template,
could be another way to reduce intra sample variation so that set difference based con-
structs can be used to protect the templates. One such method using high curvature points
has been employed to prealign minutiae based templates in a Fuzzy vault implementation
by Nandakumar et al [49]. The results from the second part of this chapter show that
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the TRI representation has the potential to be developed as a pre-alignment mechanism
for minutiae-based templates. Once pre-aligned, the templates can be protected by any
cryptographic construct, not necessarily the Fuzzy Vault. One potential line of work is to
follow secure pre-alignment with a fractional biometric system for re-usable and revocable
fingerprint templates [12].
The main results of this chapter are:
1. We studied the suitability of the FNN, VOR and TRI structures to a
Fuzzy Vault by running a non quantised match based algorithm on DB1.
The VOR representation showed most promise to be incorporated into a
Fuzzy Vault based authentication scheme.
2. For templates to be securely compared using a Fuzzy Vault that uses
GRS decoding, the commonality between templates from samples of the
same fingerprint must be at least 33.33% of their union size.
3. A feasibility study for all the representations except TRI for their suit-
ability to a Fuzzy Vault was conducted on DB4. We found that due
to the high natural variation between samples from the same finger ex-
acerbated by quantisation error, a large set difference will need to be
corrected between genuine samples. As a result none of the representa-
tions were found suitable for implementing a Fuzzy Vault that uses GRS
codes for error correction.
4. A secure pre-alignment strategy using reference point free representa-
tions was studied. The TRI representation showed most promise to
pre-align templates without leaking much information about the minutia
pattern.
In this chapter we have only analysed the suitability of the Fuzzy vault for minutiae-
based templates and not actually implemented a Fuzzy vault based system. There are
two reasons for this.
First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in a Fuzzy Vault based system, the enrolled and query
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templates must be of the same size. In minutiae-based templates, the number of minutiae
obtained in any two capture instances will be different. Therefore unless a method exists
to select a fixed number of the most reliable minutiae to form the template, a Fuzzy vault
based system cannot be implemented. The feature extractor that we used, did not give
us information on the quality of the extracted minutia. Hence we had no way of ranking
the minutiae and selecting a fixed number of the nest ones.
Secondly, as indicated in our main results above, a minimum of 33% of the minutiae-based
structures must be in common to be able to use GRS decoding in the Fuzzy vault. Our
experiments show that this minimum requirement is not met by minutiae-based templates.
Till date we are not aware of any implementations of GRS decodng based Fuzzy vault
systems for minutiae-based templates.
The PinSketch construct, based on the principle of decoding of BCH codes, does not
require the sizes of the templates to be the same. The main question to be asked of
this construct is if BCH codes that correct the number of errors that naturally ocurr
between samples of the same fingerprint, exist. The next chapter answers this question
and describes our design and implementation of minutiae based authentication systems
using the PinSketch Construct.
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Chapter 7
Minutiae-based Structures for
PinSketch
PinSketch is an error tolerant cryptographic construct introduced by Dodis et al in [24]
that also works over the set difference metric. Its primary advantage over the Fuzzy Vault
construct is that the two sets being compared need not be of the same size. This property
makes it very attractive as a prospective technique for a minutiae-based authentication
system as the number of minutiae extracted from different samples of the same finger will
almost always be different. PinSketch has been described in detail in Chapter 3.3.3.
In this chapter we will describe three different methods to use the PinSketch construct
for Secure Authentication. We will denote them as Algorithm1, Algorithm2 and Algo-
rithm3 for clarity.
Algorithm1 was the first PinSketch based authentication system developed for this
thesis. This algorithm was tested on the FNNLocalPlusGlobal representation on DB1
and DB3. It is a two stage algorithm i.e. the PinSketch construct is applied at two levels
in the template creation and secure matching process. The results of the matching accu-
racy and security of Algorithm1 were published in a paper titled “Fuzzy Extractors for
Minutiae-based Fingerprint Authentication" [8]. Algorithm1 has security drawbacks due
to the nature of its implementation, the details of which are explored in Chapter 8.
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Algorithm2 was developed with the aim of avoiding the vulnerabilities present in Al-
gorithm 1. It uses the PinSketch construct for secure authentication using point based
templates like the 3DPolar, 3DCartesian, FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D and VOR5D. In all
these representations, each template is a set of quanta indices, each quanta correspond-
ing to a three, four or five dimensional quantised space respectively. The design and
matching performance of the point based templates using Algorithm2 at their respective
QUANTbest parameters from Table 5.5 will be described.
Finally we describe Algorithm3, a modified matching algorithm designed for structure
based templates like the FNN, VOR, FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal
representations, where each template is a set of sets of quanta indices describing the two
dimensional position of structures.
A comparison of the security of the three algorithms will be conducted in Chapter 8.
The software for all the algorithms has been written in C++ and run on the Windows
platform on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz machine. We used the public domain software written
by Harmon and Reyzin [32] for syndrome computation and syndrome decoding of BCH
codes. Victor Shoup’s NTL library [63] was used for performing Finite Field computations.
In the algorithms to follow, to achieve information theoretic security as suggested in
[24], we use a simple pairwise independent hash function described as follows: If P is
the Message Space, K is the Key Space and T is the Tag Space, the Hash Function is a
mapping Hash : K × P → T . In our implementations, the message p, tag t and a key
pair (k1,k2), each in GF(2m), where m is a positive integer, are related by the function
[64]
t = Hash(p) = k1 × p+ k2, (7.1)
. where the multiplication occurs over GF (2m).
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7.1 Algorithm1: PinSketch based Authentication sys-
tem using a two stage process
This was the first PinSketch based authentication system for minutiae-based templates
that was developed for this thesis. Testing was only performed on one of the representa-
tions i.e. FNNLocalPlusGlobal with the intention that if it proved efficient and secure, it
could be extended to other structure representations.
The two stage process was developed with the intention of compensating for non linear
distortion that causes quantisation error, in a secure manner during matching.
Let TQenr = {SQ1 , SQ2 , ....., SQNenr} be the quantised enrolled template comprising of struc-
tures where each quantised structure SQi ; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr is a set of indices of two dimensional
quanta that represent the structure shape. Thus the quantised enrolled template will be
a set of sets of quanta indices. Similarly TQver = {S
′Q
1 , S
′Q
2 , S
′Q
3 , ....., S
′Q
Nver
} will be the
quantised query template.
In this algorithm, every quantised structure SQi = {PQloci , PQglobi} is defined by a Descrip-
tor. Each structure’s Descriptor is comprised of two parts: a binary vector describing the
minutia’s global position quantum and binary vectors representing the position quanta
of the neighboring minutiae. In other words, each two dimensional quantum of each
quantised structure i.e each index, is represented by a binary vector. Thus a structure’s
Descriptor is a set of binary vectors of which one represents the global position and the
rest represent the local pattern of a minutia.
In order to compare two templates, we compare the corresponding structures in the
two templates and count the number of structures that match between them. Two struc-
tures are compared by comparing their Descriptors. As the comparison of Descriptors
must be done securely, the components of the Descriptor of each quantised structure will
be secured using the SS module of PinSketch and a pairwise independent hash function
(see Chapter 3.3.3). Secure comparison with the Descriptors associated with the struc-
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tures in the query fingerprint is achieved by using the REC module of the PinSketch
construct and a pairwise independent hash function.
In this section we will first describe our technique to compensate for non linear dis-
tortion. This is followed by a description of the binary vectors that form the descriptor
and our algorithm for the secure matching process.
7.1.1 Compensating for Non-Linear Distortion in minutiae po-
sitions
Each minutia, by virtue of its position in a global or local reference frame, will lie in some
quantum Q. Non-linear distortions in minutia position may cause it to move to a different
quantum when compared to its corresponding minutia in the enrolled fingerprint. We
propose a novel scheme to match corresponding minutiae positions when such movement
occurs. Every local or global position, instead of being identified by a quantum, will be
described by a set of quanta. This set includes quantum Q where the minutia lies and the
8 quanta that surround Q and it is called a Position Set. The shaded regions in Figure
7.1(a) give an example of the elements of the Position Set for a Minutia’s global position.
If non-linear distortion causes a minutia to move to any one of the eight surrounding
quanta, the resulting Position Set will differ from the correct Position set by a maximum
of 10 elements. An illustration of this is given in Figure 7.1(b), (c) and (d). Hence two
minutiae positions are considered to match if the set difference between their Position
Sets is less than or equal to 10. For minutiae that lie in the first tier (core is one of
the corners) of the quantized frame, a similar compensation for movement results in a
maximum set difference of 7. Thus, by setting the maximum allowable set difference to
10 we permit slightly more position variation in minutiae lying in the inner quanta.
7.1.2 Binary Representation and Matching Condition
Let the maximum radial measure in the polar coordinate frame for the global position be
Rmax and that for the local position be denoted by rmax. The maximum angular measure
of the coordinate system in the global and local frames will be 360◦. The two dimensional
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Figure 7.1: Error tolerance in minutia position
polar coordinate frame is quantised separately using the quantisation parameters for the
global and local positions. For the FNNLocPlusGlobal representation, let |Dg| and |Dl|
denote the maximum number of quanta in the two dimensional global and local reference
frames used to describe the global position and local pattern respectively.
The global Position Set of a Minutia Mi will be represented by a binary vector Gi,
called its global Position Vector, having length equal to |Dg| and with 0 in every position
except those corresponding to the elements in its Position Set. Similarly, each of Mi’s
neighbors will be represented by binary local Position Vectors Lji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, each of
length |Dl| with non zero bits in positions corresponding to each of their local Position
Sets. In general a Position Vector is the characteristic vector of the corresponding Position
Set. A minutia in the enrolled fingerprint matches a minutia in the query fingerprint if:
1. The global Position Sets (Position Vectors) of the two minutiae have a set difference
(Hamming distance) of not more than 10.
2. At least four out of the five neighbors in their corresponding FNN structures will
have a set difference (Hamming distance) not more than 10, when local Position
Sets (Position Vectors) of corresponding neighbors are compared.
7.1.3 Encrypted Matching of Minutiae Points
IfN minutiae were extracted from a fingerprint, the un-encrypted fingerprint template will
consist of N Descriptors, one for each minutia. For a minutia Mi, its Descriptor consists
of a binary global Position Vector Gi and binary local Position vectors Lji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5.
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To perform matching in the encrypted domain, every global Position Vector and local
Position Vector is protected by generating its sketch using the SS module of the PinSketch
construct and securely comparing with a query using the REC module. The working of
the SS and REC modules is described in Chapter 3.3.3. The block diagrams of the
modules in the enrolment and verification processes for the matching of global and local
Descriptors are shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3 respectively.
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Figure 7.2: Enrolment and Verification modules for global Descriptor
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Figure 7.3: Enrolment and Verification modules for local Descriptor
The goal of the PSglobal enrolment and verification modules is to securely correct any
error in the global position due to non linear distortion. The goal of the PSlocal enrol-
ment and verification modules is to securely correct the non linear distortion in each local
position of a neighbour and securely correct the insertion and deletion of neighbors in a
local structure. This is the reason for two SS and REC modules in PSlocal.
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PSglobal Enrolment: The enrolment stage is shown in Figure 7.2(a). The enrolment
stage consists of 2 modules - the SS module and a pairwise independent hash function
module. In order to encrypt the global position of minutia Mi, its global Position Vector
Gi and the maximum set difference correctable t1 = 10 are given as input to SS to
obtain the SS(Gi). SS(Gi) is the syndrome of the characteristic vector Gi of length |Dg|.
The number of quanta in the quantised global frame, |Dg|, determines the Galois Field
GF (2mg) over which the Syndromes are computed, where mg is the smallest integer such
that
|Dg| ≤ 2mg − 1. (7.2)
As a valid match to Gi can have a Hamming distance of 10 from it, the maximum error
that the BCH code can correct must be t1 = 10. Let the BCH code used be denoted
by BCH1, which will have codeword length at least |Dg| and error correction capability
t = 10. Two random seeds RS1global and RS2global each of length |Dg| are selected and are
used to generate a Hash of Gi denoted by Hash(Gi), using the pairwise independent hash
function module. For each minutia’s global position, SS(Gi), t1, Hash(Gi), RS1global and
RS2global form part of the publicly stored template.
PSglobal Verification: The Verification stage also consists of 2 modules - the Recovery
module REC of PinSketch and a pairwise independent hash function module. When a
minutia M ′k in the query fingerprint is compared with minutia Mi of the enrolled finger,
the global Position Vector of the query minutia, G′k, is first compared. To perform the
comparison, the public template information corresponding to Gi is retrieved and the
following procedure takes place:
1. G′k is passed through the REC procedure of the PinSketch module along with t1
and SS(Gi). If G′k was within a Hamming distance of 10 bits to Gi, the decoder
would correctly recover Gi. Let Giest be the estimate of Gi got from REC.
2. Using the pairwise independent hash function module and using the same random
seeds RS1global and RS2global get Hash(Giest). If Hash(Gi)= Hash(Giest), the ith
enrolled structure and kth query structure are said to match in their global position.
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PSlocal Enrolment: Figure 7.3(a) shows two SS modules. SS1 is used to correct the
variation in each of the local Position Vectors due to non linear distortion. SS2 is used to
correct the variation in the shape of the FNN structure due to insertions and deletions.
Each local Position vector of a neighbour Lji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 of minutiaMi, is given as input
to the SS1 module along with t1 = 10 to get 5 syndromes denoted by SS(Lji ),1 ≤ j ≤ 5.
Let BCH2 denote the BCH code with minimum codeword length |Dl| and error correction
bound t1 = 10. The syndromes will be computed over the field ml where
|Dl| ≤ 2ml − 1. (7.3)
The local Position vectors are considered as a Local Set Li = {Lji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5}. Li
is also used to denote the ith Local Set’s characteristic vector which is a binary string
of length equal to 2|Dl|, with ones occurring at positions corresponding to the elements
in the set. The length of the characteristic vector of Li is due to the fact that there
are 2|Dl| possible values that each binary vector of length |Dl| can take. In this algo-
rithm we set the local match threshold to be a set difference threshold where l = 2.
Therefore two structures can have a maximum set difference of 2 quanta i.e t2 = 2. The
characteristic vector Li is passed through SS2 which works over a BCH code BCH3 of
minimum codeword length 2|Dl| and minimum distance 2t2 + 1 = (2× 2) + 1 = 5, to get
SS(Li). This is used to correct the errors that can occur between local structure patterns.
The local Position vectors Lji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 are also used to create an identifier for the lo-
cal structure. They are ordered and concatenated to form a single word LLi of maximum
length 5|Dl|. Two random seeds RS1locali and RS2locali each of length 5|Dl| are used to
generate Hash(LLi) using the pairwise independent hash function. Thus, the pattern of
the local Neighbour Structure for minutia Mi is defined by SS(Lji ), 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, SS(Li),
Hash(LLi) and RS1locali and RS2locali in the publicly stored template. The parameters
of the two BCH codes used, are also stored.
PSlocal Verification: Our criteria for matching two local structures, allows a max-
imum set difference of 2 neighbors. This allows for one insertion and one deletion of
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minutiae between two structures that are compared. We call every map of correspond-
ing neighbors in the enrolled structure and query structure a Permutation. For each
Permutation, there will be a one to one correspondence between the neighbors in the
two structures that are being compared. In a certain Permutation, let L′lk be the query
structure’s neighbour corresponding to Lji . The following procedure is performed:
1. Each L′lk , 1 ≤ l ≤ 5, is given as input to REC1 along with t1 and SS(Llk) to obtain
an estimate of Lji denoted by L
j
i est.
2. Combine all the 5 estimates to form the estimated Local Set L′i = {Lji est, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5}.
3. Pass L′i along with t2 and SS(Li) through the REC2 module, which will correct 2
set difference errors between Li and L′i. The resulting set of 5 vectors are ordered
in the same way as during enrolment and concatenated to form LL′i.
4. Finally the random seeds RS1locali and RS2locali ares used to compute Hash(LL′i) us-
ing the pairwise independent hash function module. If Hash(LL′i) equals Hash(LLi),
the local structures are said to match. All possible Permutations are tried until a
match is found. If no Permutation yields a match, then the local structures of the
corresponding minutiae do not match.
When two fingerprints are compared, the global positions of corresponding minutiae
are compared first. Only on obtaining a match in global position are the minutiae tested
for match in the shape of the local structure. If sufficient minutiae structures match in
both global position and local structure, the two fingerprints are considered a successful
match.
7.1.4 Experiment Description
Our algorithm was run on databases DB1 and DB3. The design parameters for each
database is given below.
Quantization Parameters: The quantization parameters for each database had
to be separately tuned. The QUANTbest parameters for DB1 and DB3 differed from
QUANTbest chosen for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal representation for DB4 in Table 5.5.
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For DB1 we chose (40, 20, 2, 40, 20) as the quantisation parameters, which resulted in
|Dg| = |Dl| = 126. For DB3, we chose (20, 20, 2, 20, 20) as the quantisation parameter
which caused |Dg| = |Dl| = 270.
BCH Codes: For DB1, the smallest BCH code length covering 126 quanta was 127.
As we needed to correct 10 errors (Section 7.1.1), we chose both BCH1 and BCH2 to
be BCH(127,64,21). BCH3 was chosen to have a codeword length of 264 and minimum
distance of 5. For DB3 we chose BCH1 and BCH2 to be BCH(511,421,21) and BCH3 to
have a codeword length of 2421 and minimum distance of 5.
7.1.5 Results and Analysis
Applying the above parameters to the fingerprints in our database, we evaluated the
FNMR and FMR at different match thresholds (MTh). The graph is shown in Figure
7.4. For DB1, we observe that Equal Error occurs at a threshold of 18 and the error is
roughly 10%. However, for DB3 we found the error at Equal Error was closer to 15%.
We observed that the low Genuine Acceptance Rate and higher error in DB3 compared
to DB1 was due to the error introduced by the feature extractor in extracting minutiae
and the core location. False non matches particularly occurred when the extractor found
double cores in the fingerprint.
Observing the performance at 0% FMR, we found that for DB1, an operating match
threshold MTh was 23 structures and for DB3, the operating match threshold was 10
structures. The FNMR at 0% FMR for DB1 is 25% and for DB3 is 30% as can be seen
from the figure. The lowest FNMR at 0% FMR for the quantised FNNLocalPlusGlobal
representation tested on DB4 from Table 5.5 is 17.69% at SDTh% = 93%. This indi-
cates that a better matching performance for Algorithm1 could be obtained if a relative
threshold were used instead of an absolute measure like MTh used here.
One drawback of this scheme is that by applying the PinSketch to protect the matching
of Descriptors, it became necessary for each pair of structures to test several Permuta-
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Figure 7.4: FMR and FNMR curves
tions before the structure pattern that corresponded could be found. This significantly
increased the computational time for matching of templates. In addition, the security
analysis of this scheme, described in Chapter 8, reveals that by applying the PinSketch
modules to the Descriptors, the templates reveal too much information about the minu-
tiae point pattern of the enrolled fingerprint.
7.2 Algorithm2: PinSketch-based Authentication Sys-
tem for Point based Templates
Let TQenr = {Q1, Q2, ....., QNenr} be the quantised enrolled template obtained from a non
quantised template Tenr = {P1, P2, ..., PNenr}, a set of multi-dimensional points described
using one of the 3DPolar, 3DCartesian, FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D or VOR5D represen-
tations. Each Qi; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr is the index of the multi-dimensional quantum where
the corresponding multi-dimensional point Pi from the non quantised template lies in the
quantised coordinate frame. Similarly let TQver = {Q′1, Q′2, ...., Q′Nver} be the quantised
query template obtained from the query fingerprint sample. Let E denote the character-
istic vector of the set Tenr and E ′ denote the characteristic vector of the set Tver.
The block diagram of a secure authentication system built using the PinSketch con-
struct is shown in Figure 7.5. SS denotes the component of the PinSketch construct that
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generates the Syndrome of the input binary string E during enrolment. E will have a
length equal to the size |D| of the universal set, which in turn is the maximum number of
possible multi-dimensional quanta in the quantised fingerprint reference frame. The size
of the universal set |D| determines the Galois Field GF (2m) over which the Syndromes
are computed, where m is the smallest integer such that
|D| ≤ 2m − 1. (7.4)
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Figure 7.5: Block Diagram of Authentication System for Point based Templates
In order to compute the syndrome, we need to determine the maximum set difference
between the enrolled and query sets that can be corrected by the system, denoted by
tenr. In our schemes the maximum set difference that is permissible between two sets is
described as a percentage of the cardinality of the union of the enrolled and query sets
(SDTh%). In practice however, we will not know the size of the query set at enrolment.
Thus a design issue at enrolment is to determine tenr. If |U ′|max denotes the estimate
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of the maximum possible cardinality of the union of the two sets and SDTh% denotes
the maximum permissible set difference as a percentage of |U ′|max, the syndrome of E is
computed so that it can correct tenr number of set difference errors between the enrolled
and query sets where,
tenr =
SDTh%
100
× |U ′|max (7.5)
To estimate |U ′|max, we first estimate the size of the query set as 40% greater than the
cardinality of the enrolled set. The value 40% was set empirically. We overestimate the
amount of error correction during enrolment because if the query set is truly of a larger
size, then the actual allowed error correction will also be greater. However, at enrolment
if we work with a smaller error correction capability, we will not be able to increase it
to the desired value when the query set size is known during verification. On the other
hand, if we work with a larger error correcting capability at enrolment, we can always
reduce the error correction capability to the desired value at verification. Thus, to reduce
the chance of a false non match due to underestimating the query set size and hence
error correcting bound, we overestimate the cardinality of the query set at the expense of
revealing some more information about the enrolled set in terms of the extra syndrome
components calculated.
Let |E| be the size of the enrolled set and |E ′|est = 1.4×|E| be the estimated size of the
query set. As tenr is the maximum set difference permissible, the minimum intersection
required between the two sets is |U ′|max − tenr. Using Equation 7.5 and basic set theory,
we determine |U ′|max as:
|U ′|max = |E|+ |E
′|est
2− SDTh%
100
; (7.6)
then substitute |U ′|max in Equation 7.5 to determine tenr.
As the binary vector E is used as an authentication token, it needs to be stored se-
curely by applying a one-way transform or hash function to it. The hash function used is
described in Equation 7.1, where k1 = RS1, k2 = RS2, p = E and m = GF (2|D|).
The Secure Enrolled Template will therefore contain the following information:
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• tenr, the maximum permissible set difference.
• SS(E), the syndrome of the characteristic vector of E.
• |E|, the cardinality of the enrolled set.
• m, the index of the binary extension field over which the syndrome is calculated.
• Hash(E), the authentication token.
• RS1 and RS2, the two random seeds of length 2|D| used in the pairwise independent
hash function.
On creating the Secure Enrolled Template, the characteristic vector E, which is a repre-
sentation of the enrolled fingerprint, can be destroyed. The first four components of the
template form the Sketch of E, Sketch(E), and will help recover E exactly if a query
fingerprint that closely resembles the enrolled fingerprint is presented at verification.
In the verification component, REC denotes the BCH decoding module of PinSketch
which will recover E exactly if the characteristic vector E ′ of the query set TQver differs by
no more than a prescribed Hamming distance t from E, which corresponds to a maximum
set difference t between TQenr and TQver. In order to determine t, now that we know the
cardinality |E ′| of the query set, we can compute the actual size of the maximum union
size |U |max by substituting |E ′| in place of |E ′|est in Equation 7.6 and then computing the
actual maximum set difference permissible denoted by tver as
tver =
SDTh%
100
× |U |max. (7.7)
We then choose the set difference t that we will correct, as the minimum of tenr and tver.
If E ′ and E have a set difference greater than t, then the BCH decoder that forms part of
REC either does not output anything or will output an incorrect vector. In both cases,
the authentication will fail. The same random seeds used at enrolment will be used in the
pairwise independent hash function in the verification stage. If Eest is the estimate of E,
only when Hash(E) = Hash(Eest), will the authentication be successful.
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Representation Type Quantisation Parameters Field SDTh% FNMR FMR
3DPolar (20,40,40) GF (211) 73 33.95 .02
3DCartesian (20,30,30) GF (213) 79 29.96 0.04
FNN4D (30,20,20,30) GF (215) 89 26.72 0
VOR4D (20,20,20,30) GF (216) 93 17.57 0
FNN5D (20,30,20,50,30) GF (218) 93 20.94 0.02
VOR5D (20,20,20,30,40) GF (219) 96 16.32 0
Table 7.1: Result of Secure Matching of Point based Templates on DB4
The secure matching algorithm was tested on the fingerprint samples from DB4 using
the 3DPolar, 3DCartesian, FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D and VOR5D representations at
the quantisation parameters and operating thresholds giving the best performance as
described in Table 5.5 in Chapter 5. The results of that experiment are presented in
Table 7.1.
The third column in Table 7.1 indicates the Galois Field over which the computations
were performed. For each representation the value of m in GF (2m) is given by Equation
7.4 where |D| for each case will be the total number of quanta in the reference frame. For
example for the 3DPolar representation, 300 pixels is the maximum radial distance from
the core that we will consider any minutiae to be located at and 360◦ is the maximum an-
gle possible. Thus (300, 360, 360) defines the boundary of the 3DPolar space. Using these
boundary values and the quantisation parameters, |D| = 300
20
× 360
40
× 360
40
= 15×9×9 = 1215.
Since 211 = 2048 is the smallest power of two that gives a number greater than 1215, for
this representation, m = 11.
When we compare the matching accuracy obtained in Table 7.1 with the unencrypted
match results for corresponding representations in Table 5.5, we find that the accuracy on
secure matching is not significantly different from the quantised and unsecured accuracy.
The slight variation will arise due to the process of estimating the query set size and hence
estimating the error correcting capability for syndrome calculation at enrolment. When
comparing two samples of the same finger, if for some reason the actual error correcting
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allowance computed at verification tver is greater than that estimated at enrolment tenr,
we will be setting the error correcting allowance threshold t lower than it should be as we
choose t as the minimum of tenr and tver. This can lead to false non matches to occur in
the encrypted matching process when those templates match successfully in the quantised
unencrypted matching process.
Observing the SDTh% column in Table 7.1, we see that the set difference required to
be corrected is very large. The security implications of this will be discussed in Chapter
8. It is however clear from the results in Chapter 5.5 that the quantisation process greatly
decreases the number of elements in common between two samples of the same fingerprint.
Therefore, a matching algorithm that counts the number of elements in common between
two templates rather than the number that differ, will better model the nature of the errors
in quantised minutiae-based templates. We apply this idea to matching of structure based
templates in the next section.
7.3 Algorithm3: PinSketch-based Authentication Sys-
tem for Structure based Templates
This section describes the design of a PinSketch based authentication system for templates
constructed using the FNN, VOR, FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal repre-
sentations. Matching of structure based templates involves comparison of the structures
that comprise it. The basic goal of Algorithm3 when comparing two templates, is to
securely compare individual structures using PinSketch and count the number of struc-
tures that match. The authentication decision will then be based on a Match Percentage
Threshold MTh%, which is the number of structures that must match, relative to the
cardinality of the union of the two sets. It must be noted that for any pair of templates
if SDTh% is the Set Difference Percentage Threshold of operation, the corresponding
Match Threshold MTh is given by:
MTh% = 100− SDTh%. (7.8)
Let TQenr = {SQ1 , SQ2 , ....., SQNenr} be the quantised enrolled template comprising of struc-
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tures where each quantised structure SQi ; 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr is a set of indices of two dimensional
quanta that represent the structure shape. Thus the quantised enrolled template will be
a set of sets of quanta indices. Similarly T qver = {S
′Q
1 , S
′Q
2 , S
′Q
3 , ....., S
′Q
Nver
} will be the
quantised query template.
For the FNN and VOR representations, each SQi will be a set of indices of two dimen-
sional quanta describing the local structure. For ease of explanation we will denote this
set as PlocQi . Thus for these two representations, S
Q
i = Ploc
Q
i .
For the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal representations, each SQi will
consist of two parts: the local structure around the central minutia of the structure,
denoted as PlocQi and the global position of the central minutia in a quantised polar co-
ordinate system, denoted as PglobQi i.e. S
Q
i = (Ploc
Q
i , Pglob
Q
i ). Two structures match when
their quantised global positions match exactly and the quantised local structures match
as defined by the local match threshold l. As the structures are securely compared using
the PinSketch construct and the PinSketch construct works over the set difference metric,
the local match threshold l is defined as a set difference threshold.
The block diagram of the enrolment and verification modules is shown in Figure 7.6.
In order to store the enrolled template securely, the sketch of each structure is generated
using the SS module and a transformed version of the structure, which is used as the
identifier for the structure, is created using the Hash module. During verification each
structure of the query template is securely compared with a structure in the enrolled
template using the REC module and information from the corresponding Sketch of the
enrolled structure. The Hash module is used to generate the transform of the estimate
of the enrolled structure generated by REC. If the transformed version of the estimate
exactly equals the identifier of the enrolled structure, the two structures match. This pro-
cedure is continued until all query structures have been tested for matches with enrolled
structures. The number of structures that match between the templates is recorded and
a match decision is made based on the match count and MTh for the pair of templates.
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Figure 7.6: Block Diagram of Authentication System for Structure based Templates
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Let Eloci denote the characteristic vector for the local structure PlocQi of a structure
SQi in TQenr. For the representations where the global position exists, let Eglobi denote the
characteristic vector for the global position PglobQi of S
Q
i . Let Dl be the set of indices of the
two dimensional quantised space from which the components of PlocQi are drawn and Dg
be the set of indices of the two dimensional quantised space from which the components
of PglobQi are drawn. Let |Dl| and |Dg| be their respective cardinalities.
ENROLMENT:
The enrolment procedure for the FNN and VOR representations which only have a local
structure differs slightly from that for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal
representations.
ENROLMENT for the FNN and VOR representations:
1. For each structure SQi , generate the syndrome of Eloci denoted by SS(Eloci), using
the SS module. The field of operation GF (2ml) will be determined by substituting
|Dl| into Equation 7.4. The error correction bound t will be the local match threshold
l expressed as a set difference.
2. Generate two random seeds RS1i and RS2i of length |Dl| and using the pairwise
independent hash function module generate Hash(Eloci).
Let the Secure Enrolled Template (SET) for SQi be denoted by SET (S
Q
i ). This will
comprise:
SET (SQi ) = (SS(Eloci),ml, t, Hash(Eloci), RS1i, RS2i). (7.9)
The first three components of Equation 7.9 are the sketch of the local structure and
are used to perform secure matching of the local structure with query structures. Once
SET (Eloci) is generated, Eloci can be destroyed.
ENROLMENT for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal rep-
resentations:
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1. For each structure SQi , generate the syndrome of Eloci denoted by SS(Eloci), using
the SS module. The field of operation GF (2ml) for the SS module, will be deter-
mined by substituting |Dl| into Equation 7.4. The error correction bound t will be
the local match threshold l.
2. Create a binary vector Ei which will be a concatenation of Eloci and Eglobi, i.e.
Ei = Eloci + (Eglobi >> ml), (7.10)
where >> denotes the bitwise right shift operation. Thus Ei will have a maximum
length of |D| = |Dl|+ |Dg|.
3. Generate two random seeds RS1i and RS2i of length |D|. The field of operation
GF (2m) for the pairwise independent hash function module, will be evaluated by
substituting |D| in Equation 7.4. Generate Hash(Ei) using RS1i, RS2i and m.
The Secure Enrolled Template for SQi denoted by SET (S
Q
i ) will now be:
SET (SQi ) = (SS(Eloci),ml, t, Hash(Ei),m,RS1i, RS2i). (7.11)
The Secure Enrolled Template for TQenr will be the set of the SET s for the structures
that comprise it.i.e,
SET (TQenr) = {SET (SQi ), 1 ≤ i ≤ Nenr}. (7.12)
Note that in Figure 7.6, for the FNN and VOR representations, Eglob, E ′glob and mg
will be ignored as there is no global component.
VERIFICATION:
The verification procedure for the FNN and VOR representations will also differ from
that for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal representations.
Let TQver = {S
′Q
1 , S
′Q
2 , S
′Q
3 , ....., S
′Q
Nver
} be the query template being compared with TQenr =
{SQ1 , SQ2 , ....., SQNenr}.
Each structure in T qenr is successively compared with a structure in TQver. If the ith enrolled
structure matches the jth query structure, a match counter NMatch is incremented, the
test for the ith enrolled structure ceases and the jth query structure is flagged as having
matched to an enrolled structure so that it will not be compared with in future structure
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comparisons. Then, the next enrolled structure i.e. the i + 1th structure is tested for a
matching query structure and the process continues until all the enrolled structures have
been securely compared.
Let E ′locj denote the characteristic vector for the local structure P ′loc
Q
j of a structure
S
′Q
j in T qver. For the representations where the global position exists, let E ′globj denote the
characteristic vector for the global position P ′glob
Q
j
of S
′Q
j . If the ith enrolled structure S
Q
i
is being compared with the jth query structure S
′Q
j , the following steps occur:
VERIFICATION for the FNN and VOR representations:
1. Feed E ′locj into the REC module along with SS(Eloci), the field GF (2ml) and er-
ror correction bound t from the sketch of the ith structure. If E ′locj differed by a
Hamming distance no greater than t from Eloci, the REC module will be able to
reconstruct Eloci exactly at its output. Otherwise a ∅ will be output. Let Elociest
be the estimate of Eloci generated at the output of the REC module.
2. Use Elociest, RS1i, RS2i and ml as inputs to the Pairwise Independent Hash function
module to generate Hash(Elociest).
3. If Hash(Elociest) = Hash(Eloci), S
Q
i is said to match S
′Q
j .
VERIFICATION for the FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlusGlobal
representations:
1. Feed E ′locj into the REC module along with SS(Eloci), the field index ml and er-
ror correction bound t from the sketch of the ith structure. If E ′locj differed by a
Hamming distance no greater than t from Eloci, the REC module will be able to
reconstruct Eloci exactly at its output. Otherwise a ∅ will be output. Let Elociest
be the estimate of Eloci generated at the output of the REC module.
2. Generate the concatenated word Eiest given by:
Eiest = Elociest + (E
′
globj
>> ml). (7.13)
3. Use Eiest, RS1i, RS2i and m as inputs to the Pairwise Independent Hash function
module to generate Hash(Eiest).
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Representation Type QUANTbest Field SDTh% FNMR FMR
FNN (20,20,2) GF (29) 90 54.15 0
VOR (20,20,2) GF (29) 92 53.13 0
FNNLocalPlusGlobal (20,20,4,30,40) GF (29), GF (27) 92 21.29 0
VORLocalPlusGlobal (20,30,4,20,30) GF (28), GF (28) 93 21.34 0
Table 7.2: Result of Secure Matching of Structure based Templates on DB4
4. If Hash(Eiest) = Hash(Ei), SQi is said to match S
′Q
j .
If NMatch is the number of structures that matched between TQenr and TQver whose
cardinalities are Nenr and Nver respectively, the size of the union between the two sets,
denoted by |U | is given by,
|U | = |Nenr|+ |Nver| −NMatch. (7.14)
If SDTh% is the set difference percentage threshold for which the system was designed,
the corresponding match percentage threshold MTh% is given by Equation 7.8. The
Match Threshold MTh is then determined as:
MTh =
MTh%
100
× |U |. (7.15)
If NMatch > MTh, Tenr is said to match Tver.
We tested this algorithm on fingerprints in DB4. The results are given in the Table
7.2:
A comparison of the results in Table 7.2 with the un-encrypted matching in Table
5.5 indicates an increase in the FNMR at 0% FMR. The FNN and VOR structures fare
poorly with a 10−20% increase in error rate. However the FNNLocPlusGlobal and VOR-
LocPlusGlobal give much better performances, with an increase in error by only 5− 6%.
A comparison of the matching performances using Algorithm2 and Algorithm3 indi-
cates that the VOR4D and VOR5D give the lowest FNMRs at 0% FMR. All the repre-
sentations except the 3DPolar and 3DCartesian operate at a SDTh% above 90%. The
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security implications of operating at such a threshold for Algorithm2 and Algorithm3 are
described in Chapter 8.
The main results of this chapter are:
1. Three algorithms for minutiae-based secure authentication that used the
PinSketch construct were proposed and their design and working clearly
explained.
2. Algorithm1 used the PinSketch construct to protect the matching of
Descriptors to compensate for non linear distortion. The algorithm was
tested using the FNNLocalPlusGlobal representation on DB1 and DB3.
The matching performance was acceptable but the algorithm has a long
computation time and security vulnerabilities.
3. Algorithm2 used the PinSketch construct to protect matching of point
based templates like 3DPolar, 3DCartesian, FNN4D, VOR4D, FNN5D
and VOR5D. The algorithm was tested over DB4 and the VOR4D and
VOR5D gave the best performance at 0% FMR. However, the large nat-
ural variation caused the set difference to be corrected between genuine
samples, to be very high.
4. Algorithm3 used the PinSketch construct to protect matching of struc-
ture based templates like FNN, VOR, FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VOR-
LocalPlusGlobal. The tests were run over DB4 and the latter two repre-
sentations gave the lowest FNMR rates at 0% FMR.
In this chapter we have described three approaches to using minutiae-based templates
for a PinSketch based authentication system. The first approach has a long computational
time and as will be described in Chapter 8, poor security of the template. The next two
approaches were designed to avoid susceptibility to such an attack. However, how well
do these systems achieve their goal of security and privacy of the templates? This is a
question we explore in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 8
Security of the Templates in a
PinSketch Construct
In the previous chapter we have described the design and performance of three implemen-
tations of a PinSketch based authentication system for minutiae based templates. The
PinSketch construct achieves error correction by computing the syndrome of the binary
vector that needs to be protected. The syndrome gives away some information regarding
the binary vector. If N is the weight of the characteristic vector of a set that needs to
be securely compared and t is the set difference that needs to be corrected, the syndrome
causes an entropy loss of mt, where m defines the Galois Field GF (2m) over which the
syndrome computations are performed [24, Section 6.3]. In fact the authors indicated
that for the comparison to be secure, the number of errors that need to be corrected must
be very small. The greater the error correction bound, the more information about the
binary vector that will be available to an attacker for analysis.
If |D| is the total number of quanta in a reference frame, N is the number of elements
in a set that needs to be securely compared and if all N are equally likely out of the |D|
possibilities, the entropy of the set will be [24]:
log2(
(|D|
N
)
) ≈ N log2(|D|). (8.1)
Therefore for secure comparison of sets to occur, the entropy loss mt must be less than
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the entropy of the set i.e.
N log2(|D|) > mt. (8.2)
In this chapter we will assume that the aim of the attacker is to be able to guess a
quantised template such that if it is given as the query template to a matcher, will be
able to masquerade as a valid user. We will analyse the template security in the three
algorithms that we developed.
8.1 Security Analysis for Algorithm1
Let us assume that the authentication system operates at 0% FMR. This implies that
for DB1, the minimum number of structures that must match is 23 and for DB3, the
minimum number of structures that must match is 10 (from Figure 7.4). The PinSketch
construct is used to protect both the global Position Vector and the local Position Vec-
tors. As a result of quantisation (refer Chapter 7.1.4), for DB1 there are exactly 126
quanta for the global position and the positions of each of the neighbors. For global and
local Position Vectors, to compensate for non linear distortion, we allow t = 10 set dif-
ference errors between Position Sets. Since the eight surrounding quanta in the 127 bit
long vector follow directly from the central quantum, the entropy of the binary vector is
log2(
(
127
1
)
) ≈ log2(127) ≈ 7. However the syndrome reveals a huge amount of information
about the binary string, specifically mt = 7 × 10 = 70 bits. Thus this system does not
satisfy Equation 8.2 for secure comparisons of sets.
More specifically, the weight of each Position Vector is only 9 while there are 10 syndrome
vectors for it in the SET. As a result the attacker simply needs to use any 9 of the 10
syndromes to solve linear simultaneous equations to recover the Position Vector and hence
the quantum. If this deterministic reconstruction is done for every global Position Vector,
the entire enrolled template can then be recovered.
For DB3, there are 270 possible quanta. However, the syndrome still reveals too much
information (80 bits entropy loss) about a characteristic vector having entropy only 8 bits.
Thus, by using the PinSketch to protect a set where the set cardinality (N) is smaller
than the error correction bound t, we have completely revealed the enrolled template.
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This algorithm does not succeed in preventing an attacker from learning the original
quantised template in entirety. We made this observation after the results were published
in [8]. The security analysis there, indicates the algorithm is susceptible to a hill climbing
approach. However, we have discovered that as the entire enrolled template is revealed,
there is no uncertainty left about the quantised template. It is just a deterministic task
for the attacker to compute the position vectors from the syndromes.
Nonetheless, FNNLocalPlusGlobalPoints do not contain explicit information about
the minutiae ridge orientations. Recovering an approximate reconstruction of the ridge
flow without the ridge orientations at the minutiae point locations will be insufficient
to reconstruct the fingerprint as described in [57] and trace a person’s identity by using
the reconstructed ridge pattern to match against an existing fingerprint image database.
Hence the identity of a user is protected under our scheme. However, an attacker who
could hack into the feature extractor module could use this estimated point pattern to
masquerade as the genuine enrolled user by overriding the feature extractor. A safeguard
against such an attack would be to ensure that the feature extraction and matching
algorithms be done at a secure site.
8.2 Security Analysis for Algorithm2
In this section, we will use the 3DPolar representation tested over DB4 as an example to
evaluate the security of the templates in Algorithm2. The 3DPolar representation had
the best SDTH% = 73% at 0% FMR. We will show the importance of evaluating the
entropy of the template when analysing the security of such an authentication system. We
also demonstrate how an attacker can exploit a non uniform distribution of the template
elements to easily masquerade as a genuine user.
For the PinSketch construct, the entropy loss due to the sketch is t log2(|D|) ≤ tm
(refer 3.3.3), where |D| is the number of quanta in the quantised reference frame, t is
the maximum set difference that can be corrected and m defines the field of operation
according to Equation 7.4. In the 3DPolar representation, using the value of m from
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Table 7.1, we can approximate the maximum entropy loss due to publishing of the sketch
to be t× 11 bits.
A simple test conducted over all the minutiae-based templates from DB4 revealed that
the average number of elements in a 3DPolar template is Navg = 38. When we operate
the system at the Set Difference Percentage threshold indicated in Table 5.5, we can use
basic set theory to estimate the average number of quanta that a query template would
have to have in common with an enrolled template to be matched successfully to it. Let I
denote the average intersection required between the enrolled and query at the operating
point SD%. Then
I = (1− SD%
100
)× 2×Navg
1 + (1− SD%
100
)
= (1− 0.73)× 76
1 + (1− 0.73)
≈ 18
(8.3)
This implies that the average set difference that needs to be corrected is t = 2(38 −
18) = 40. If all the N = 38 quanta were equally likely, the entropy of a template would
be 38 log2(1215) ≈ 389 bits. The entropy loss due to the syndrome will be 40× 11 = 440
bits. This again indicates that the syndrome will reveal the entire enrolled template as
the N log2(|D|) < mt.
The above template entropy of 389 bits was calculated assuming that each distinct
template had 38 equally likely quanta. However, in fingerprint matching, any template
which has 18 minutiae matching will be considered the same. Therefore there are fewer
than 121538 distinct possible templates. An estimate of the entropy of the 3DPolar tem-
plate if all quanta were equally likely is given below.
If each of the 1215 distinct quanta in the quantised space of the core-centered reference
frame were equally likely and independent, the probability PT for an enrolled template
T , that another template would occur in the population with at least 18 of the quanta in
147
common with T is approximately
PT =
∑
18≤i≤N
(
38
i
)(
1215
i
) (8.4)
where N is the size of the query template. The above probability will be at least
PT =
(
38
18
)(
1215
18
) ≥ 7.32× 10−30 (8.5)
This gives a maximum possible entropy Hmax of
Hmax = − log2(PT ) ≈ 96 bits (8.6)
However, all quanta in a the reference frame are not equally likely. To confirm this,
we constructed a probability distribution table for the frequency of occurrence of quanta
in templates from the database. For each of the 1215 distinct quantisation blocks, we
counted the number of times each block occurred in any fingerprint template. We divided
the obtained frequency by the number of templates in the database that helped generate
the table to get an empirical estimate of the probability of occurrence for each quantum in
a randomly chosen fingerprint template. The Table 8.1 depicts the 18 most likely quanta
across the database and their probabilities.
As the table shows the most probable quanta are those with the lower limit of the
radial dimension as 0. This strengthens the notion that minutia are more likely to occur
closer to the core and hence quanta closer to the origin will have a higher probability
across the database if we use a uniform quantisation process as we have in this thesis. It
is expected that the performance of the 3DCartesian representation will be worse as the
quantisation is much coarser around the core.
Assuming these empirical probabilities represent the real world distribution of quanta
from fingerprints, the probability PT of finding another template with 18 minutia in com-
mon with a template T is approximated as the product of the probabilities of the 18 most
likely quanta in T . Such probabilities have been computed for every enrolled template
in the database and these probabilities are used to compute the corresponding maximum
entropy Hmax of each template. The empirical study showed that the average maximum
entropy of a template with this representation is 39 bits. This is much less than the 96
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Lower Limits of Quanta Probability (%)
(0, 0, 80) 28.76
(0, 280, 80) 27.69
(0, 240, 40) 25
(0, 40, 80) 23.92
(0, 320, 80) 23.66
(0, 240, 40) 22.85
(0, 320, 80) 21.77
(0, 320, 80) 21.24
(0, 80, 80) 21.24
(0, 40, 80) 20.97
(0, 280, 80) 20.9677
(0, 240, 40) 20.6989
(0, 200, 40) 20.4301
(0, 280, 80) 20.1613
(0, 320, 80) 19.8925
(0, 320, 320) 19.6237
(0, 320, 280) 19.3548
(0, 0, 280) 19.086
Table 8.1: 18 Most Likely Quanta in a (20,40,40) quantisation using templates from DB4
149
bits for a random distribution.
The left over entropy remaining in a template once the sketch is published will be
39 − 11t. Thus if t > b39
11
c = 3 the sketch reveals the entire enrolled template. In
our system, for each enrolled template, the maximum set difference that is corrected is
significantly greater than 3. Thus in practice, at the chosen operating parameters, the
authentication system is very insecure. In order to operate at lower Set Difference Percent-
ages we must compromise on the accuracy of the matching performance i.e we must allow
for higher FMRs. A high FMR would allow an attacker a high probability of breaking the
system by simply using random fingerprints at authentication attempts. Thus there is a
tradeoff between desired accuracy and desired security when using such minutiae based
templates.
For templates to have a good matching performance and good security they must have
very little intra-finger variation and significant inter-finger variation. Unfortunately with
uniform quantisation methods, we need to tradeoff between them. A fine quantisation
will improve the discrimination between templates of different fingers but also increase
the inter-sample variation. Similarly a broader quantisation may reduce inter-sample vari-
ability, but will also lower intra-finger discrimination.
In a final analysis we study the resistance of the PinSketch system designed for the
3DPolar representation, to a specific attack strategy. Assume the attacker has access
to the quanta probability distribution across the database and will exploit it to attack
the system. We study how likely is it that an attacker, creating a fake template with
the most likely quanta according to the distribution, will succeed in masquerading as a
valid enrolled user. In order to do this we counted how many of the templates did have
a set difference below the maximum permissible with this fake template. The test was
performed for different sizes of the fake template from 20 to 35 minutiae. We start at
20 as the authentication system has been designed to require a minimum template size
of 20 elements. Table 8.2 illustrates the results. We find that as the fake template size
increases to include more highly likely quanta, the greater is the chance that the fake
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FakeTemplateSize NumTemplatesMatched AttackProb
20 0/372 0
21 1/372 0.00268817
22 1/372 0.00268817
23 2/372 0.00537634
24 2/372 0.00537634
25 4/372 0.0107527
26 4/372 0.0107527
27 4/372 0.0107527
28 6/372 0.016129
29 6/372 0.016129
30 4/372 0.0107527
31 6/372 0.016129
32 7/372 0.0188172
33 6/372 0.016129
34 6/372 0.016129
35 5/372 0.0134409
Table 8.2: Relationship of Fake Template Size to Attack Success Rate
template matches a person from the database. The second column indicates the number
of fingerprint templates out of the 372 in the database, that matched to the fake template.
8.3 Security Analysis for Algorithm 3
Here we use the FNN representation over DB4 as an example to illustrate the templates
security in Algorithm3. This representation had the lowest SDTh% of 90% at 0% FMR
compared to the other three structure based template representations on which Algo-
rithm3 was run. Again, using the quantisation chosen for the FNN representation over
DB4, there are 270 quanta and as a result we work over GF (29) in the SS module. The
PinSketch construct here has been applied at the structure level, to securely compare
structures. For a given FNN structure there are 5 possible ways to select a set of 4 or
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5 quanta that would match it with a maximum set difference of l = 2. Therefore the
probability of finding another structure that matched a given structure is given by
PS =
4(
270
4
) + 1(270
5
)
= 1.855× 10−8.
(8.7)
Therefore the entropy of a FNN structure in bits is
HS = − log2(PS)
≈ 25.
(8.8)
For each syndrome of a structure with t = 2 and m = 9, the entropy lost is mt =
9× 2 = 18 bits. Therefore the left over entropy is 25− 18 = 7 bits approximately for each
structure. If we operate at the parameters listed in Table 5.5, the operating SDTh% value
will be 90%. The average number of FNN structures in a template at the quantisation
parameter of (20, 20, 2) from Table 6.1, is Navg = 44.
Using these values in Equation 8.3, the average number of structures in common be-
tween two templates is I = 8.
The average entropy of a FNN structure based template using this system is then the
product of the left over entropy of each structure with the number of structures needed
to match this template i.e. 7× 8 = 56 bits. This is the same security as in a DES key, so
will provide the same level of security.
This analysis has been done assuming all the quanta equally likely. However, experi-
ments in Section 8.2 clearly shows that with a uniform quantisation, the quanta will not
be uniformly distributed. As a result, the actual entropy of a structure will be lower.
However, if we use a quantisation technique where the minutiae distribution will be
close to uniform across the quanta, this algorithm is able to compare templates securely
without revealing the entire enrolled template, a distinct gain over Algorithm1 and Al-
gorithm2. An experiment to estimate the true entropy of an FNN structure will give a
clearer understanding of the number of set difference errors between templates that can
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be corrected.
A similar analysis can be performed for the VOR, FNNLocalPlusGlobal and VORLocalPlus-
Global representations.
The reason for the success of this Algorithm3 compared to the previous algorithms is
that in Algorithm3 we have used the PinSketch construct to protect sets whose sizes are
greater than the amount of error correction required. By comparing structures securely
and then using a match based threshold to compare templates, we have achieved security
as well as rewarded commonality to determine a match instead of penalising differences
like the set difference based constructs usually do.
The main conclusions from this chapter are:
1. In Algorithm1, the sketch reveals everything about the enrolled finger-
print. Therefore it fails in keeping the enrolled template secure.
2. In Algorithm2 as well, the error correction required for a reasonable
FNMR at 0% FMR is so large that the SET will reveal the entire enrolled
quantised template. Therefore it also fails to build a system that enables
secure comparison of minutiae-based templates.
3. Algorithm3 identifies that using a match based measure to compare tem-
plates is a better representation for the kinds of errors found in minutiae
based templates. It uses PinSketch to compare structures securely as the
structures themselves are more robust and require less error correction.
As a result some entropy is still retained in the enrolled fingerprint by
virtue of the entropy retained when comparing structures securely. Thus
Algorithm3 succeeds in realising a minutiae-based secure authentication
system, where some information is still retained while securely comparing
templates that possess large intra-sample variation.
We have thus demonstrated that in terms of security, the structure based matching us-
ing Algrithm3 provides a feasible and secure method to match minutiae-based templates.
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The FNMR rates, though high at almost 20% for the FNNGlobalPlusLocal and VOR-
GlobalPlusLocal representations, are encouraging enough to motivate further research
into techniques to improve this algorithm.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has studied the implementation of secure minutiae-based authentication sys-
tems so that templates can be stored and compared securely, without violating the privacy
of an enrolled individual. It has demonstrated how to implement a PinSketch-based au-
thentication system for minutiae-based templates that have intra-sample variations so
large that it would normally prevent them from being secured by set difference based
constructs.
We built minutiae-based templates using 8 different representation methods. The
first five have been employed for unencrypted matching of minutiae based templates,
while the last three have been developed for this thesis. To our knowledge this is the
first widespread study of the different representations possible with non rigid point pat-
terns like minutiae for use in a cryptographic scenario. As part of this comprehensive
study, we tested the matching performance of each representation (except TRI) in a non
quantised scenario to determine the tolerance limits that best modeled the natural non
rigid variation in the position of the points in multiple samples of the same finger. We
tested the representations in the context of their use in a cryptographic system where it
is imperative that the probability of an attacker using random templates to masquerade
as a valid user, is very close to 0. As a consequence we identified the need to operate
at a threshold where the FMR was 0. We defined the best tolerance limit TOLbest for
each representation as the tolerance limit for which the FNMR was the lowest at 0% FMR.
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As quantisation is the first step to building secure systems using cryptographic con-
structs, the best tolerance limits that were determined for each representation type, were
used to quantise the templates. The TOLbest values in each dimension were used to define
the quantisation steps for the process. We tested the matching performance of quantised
templates and compared it to the non quantised performance. Although the VOR4D rep-
resentation was very slightly affected by quantisation error, most other representations
noted a 7−20% rise in the FNMR on quantisation while the relative threshold of operation
was approximately the same for each representation (refer Chapter 5). Thus non linear
distortion leads to quantisation error that increases the error in a fingerprint matcher’s
performance by up to 20%.
We then tested if the best non quantised tolerance limits TOLbest were indeed the best
quantisation parameters as well. We found that they were not, except for the FNN and
VOR representations. We also noted that as cryptographic constructs work on discrete
data, it is better to design a system using the best quantisation parameters, QUANTbest,
to obtain the best possible performance in the discrete domain.
This thesis is also the first to define a threshold which takes into account the cardi-
nality of the templates being compared. The set difference percentage threshold SDTh%
and the match percentage threshold MTh% were defined as a consequence of that. These
relative thresholds were used to make authentication decisions in the secure authentica-
tion systems designed and implemented in this thesis.
Two cryptographic constructs, inspired from error tolerant cryptography, were stud-
ied: the Fuzzy Vault and the PinSketch construct, both functioning over the set difference
metric.
In Chapter 6 we looked at two approaches to build a Fuzzy Vault based authentication
system. The first method was using translation and rotation invariant, reference point
free, structures as elements of the template. The FNN, VOR and TRI representations
possessed these properties. They were tested for their suitability to build Fuzzy Vault
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based authentication system. Our experiments on DB1 indicated the VOR representa-
tion gave the best performance when the system was operated at equal error threshold.
However, that would mean allowing a non zero FMR that would undermine the system’s
security. On analysis of all the structure representations (other than TRI) on DB4, we
found that on quantisation, the commonality between any two templates which were sam-
ples from the same person, had less than half of their elements in common. This meant
that the set difference to be corrected would always be very high. From a GRS decoding
viewpoint we showed that it was infeasible to develop a Fuzzy Vault at 0% FMR, using
the minutiae-based constructs, due to the limited overlap in the corresponding quantised
templates from samples of the same person. We also determined that for a GRS code
based Fuzzy Vault to be practical, genuine samples being compared must have a natural
variation such that the proportion of the elements that are in common between them with
respect to the union size, is at least 33.3%.
The second approach studied was pre-alignment by leaking minimal information. The
FNN, VOR and TRI representations were again selected for study as these were reference
point free structures. The results indicated that the TRI structures had potential to be
developed as a secure pre-alignment strategy that could then improve the commonality
of structures between quantised templates from the same fingerprint. Hence the secure
pre-alignment using the TRI structures could precede any cryptographic construction like
Fuzzy Vault or PinSketch.
Three implementations for a PinSketch based authentication system were studied. The
first, Algorithm1, used the PinSketch construct to protect the process of compensating
for non linear distortion during comparison of templates. Algorirhm2 used the PinSketch
construct to perform secure comparison of two templates represented as a set of Points.
Both algorithms were found to be vulnerable to analysis by an attacker as the number of
syndrome components of the vector that were published, determined by the error correc-
tion bound t, completely exposed the original characteristic vector of the set. Thus the
large set difference naturally occurring between quantised templates made it impractical
and insecure to compare them using PinSketch.
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A more natural and appropriate threshold between templates appeared to be a match
based threshold. As the number of matches is not a metric, no standard cryptographic
constructs exist that work over it. Algorithm3 was an attempt to use the PinSketch
construct on structures which were sets that satisfied Equation 8.2 and then making an
authentication decision based on a match threshold instead of a set difference threshold.
Thus we succeeded in performing secure comparison without revealing the entire enrolled
template, as was the case with Algorithm1 and Algorithm2.
The Modified Fuzzy Vault is the first step to an error tolerant cryptographic construct
that works over a commonality measure, not a metric space. However, we need constructs
that can work faster and are more secure. Our research summarises the main character-
istics that a cryptographic construct must have so that point sets (like minutiae) with
large natural variation between genuine samples can be securely compared:
1. If the characteristic vectors, W1 and W2, of two sets are being compared, the au-
thentication decision must be based on the Hamming weight ofW = W1⊗W2 where
⊗ is the bitwise AND operation.
2. The construct must work over this commonality measure to securely compare W1
and W2.
When biometrics are used for secure authentication, it is very important to create a
template that has high entropy and low intra sample variation. If not, constructs like
PinSketch will expose the enrolled template when large set differences must be handled.
A similar principle can be applied to the Fuzzy Vault or other constructs used for secure
biometric authentication. With fingerprints our representation strategy resulted in tem-
plates that had an average intra sample commonality less than half of the sizes of each
set. Apart from insertion and deletion errors, the quantisation error which is under our
control to some extent, is the main contributor to the large set difference.
One obvious fix to increase the template entropy is to use a non uniform quantisation and
utilize finer radial and angular quantisation for regions close to the core. This will give a
more uniform spread to the probabilities of occurrence for quanta in the reference frame.
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It is an open question how best to do this while minimising intra sample variation and
we are currently investigating this problem. The results of such research can be extended
to any non rigid point pattern matching problem.
A fingerprint image of a person, by itself may have a high entropy. However, the tem-
plate creation process will cause some drop in entropy when quantisation is performed.
If minutiae based representations are used for authentication systems we must develop
templates whose components have a distribution close to uniform and possess very low
intra sample variation.
To end our analysis, we answer the questions first posed in the start of the thesis.
1. How does quantisation affect the matching accuracy for minutiae-based
templates? Quantisation causes a drop in the match performance by about 20%
when compared to un-encrypted matching. A significant contributor to the deteri-
oration in performance is the quantisation error introduced as a result of non linear
distortion in minutiae positions.
2. Using public databases as samples of the population, what percentage of
minutiae are in common between intra user templates? We found that less
than 33% were in common between templates after quantisation, using matchers at
the operating thresholds where the FMR was 0%.
3. Are there minutia representation schemes that have a great degree of dis-
tinctiveness so as to achieve a good error performance? Yes there are. The
VOR4D and VOR5D representations showed the best performance on quantisation.
However this is at a very large set difference threshold. It will be advantageous to use
such constructs in systems that reward commonality instead of penalize differences.
4. Is it possible to construct secure authentication systems by storing min-
imal information for pre-alignment? Yes. The TRI representation has demon-
strated great promise in this regard.
5. Is it feasible to use minutiae-based translation and rotation invariant
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structures to build practical secure fingerprint based authentication sys-
tems? Yes it is. Algorithm3 is a demonstration of the feasibility of using current set
difference based cryptographic constructs by using them on components that have a
smaller natural variation that fit within the operating bounds of the construct. An
alternative is to use some form of secure pre-alignment to improve the commonality
between quantised templates.
6. What bio-cryptographic constructs are more suitable for minutiae-based
representations? Match based error tolerant cryptographic constructs that have
the properties determined above. We are unaware of the existence of any such formal
constructs.
7. What is the minutia feature distribution across the whole sample? Are
there minutiae features that occur more often than others across the
population? Minutiae tend to be more densely populated around the core than far
from the core. A uniform bounding box based analysis showed a greater probability
of a minutia being found in a quantum bordering the core location than elsewhere
in the fingerprint image.
9.1 Future Work
We will conclude with a brief description of the future directions that this research can
take.
1. Determine the features of a good commonality based construct for secure matching
of point sets having large natural variation.
2. Investigate the possibility of using Information Reconciliation (Refer Section 3.1) to
create revocable templates using a Fractional Biometrics System [11].
3. Conduct a detailed attack on each representation in the PinSketch implementations
of Algorithm2 and Algorithm3 to quantify the vulnerability of each representation
to a masquerade attack.
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4. Study the vulnerability of the templates in Algorithm2 and Algorihm3 when multiple
templates from the same fingerprint are enrolled with different organisations.
5. Build a secure authentication system where secure pre-alignment using the TRI
representation is followed by the implementation of a fractional biometric system
for re-usable and revocable fingerprint templates [12]
6. Study the reduction in entropy in minutiae-based templates caused by quantisation.
Results from the comparison of non quantised matching with quantised matching
give us a first estimate of around 20%. However a more detailed study would give
us an insight to the actual information retained in a quantised template. This will
hopefully lead to methods of quantisation that keep the distribution of the quanta
close to uniform.
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